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Abstract
We criticise the current philosophical practice of invoking causation as a
solution to various problems in various fields of philosophy. Our specific
concern is that many of these solutions to problems rely on the intuition that
causation is "the cement of the universe". We question whether several
different analyses of causation which are supposed to substantiate this intuition
(or at least are treated as if they substantiate this intuition) in fact substantiate
this intuition.
We begin by establishing a basic desideratum for such an analysis of
causation - that causal dependence ought to track physical dependence in this
universe. We investigate in turn a Lewis-style counterfactual analysis of
causation, the transference analysis developed by Aronson, Fair and Heathcote,
and the process analyses developed by Salmon and Dowe. Rather to our
surprise, none of the analyses fulfil our basic desideratum. Although this is not
in itself conclusive grounds for scepticism about causation, our results speak
against casually invoking analyses of causation in order to solve particular
varieties of philosophical problems.
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Introduction
There are two ways of dealing with a difficulty - the metaphysical and the scientific
way. The first is very simple and expeditious - it consists merely in giving the
unknown a name whereby it may be classified and categorised. Thenceforward the
unknown is regarded as having become part of knowledge. The scientific man goes
further, and endeavours to find what lies concealed under the name. If it were
possible for a metaphysician to be a golfer, he might perhaps occasionally notice that
his ball, instead of moving forward in a vertical plane (like the generality of
projectiles, such as brickbats and cricket balls), skewed away gradually to the right. If
he did notice it, his methods would naturally lead him to content himself with his
caddie's remark - "ye heeled that yin", or "Ye jist slicet it" (we here suppose the
metaphysician to be right-handed ... ). But a scientific man is not to be put off with
such flimsy verbiage as this. He must know more. What is "heeling", what is "slicing,"
and why could either operation (if it could be thoroughly carried out) send a ball as if
to cover-point, thence to long slip, and finally behind back-stop? These, as Falstaff
said, are "questions to be asked."l
Such questions are also to be asked about causation. The notion of causation
plays a central role in many areas of contemporary analytic philosophy. In the
philosophy of language we find the causal theory of language. In metaphysics
we find causal theories of personal identity. In the philosophy of science we
find causal solutions to the problem of induction, causal decision theories, and
causal theories of scientific explanation. There is something distinctly
unsatisfactory about leaving causation as an unanalysed primitive if it is doing
such important work for us.
Indeed, such a policy might even be extremely dangerous. What do we mean
by "causation" when we use the term as an unanalysed primitive? Presumably,
we use our common-sense understanding of the term as it is used in the course
everyday talk - although there is a certain tension in claiming that a term is
unanalysed when we apparently have some understanding of what it means.
But as noted by Hilary Putnam, "causal talk arises from a variety of 'vulgar'
1 Tait, P G: "The unwritten chapter on golf", pp80-1, Gratzer, Walter, editor: A bedside
Nature (London: Macmillan Magazines Ltd, 1996)
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ways of speaking and has a variety of uses".2 So if causation is to be treated as
an unanalysed primitive, then philosophical positions such as the claim that
words "hook on to the world" by virtue of causal chains linking utterances to
their references may well be massively ambiguous and relentlessly ad hoc.
Such worries, or at least the spirit of such worries, underlie the perennial
claim that talk of causation belongs in the philosophical wilderness, a view
famously proposed by Bertrand Russell, and in more recent times by Willard
Van Orman Quine. Talk of causation is a vestige of our pretheoretic
understanding of the world, made redundant or about to be made redundant
by our more advanced scientific understanding of the world, and the sooner we
stop jabbering on about causes, the better off philosophy will be.
We have some initial sympathy for this position, which we call the Russell-
Quine thesis. Yet it seems a little hasty. Even if our vulgar, pretheoretic and
unanalysed primitive notion of cause needs to be abandoned, there are a lot of
philosophical analyses of causation about. Perhaps one of these analyses would
serve to provide a respectable foundation for various philosophical theories in
the philosophy of science, philosophy of language and metaphysics. Our broad
concern is whether or not several contemporary analyses of causation are up to
the job.
This concern is probably too broad for practical purposes. The extensive
variety of uses of causation in vulgar talk is reflected in the extensive variety of
philosophical analyses of causation - the various different analyses seeking to
capture and consolidate different sets of important pretheoretic intuitions. This
diversity is also driven by the wide variety of philosophical problems for which
causation is proposed as a therapy. The perceived importance of particular
causal intuitions is largely a function of what needs to be established in a
particular philosophical context. As often as not, we find perceived theoretical
desiderata driving the development of the supporting analysis of causation,
rather than due consideration of a particular analysis of causation dictating
which theoretical positions should be taken. So no particular analysis of
causation is likely to be the panacea for all philosophical ills.
2 Putnam, Hilary: "ls water necessarily H20?", pp54-79, Putnam, Hilary: Realism with a
human face (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990)
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So be it: but if this is the game, we insist that the players follow the rules. We
shall pick a particular desideratum that an analysis of causation ought to fulfil
in order to support some philosophical contentions. We shall examine several
analyses of causation to see if they fulfil this desideratum. If they do not do so
(and we shall argue that this is the case), then they should not be invoked in
contexts where this desideratum needs to be fulfilled.
Our desideratum seems innocent enough at first glance. We are looking for
an analysis of causation that gives a satisfactory account of physical
dependence between things in the world - the vulgar intuition that we are
trying to analyse is that causation is "the cement of the universe". Such a
desideratum requires a few presuppositions: first, that there is a physical world
with physical things in it, and second that the states of these physical things
physically depend on the states of other physical things. We won't defend the
first presupposition, but some explanation of what is meant by "physical
dependence" is in order.
We have both a pretheoretic, common sense understanding and a more
advanced theoretical understanding of the notion of physical dependence. The
coffee cups on my desk do not fall through the desk and shatter on the floor.
Why? At a fairly pretheoretic level of discourse we might say the desk is a
strong solid object and the coffee cups are not particularly heavy, so the desk
holds the cups up. At a more advanced theoretic level, we note that the cups
and the desk are mostly composed of fermions (subatomic particles such as
protons, neutrons and electrons) bonded together by various fundamental
interactions. The cup cannot fall through the desk, because the Pauli exclusion
principle dictates that no two fermions with the same spin state can occupy the
same spatiotemporal position. Hence the predominant interaction between the
cups and the desk is the repulsive component of the electromagnetic
interaction, which provides a normal force balancing the force of the
gravitational interaction between the cups and the Earth. So the table holds the
cups up, and the cups do not float up into the air as a consequence of the
interaction with the table. In either case, we are asserting that a particular set of
physical circumstances (the state of the cups) is thus, because other sets of
physical circumstances (the states of the desk and the Earth) are so. We will
insist that an analysis of causation is consistent with our best possible
theoretical understanding of physical dependence.
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We do not require that all physical dependence reduces to causal
dependence in a particular set of circumstances, or vice versa. It is not clear that
all physical dependence need resolve to causal dependence. (We suspect that
many forms of physical dependence are more comfortably subsumed to - or
comprise - nomic dependence, but discussing the point is beyond the scope of
this thesis.) But we will require that when there is no relevant physical
distinction between sets of physical circumstances, and there is physical
dependence in both cases, then the analysis of causation should either hold that
there is causal dependence in both cases or there is no causal dependence in
both cases. Our shorthand expression for this relation is that causal dependence
should track physical dependence.
We do not require that causal dependence tracks non-physical dependence
between entities (such as logical entailment) nor do we require that the analysis
tracks dependence between non-physical entities (whatever they might happen
to be). Nor do we require that the analysis of causation gives a satisfactory
account of causation in every possible world. This one will do nicely. Moreover,
we will not treat of issues of causal transitivity, nor causation by omission.
Although few analyses of causation have been produced with the deliberate
intention of fulfilling our basic desideratum, such a desideratum ought to be
fulfilled by analyses of causation underlying, for example, a causal theory of
scientific explanation. At least one of the roles of scientific explanation is to
explain physical dependence in this in this world. If all good explanations are
supposed to be causal explanations, then it better be the case that causal
dependence tracks physical dependence. Otherwise, the theory would not be a
theory of scientific explanation. Indeed, most of the analyses of causation we
shall discuss have been developed to support a theory of scientific explanation,
or are at least invoked in the service of theories of explanation. Similarly, the
causal chains linking utterances of terms and their referents required by a
causal theory of reference also appear to be - or at least track - relations of
physical dependence between physical things (physical objects in the world,
brain states, utterance tokens and so forth).
We shall investigate three analyses of causation in detail: a basic version of
David Lewis's counterfactual analysis, the transference analysis developed by
Jerrold Aronson, David Fair and Adrian Heathcote, and three process analyses
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of causation developed by Wesley Salmon and Phil Dowe. Our conclusion is
depressingly negative: none of these analyses fulfil our basic desideratum.
Although this result does not constitute a proof of the Russell-Quine thesis, it
must undermine the casual practise of invoking causation as a solution to a
philosophical problems when what is required in order to solve those problems
is an account of physical dependence.
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Counterfactuals
Why investigate the counterfactual
analysis?
The prevailing orthodoxy among analyses of causation is probably still the
counterfactual analysis initially presented by David Lewis in the 1973 paper
"Causation".3 Part of the attraction of the analysis is the deceptive ease with
which a basic formulation of the analysis can be expressed. Consider, for
example, the commonly-cited formulation by Jaegwon Kim:
(1) An event e causally depends on an event c just in case if c had not occurred e
would not have occurred
(2) An event c is a cause of an event e just in case there is a chain of events from c to
e, each event in this chain being causally dependent on its predecessor4
Actually, this is too simple an expression. The case that "just in case" refers to is
the closest possible world in which c does not occur. The closeness of possible
worlds is cashed out by a relation of comparative similarity across possible
worlds - the more similar two possible worlds are, the closer they are. Events
are to be taken as properties of spatiotemporal regions of possible worlds. Even
so, possible worlds, similarity, properties, and spatiotemporal regions are all
comfortable furniture of philosophical discourse, so the more complicated
expression of the basic analysis is still readily understandable.
So do Lewis-style counterfactual analyses fulfil our basic desideratum?
Arguably, there is no point in even asking the question.5 Lewis's basic
desideratum is to produce an analysis which is consistent with both our
advanced theoretical understanding of the way the world is and our common
3
4
5
Originally published as Lewis, David: "Causation", pp556-67, Journal of philosophy vol 70
(1973), reprinted with extensive postscripts in pp159-213, Lewis, David: Philosophical papers
volume II (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986). All page references are to the latter
source.
Kim, Jaegwon: "Causes and counterfactuals", pp205-7, Sosa, Ernest; Tooley, Michael;
editors: Causation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993)
Edwin Mares (incessant personal communications)
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sense understanding of the notions of causation and events. Yet common sense,
useful though it may be, is ever likely to be in conflict with our advanced
theoretical understanding. If the counterfactual analysis truly respects common
sense, then it could hardly be expected to fulfil our desideratum.
It is not even clear that the counterfactual analysis gives an account of causal
dependence between physical things in the sense that causation is the cement of
the universe. Although Lewis appears to be asserting that causal dependence is
a relation between events (which we will allow to be some species of physical
thing for the purposes of the present discussion), not all proponents of Lewis-
style counterfactual analyses require this. For example, Philip Kitcher has
championed the use of a Lewis-style counterfactual analysis of causation in the
context of a theory of scientific explanation, but Kitcher suggests that the
assignment of causal dependence is driven by explanatory dependence.6
Counterfactual dependence is properly a relation between explanations of
events (or at least statements about events) rather than events themselves.
Similarly, Lewis might deny that there is any such thing as "physical
dependence". The Lewis-style counterfactual analysis is intended to be
consistent with "Humean supervenience":
It is the doctrine that all there is to the world is a vast mosaic of local matters of
particular fact, just one little thing and then another ... We have geometry: a system of
external relations of spatiotemporal distance between points. Maybe points of
spacetime itself, maybe point-sized bits of matter of aether or fields, maybe both. And
at those points we have local qualities: perfectly natural intrinsic properties which
need nothing bigger than a point at which to be instantiated. For short: we have an
arrangement of qualities. And that is all. There is no difference without difference in
the arrangement of qualities. All else supervenes on that.7
Under Humean supervenience it simply is not the case that the cups are thus
because the desk and the Earth are so. The cup being on the table is just the cup
being thus and the desk being thus. Why should causal dependence track
physical dependence if there ain't no such thing?
6
7
See Kitcher, Philip: "Explanatory unification and the causal structure of the world',
pp410-505, Kitcher, Philip; Salmon, Wesley; editors: Minnesota studies in the philosophy of
science vol 13: Scientific explanation (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989)
Philosophical papers volume II, ppix-x
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Well, fair enough. We have no quarrel with a Lewis-style counterfactual
analysis in which causation is explicitly not intended to be fully consistent with
our physical understanding of the world, or in which causal dependence is a
relation between explanations, or in which causation is nothing to do with
physical dependence because there is no such thing as physical dependence.
(Although we really aren't sure what such an analysis could be usefulfor.)
What we are concerned about is the common tendency to use Lewis-style
analyses as if they are totally consistent with our best theoretical understanding
of the world, as if causal dependence is the cement of the universe, and as if the
analyses give an account of physical dependence. The use of a Lewis-style
analysis in this way would only be warranted if counterfactual dependence
tracked physical dependence. So there is some point to investigating whether
such a counterfactual analysis fulfils our basic desideratum.
We will carry out this investigation by examining very simple examples of
physical dependence - impacts. Any analysis of causation which fulfils our
basic desideratum ought to be able to deal with collisions. We shall
demonstrate that some of the classical failures of the basic Lewis-style
counterfactual analysis to assign causal relations in these cases arise because
counterfactual dependence does not track physical dependence. Furthermore,
attempting to improve the Lewis-style analysis by trying to make causal
relations more sensitive to physical dependence produces an analysis which is
less successful in assigning causal relations in cases of impacts.
Overdetermination problems
We shall investigate instances of physical dependence associated with putative
instances of causation in which cause and effect are directly rather than
transitively linked - cases for which the first of Kim's characterisations of the
Lewis-style analysis should hold:
(1) An event e causally depends on an event c just in case if c had not occurred e
would not have occurred
Such basic Lewis-style analyses are subject to problems of overdetermination.
Consider the case of an ordinary glass window struck by a rock plenty large
enough to break the window (we will call a rock this size a standard rock). The
window breaks. The counterfactual analysis justifies our claim that the rock
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caused the window to break - ceteris paribus if the rock had not struck the
window the window would not have broken.
But consider the situation where a shower of standard rocks strikes the
window. No particular rock would then seem to have caused the window to
break, because if that rock had not struck the window ceteris paribus the
window would still have been broken by another rock - the effect would still
have occurred. No subset of the rocks smaller than the entire shower of rocks
would have caused the window to break, because if those rocks had not struck
the window, any of the remaining rocks would still have broken the window-
the effect would still have occurred. We can't even say that the entire shower of
rocks caused the window to break, because in the counterfactual instance where
ceteris paribus one less than the entire shower of rocks strike the window, the
window is still broken. So rocks have hurtled through the window, there is
glass allover the show, but we cannot say that a rock causes the window to
break.
The failure of the analysis is ontological rather than epistemological. An
epistemological failure would be that in the single rock case we can tell that a
rock caused the window to break and in the overdetermined case we can't tell
that a rock caused the window to break, even though the window breakage
clearly physically depends on the impact of rocks in both cases. Rather, in both
cases our commonsense knowledge claim is that "rocks caused the window
break" but in the overdetermined case the counterfactual analysis cannot
supply a truthmaking state of affairs (an appropriate counterfactual
circumstance) for the knowledge claim.
If you feel there has been some illegitimate slide between "a rock" causing
the window to break and "rocks" causing the window to break, the example
can be adjusted to recreate the problem without such ambiguities. Consider a
case where two small rocks strike a window. Neither rock can break the
window individually -jointly they can break the window. Hence under the
counterfactual analysis we can justifiably claim that "rocks cause the window to
break". But when two standard rocks strike the window we have a case of
overdetermination; we no longer have counterfactual support for the claim that
"rocks cause the window to break".
11
We can also express the problem unambiguously in terms of "a rock". In the
case where a standard rock strikes the window we can justifiably claim that IIa
rock caused the window to break". Yet in the case of a shower of rocks hitting
the window in a slightly staggered formation - each rock strikes the window
or passes through where the window would have been a fractionally different
times - we still wish to claim that IIa rock broke the window" yet we no longer
have counterfactual support for the knowledge claim. This latter case of
overdetermination is usually referred to as an instance of preemption - to be
precise, a case of late preemption.8
Prima facie, in these cases the Lewis-style counterfactual analysis fails to
assign relations of causal dependence in cases of physical dependence which
seem extremely similar to cases of physical dependence in which relations of
causal dependence are assigned. So do these various overdetermination
problems conclusively demonstrate that causal dependence does not track
physical dependence in a Lewis-style counterfactual analysis?
Well, perhaps not quite yet. To begin with, a philosophical"heavy" industry
has grown up around devising these problems and defending and amending
the counterfactual analysis in response to these problems.9 (An unfortunate
consequence of this feverish activity is that virtually every different
overdetermination problem has a different proposed solution, which converts
an attractively simple analysis into a ferociously complex and suspiciously ad
hoc theoretical apparatus.) Some of these amendments would involve explicitly
or implicitly denying that causal dependence tracks causal dependence. We
have no problem with this, so long as the resulting counterfactual analysis was
not used as if it was a satisfactory account of physical dependence.
Producing an amendment or defence of a Lewis-style analysis which is
intended to give a satisfactory account of physical dependence seems much
8
9
A shower of rocks breaking a window is a case of late preemption, since the effect of the
window being broken by later rocks in the shower is blocked by the final effect of the
window being broken already taking place. Early preemption would involve an effect being
blocked before the actual effect came about. For example, a standard rock is about to break
a window, but it is knocked away by another standard rock which then goes on to break
the window itself. See pp27-8, Ehring, Douglas: Causation and persistence: a theory of
causation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997) for a good description of Lewis's
taxonomy of preemption.
A comprehensive bibliography of the literature on this topic would probably be longer than
this thesis.
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more problematic. Prima facie the overdetermination problems do show there is
a tracking problem.
Presumably, the justification for such a defence programme would be that
the basic Lewis-style analysis does track physical dependence, but it is only
sensitive to a particular class of relevant physical considerations. The pairs of
cases which appear to involve failure of tracking due to overdetermination
problems involve differences in relevant physical circumstances between the
cases. One standard rock; two standard rocks at once. Two small rocks; two
standard rocks. One standard rock; several standard rocks one after another.
These problems arise because one of the cases in each pair involve extra
physical considerations which are not attended to by the basic analysis. The
various proposed amendments to the basic Lewis-style analysis make the
analysis sensitive to these extra physical considerations on a class-of-case by
class-of-case basis.
But we shall present two problem cases which show that this programme is
just wrongheaded. The case of the overdetermining dumbbell shows that the
analysis can supply a truthmaker for causal claims about one physical system
but not for another even though there are no relevant physical differences
between the systems. The counterfactual analysis is sensitive to varying
"common sense" assignments of object status within events, not to relevant
differences of physical dependence in the systems. We can try and avoid this
problem by keying assignment of object status to relevant physical differences,
but then the problem of single-object overdetermination arises. We find the
amended Lewis-style analysis suddenly fails to provide truthmakers to many
more apparently straightforward causal claims than the basic analysis. In other
words, trying to make the Lewis-style analysis more sensitive to physical
dependence produces an analysis of causation which is even less effective at
fulfilling our basic desideratum than the basic analysis. We conclude that some
other analysis of causation is required.
The overdetermining dumbbell
Overdetermination problems can arise in Lewis-style analyses purely as a result
of our common-sense individuation of objects within events. A
gendankenexperiment can bring these object-oriented problems into sharp relief.
13
Consider a standard dumbbell. A standard dumbbell is a physical object made
up of two standard rocks connected by a bar. The bar is solid but its mass is
negligible by comparison to the two rocks. Consider a case where the dumbbell
is hurled at a standard window. The trajectory of the dumbbell is perpendicular
to the surface of the window. Both rocks strike the window simultaneously and
the bar is perfectly parallel to the surface of the window at the moment of
impact. A standard window has a nice homogenous structure, so any forces
perpendicular to the path of the dumbbell generated by the impact with the
window are balanced: thus the dumbbell is not deflected to the side at all by the
impact with the window and the tension on the bar neither increases nor
decreases as a result of the impact. (This can be approximated physically by
making the standard window relatively weak or the standard rocks very large
or heavy, so any perpendicular perturbing forces are negligible.) Under these
circumstances, a basic Lewis-style analysis can justify the causal claim that "the
dumbbell caused the window to break".
/
1/
I
A standard dumbell strikes a standard window.
According to the counterfactual analysis, the dumbbell
causes the window to break.
Figure 1 - an unproblematic example of causation for a Lewis-style analysis
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Now consider the case where two standard rocks precisely equivalent to the
weights on the dumbbell strike the window simultaneously. Under the basic
Lewis-style analysis this is a case of overdetermination, and we can't say that
any rock or collection of rocks caused the window to break.
I
.. ..
/
;A
,
.. ..
I
Two standard rocks strike a standard window,
producing an instance of overdetermination. Neither
rock can be said to break the window under the
counterfactual analysis.
Figure 2 - an instance of overdetermination
Now consider the case of the overdetermining dumbbell. An overdetermining
dumbbell has the same overall sllape, mass and size as a standard dumbbell,
but the bar contains a quick-release mechanism - it breaks in half in the
middle and each half retracts into a rock. An ingenious recoil-damping system
inside each rock ensures that the rocks do not move together or apart when the
quick-release is triggered (or at least renders the effect negligible). We will
assume energy loss in the system due to friction is also negligible.
Hurl the overdetermining dumbbell at the window, and let it strike the
window with the bar still in place. As in the case of the standard dumbbell, the
window is broken, and we can assign a cause to the effect of the window being
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broken. Now hurl the dumbbell at the window, but disengage the bar before
the window is struck. The window is broken. Can we assign a cause to the
breakage? The answer seems to be no - two standard rocks are striking the
window, which is an instance of overdetermination.
16
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Connected dumbell strikes the window: an instance of
causation. I,
~
/
...
,
...
1
Disconnected dumbell strikes the window: an instance
of overdetermination.
Figure 3 - the paradox of the overdetermining dumbbell
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This is very odd indeed. The disconnected parts of the overdetermining
dumbbell have the same mass as the connected dumbbell. They travel in the
same trajectory as the connected dumbbell both before and after striking the
window. The window is broken in precisely the same way. Yet we can no
longer assign a cause to the effect of the window being broken. There is no
relevant physical difference between the two systems. The only distinction
between the connected and disconnected cases appears to be that in the
connected case we normally say we are dealing with one object, and in the
disconnected case, we normally say two objects are involved. Hence the
overdetermination problems arise from our common sense assignment of object
status.
Note that we can turn this gedankenexperiment into a story about preemption
simply by considering a case where the overdetermining dumbbell strikes the
window "end-on". The connected dumbbell is then a case of causation and the
disconnected dumbbell is a case of late preemption.
Let's look at a possible objection to my conclusion about the overdetermining
dumbbell gedankenexperiment. We assumed the influence of the mass of the
connecting bar, the composition of the window, and recoil and friction in the
quick-release were all effectively zero. Hence the things we want to say are
causes in the two cases are effectively physically identical, and the two effects
are effectively physically identical. So the counterfactual analysis tells
conflicting causal stories about effectively identical physical systems. But
perhaps this talk of "negligible influences" and"effective identity" is all
epistemological sleight of hand. Even if we can't perceive or detect the changes
in the effects and (putative) causes, there will be some slight physical
differences between them. So maybe there is still room to defend the line that
some relevant physical differences are driving the failure to assign causal
dependence in the disconnected case.
But surely if we have to apply such harsh strictures to the qualitative identity
of events in the gedankenexperiment, we have to apply these harsh strictures to
other instances of causation. But this would conflict with part of Lewis's basic
desideratum for development of the counterfactual analysis - that the analysis
should be consistent with our common-sense understanding of the notions of
causation and events. To be precise, such harsh strictures would make events
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too "fragile" to be consistent with our common-sense understanding of the
identity of events.
An event for the Lewis-style analysis is a property of a spatiotemporal
region: effectively, a feature of a place at a time. But an event need not
necessarily, or essentially, be any particular feature at any particular place at
any particular event. For example, consider the event of David taking a walk in
the park one fine morning. If this event was essentially associated with David
walking in that park at that time, then any slight difference in the circumstances
of David's walking (for example, that it took place at a different speed) would
render that other walking a completely different event. In Lewis's parlance,
such an account would render events very fragile (it doesn't take much to
change them into different events). But in common parlance events are
nowhere near as fragile as this. If the weather had not been propitious that very
same walk might have been taken in the afternoon. Or David could have taken
that walk in the quad. Or if there had been a sudden cloudburst, half of that
walking would have been a sprinting. Indeed, if David had gotten a job at a
different university, that very same walk could have been taken by Ed instead.
If we intend to avoid the problem of the overdetermining dumbbell by
making the analysis fantastically sensitive to physical differences between sets
of circumstances, then how can we also consistently give an account of event
identity which allows the degree of robustness displayed by events in everyday
causal talk? Even if we think it is possible that the standards for fragility of
events may differ between causal talk and causation itself, the fragility defence
to the overdetermining dumbbell smacks of a double standard. As Lewis puts
it:
Extreme fragility of effects might get rid of all but some far-fetched cases of redundant
causation, but it leads to trouble that we don't know how to control. Moderate
fragility gets rid of some cases and casts doubt on others, but plenty are left. Our topic
has not disappeared.IO
Extreme fragility is certainly required to avoid the overdetermining dumbbell
problem. The moral is that you can't think the overdetermining dumbbell case
arises from physical differences between the connected and disconnected cases
10 UCausation", p199. See pp197-9 for rather a good discussion by Lewis why he thinks
fragility is a bad defence to overdetermination problems.
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and enjoy the other apparent advantages of a Lewis-style analysis at the same
time.
So there is no relevant physical difference between the disconnected and
connected cases of the overdetermining dumbbell which leads the
counterfactual analysis to make a causal determination in the connected case
and fail in the disconnected case. The counterfactual analysis tells conflicting
causal stories about effectively identical physical systems due to its reliance on
common-sense individuation of objects within events. The case of the
overdetermining dumbbell provides good grounds for supposing that causal
dependence does not track physical dependence in a Lewis-style counterfactual
analysis.
Bonking Frank
The might be another way out of the strange case of the overdetermining
dumbbell for a Lewis-style counterfactual analysis - give up common sense
individuation of objects within events, and key individuation of objects within
events to physical involvement. Since there are no relevant physical differences
between the disconnected dumbbell and the connected dumbbell we should
treat the disconnected dumbbell as if it were a single object, just like the
connected dumbbell. If the disconnected dumbbell is a single object there is no
overdetermination, and we have a truthmaker for the claim "the disconnected
dumbbell caused the window to break".
This flight from common sense is not immediately implausible. We
commonsensically think that the planets of the solar system are individual
objects, and the solar system is thus a collection of distinct objects. Yet when
considering the gravitational influence of the solar system on nearby stars, we
might treat the solar system as a single object. At any rate, experience has often
shown us that common sense can just be wrong.
The new story about objects certainly fits with the programme of trying to fit
causal dependence to physical dependence. But this "sophisticated"
interpretation of objects might lead to different problems for a Lewis-style
counterfactual analysis. Think of cases of physical dependence involving a
single common-sense object, like a standard rock hurtling through a standard
window. The "naive" Lewis-style analysis (naive in the sense of appealing to
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common-sense objects) unproblematically supplies truthmakers to the causal
claims involved. But if the analysis is keyed to other"objects" than the common
sense variety, might it not turn out that many of these situations are actually
instances of overdetermination?
In fact, this is precisely the case. Many cases of "single-object
overdetermination" do arise. But note that these cases don't arise as cheaply as
we might expect.
For example, a tempting but incorrect line of argument for single-object
overdetermination in the case of the single standard rock striking a window is
that the assignment of single-object status to the rock is purely arbitrary. A rock
is made of trillions of independent objects: atoms and molecules. (It should not
be too controversial in these times to claim that atoms are viewed as real objects
by the woman in the street.) It seems plausible to suggest that only a subset of
those independent atoms and molecules are sufficient to break the window.
Let's suppose that subset amounts to less than half of the mass of the aggregate.
So surely the independent action of trillions of separate objects striking the
window amounts to a case of overdetermination. But then the counterfactual
analysis is telling conflicting causal stories about identical physical systems
again - when viewed as one object the rock causes the window to break, when
viewed as an aggregate of independent objects striking the window we have a
case of overdetermination.
This line of argument fails because "an aggregate of independent atomic and
molecular objects striking a window" and "a rock striking a window" are not
equivalent descriptions of the same physical system. The atoms and molecules
in a rock are chemically bonded into larger structures - generally crystals -
which are also physically tangled within together in such a way that (quantum
effects aside) the smaller objects stand in fixed positions within the rock. These
bonding and entanglement details dictate the physical properties of the rock -
its density, its elasticity and so forth. These properties dictate the nature of the
collision with a standard window and the way the window breaks. For
example, a globe of liquid with the same size and mass as a standard rock
would probably break a window in quite a significantly different way (splash,
tinkle) to a standard rock (crash, tinkle), and a globe of gas of the size and mass
of a standard rock (whoosh, tinkle). For the sake of charity, we'll accept that the
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counterfactual analysis can distinguish between these cases. So "a rock striking
the window" is only identical to the description"an aggregate of interdependent
objects striking a window", and it is not clear at all that this latter description
picks out a case of overdetermination. So this line of criticism of the
counterfactual analysis fails.
But the counterfactual analysis would be in trouble in cases of physical
dependence involving single objects if it could be shown that some parts of an
object were physically irrelevant to an interaction, even though all the parts of
the object were interdependent in some way. Let's set up one such case.
In the George Alec Effinger novel11 The nick of time. Effinger finds it necessary
to crush his hero Frank by crashing the Moon into the Earth. The Moon has
been thoroughly wrapped in duct tape so it will not break up when it passes
through the Earth's Roche limit12 and forms a single contiguous object when it
strikes Frank (and the Earth very shortly after). We will assume there is no
atmospheric involvement in this process.13 Does the Moon striking Frank and
the Earth cause Frank to be crushed?
The instant off-the-cuff response to that question is: "Of course it does! It is as
certain as certain could be that the Moon striking the Earth crushes Frank. What
else do you think could have done it?" The naive counterfactual analysis falls
into step with the off-the-cuff response - but for the Moon striking the Earth,
Frank would not have been crushed. Unfortunately, common sense puts us
wrong, because most of the Moon is physically irrelevant to Frank's being
crushed, producing an instance of single-object overdetermination.
11 Effinger, George Alec: The nick of time (Sevenoaks: New English Library, 1987)
12 The Roche limit is the orbital distance at which a satellite with no tensile strength (a
"liquid" satellite) will begin to be tidally tom apart by the body it is orbiting. A real satellite
can pass well within its Roche limit before being tom apart, particularly if it is wrapped in
duct tape. See Wesstein, Eric: "Roche limit"
(http://www.astro.virginia.edu/ -eww6n/physics /RocheLimit.html 1996-8)
13 Partly this is to ensure that the moon strikes Frank in one piece - regardless of size, most
objects entering the Earth's atmosphere are expected to break up unless they bum up first.
See pp205-9, Melosh, H J: Impact cratering: ageologic process (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1989). Partly this is out of charity to the counterfactual analysis. If we allow
atmospheric effects to be considered, the massive overpressure produced when the
atmosphere is squeezed between the Earth and the Moon would crush Frank well before
the moon actually touched him. Under a Lewis-style analysis this is a case of early
preemption, and Frank's crushing would not be caused. So we avoid the complication -
perhaps the Earth has lost its atmosphere and Frank is standing around in a spacesuit
waiting for the big event.
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In fact, even informed common sense puts us wrong. When the educated
layperson thinks about the collision of solid bodies at all, it tends to be in terms
of the classical theory of impact, or stereomechanics. Stereomechanics amounts
to a specification of initial and terminal velocities of colliding objects and the
linear or angular impulses applied during the collisions.14 The colliding bodies
behave as if they were single mass points - all internal elements of the bodies
are perfectly rigidly connected and are instantaneously subject to the same
change of motion.15 The momentum calculations exercises of high-school
physics are applications of simple stereomechanics. Under such an analysis of
physical dependence, when the Moon strikes Frank, the compressive force
applied to Frank as he is crushed thinner than a sheet of paper and beyond will
be a function of the entire mass of the Moon, and the entire mass of the Earth.
So the entire Moon and the entire Earth are treated as if they are physically
involved in the crushing of Frank, and common sense and the counterfactual
analysis are supported. But a more advanced examination of the physics of
impact tells a much different story about physical dependence and causal
dependence under a Lewis-style analysis.
Consider a more realistic "instant-by-instant" picture of the dynamics of
impact of the collision of two chunks of some solid substance. At the first
instant of impact only the barest outside surfaces of the two objects will interact
and be deformed. The "forces of collision" felt between the two objects at that
instant will be a function of the masses in the "contact zone," not of the masses
of the entire objects as in our simple stereomechanical model.16 So at that
instant, the portions of the objects outside the contact zone are physically
irrelevant to the collision, and to preserve our basic desideratum we would
want to say they are causally irrelevant to the collision process at that instant.
As we step through the collision process instant by instant, we observe the
contact zone expanding further and further through the objects at a finite
velocity. The boundary of the contact zone will be a stress disturbance within
the material of the spheres.
14 See pp4-21, Goldsmith, Werner: Impact: the theory and behaviour ofcolliding solids (London:
Edward Arnold, 1960)
15 Impact, p23
16 Impact, p22, see also p9, Zukas, Jonas; Nicholas, Theodore; Swift, Hallock; Greszczuk,
Longin; Curran, Donald: Impact dynamics (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1982)
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Precisely how quickly the stress wave will propagate will be a complex
matter. In a low velocity impact, where the stress is below the "yield point" of
the material composing the objects, the objects will deform elastically. After
deformation the objects will return to more or less their original shape - much
like squeezing a tennis ball. At least two types of elastic disturbances will
propagate through the objects.17 A longitudinal stress pulse - where the
motion of particles within the solid are parallel to the direction of propagation
of the stress disturbance - will travel through the solid at, roughly speaking,
the speed of sound in that particular solid. The longitudinal pulse will be
followed by slower transverse disturbances, where the particles' motion is
perpendicular to the propagation of the disturbance. (Residents of the Shaky
Isles will recognise these effects as the two distinct P wave and S wave jolts of
an earthquake.)
In higher energy impacts, where forces exceed the yield points of the solids,
the objects will also deform plastically. The objects do not return to their
original shapes - much like squeezing a ball of play dough. The disturbance
front has a twin-peaked structure: an elastic disturbance is followed by a slower
but much more intense plastic deformation. At still higher energies the double-
pulse structure is eliminated by the production of shock waves (much like the
sonic boom created by a supersonic jet). Shock pulses move supersonically
through the material, outstripping and absorbing the energy of the elastic
disturbance and forming an abrupt shock front - so abrupt that it is a good
approximation to represent it as a discontinuous jump of pressure, particle
velocity, density and internal energy.18
At high impact energies, solid materials will start to behave hydrodynamically
-like fluids. 19 The strength or rigidity of the solid will no longer significantly
determine the velocity of the disturbance front. The mere density of the solid
will become a dominant parameter. Transverse waves no longer propagate
through the material, and the elasto-plastic double pulse does not form. At still
17 IIAt least two" because other wave phenomena can propagate along the surface of the
objects (such as Rayleigh waves and Love waves). See Impact dynamics, p2, and also Impact
cratering, pp29-33
18 Impact cratering, pp33-7. See also ppl00-l, Rosenburg, Z: liThe dynamic response of
ceramics to shock wave loading", pp73-105, Brebbia, C A; Sanchez-Galvez, V; editors: Shock
and impact on structures (Southharnpton: Computational Mechanics Publications, 1994)
19 Impact dynamics, pp3-5
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higher levels of energy, material within the contact zone explosively
vaporises.2o
The physical (and causal) upshot of these various phenomena can be
illustrated by considering impacts when a small projectile deforms or
penetrates a large solid. In the low-energy elastic regime, the local effects
produced by the impact are strongly coupled to the overall deformation of the
target structure - so the entire target should be causally relevant to the result
of the impact. As the impact velocity rises, the response of the overall structure
becomes less important to the result of the impact. It is secondary to the
behaviour of a small local zone around the point of impact (typically around 2-
3 projectile diameters in extent), and the significant factors in the local zone will
include velocity of impact, geometry, material composition, strain rates and
local plastic flow. At higher velocities, the hydrodynamic properties of the local
zone dominate the plastic effects, and at still higher velocities things explode in
the zone.21 In these cases we want to say that dominant causal influence on the
effects of the impact is no longer the entire target but rather the impact zone,
and the nature of the relevant causal couplings can vary considerably.
So what causal morals should we take from this? First, in a comparatively
simple case of physical dependence - impact - it is clear that the common
sense objects involved in the interaction are not necessarily the relevant
structures we should be telling our causal stories about. For example, in a high-
velocity penetration of a target by a projectile the small impact zone of the
target, not the entire target, is going to be the most significant causal
determinant of the result of the impact.
In the case of the two objects colliding producing plastic deformations, the
physical forces felt at the contact surfaces at any instant will be predominantly
coupled to the material within the zone of plastic deformation, not to the
material within the wider contact zone defined by the elastic deformation. The
plastic zone should be the significant causal determinant of the result of the
impact on the contact surfaces (or indeed things between the surfaces at the
points of contact), not the entire object.
20 Impact dynamics, p156
21 Impact dynamics, pp156-7
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Finally, and the crucial point with regard to the bonking of Frank, in a case
where the impact or related relevant process has a finite duration, since
physical involvement (and hence causal involvement) in an impact propagates
through objects at a finite velocity, that impact or related process may be over
and done with before all the interacting common sense objects have had a
chance to become physically involved. Any material in the objects outside the
contact zone at the point at which the impact ceases is physically irrelevant to
the impact or related process - it virtually might as well have been made of
titanium, or custard, or not have been there at al1.22 Thus, if causal dependence
tracks physical dependence, the material outside the contact zone should not be
causally relevant to the impact and related processes.
This may seem a long-winded way of making a rather simple point. Of course
our common sense intuitions may lead us astray about putative instances of
causation, and of course we should advise our assignments of causal relations
with our scientific understanding of the world. Jonathan Bennett puts the case
rather nicely:
Objection: "But do you deny that when an explosion causes a fire, the explosion emits
force, pushes things around, acts as the elbow in the ribs?" Yes, I do. When an
explosion causes a fire, what happens is that molecules bump into other molecules,
increasing their velocity to the point where they react rapidly with the ambient gases,
etc. The idea that the pushing is done not by the molecules but by the explosion is just
the afterglow of ignorance about what an explosion is.23
22 "Virtually" does indicate a genuine equivocation. The properties of the matter or lack of it
near the boundary of the contact zone can influence the behaviour of the matter within the
contact zone. Consider the meniscus which forms at the interface of liquids and air. The
surface tension at the meniscus will affect the properties of the liquid near the surface.
Specifically, it affects the behaviour of disturbances propagating through the liquid near
the surface (which are precisely the disturbances which interest us). The precise change of
behaviour near the interface will be a function of the material composition of the materials
on either side of the interface. So the growth of the contact zone in a rock after an impact
will be affected to some extent by a nearby material boundary outside the contact zone in
the rock, and the degree to which the boundary influences the contact zone will depend on
the physical characteristics of the boundary (rock/titanium, rock/custard or rock/void).
We can avoid these problems by adopting the same strategies often used by materials
scientists and engineers - limiting our attention to impacts between semi-infinite bodies,
where semi-infinite means that there is no nearby boundary which affects the physical
behaviour of the contact zone (semi-infinite bodies under this definition can be quite small).
The examples we shall consider will involve collisions between semi-infinite bodies.
23 pp22-3, Bennett, Jonathan: Events and their names (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing
Company, 1988)
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Well, the point of our long-winded discussion of the dynamics of impact is that
when we emerge from the afterglow of ignorance about collisions, we discover
that the sophisticated Lewis-style analysis no longer assigns relations of causal
dependence in cases of impacts involving single common-sense objects.
Let's return to Frank, standing on the surface of the Earth waiting to be
crushed by the impact of the Moon. Let's now cash out the crushing of Frank
using our informed understanding of the dynamics of impact. The process
starts when the first layer of duct tape touches the top of Frank's head,
continues as Frank is progressively flattened, and ceases when there is nothing
left of Frank to be crushed. If Frank is 2 m tall, the process will have a short,
finite duration - around 0.028-0.18I1s.24
Since the Moon is not a perfectly rigid body, the initial contact zone involved
in Frank's crushing will be smaller than the entire Moon - it will be the
outermost layer of duct tape directly over Frank. This contact zone will expand
at a finite velocity until Frank ceases to be crushed. How big will the contact
zone grow? Let's make some generous assumptions. We can assume the longest
crushing duration: 0.18I1s. We can assume that the growth of the contact zone
will be governed by an elastic longitudinal wave, not a shock wave, but we will
assume the speed of sound in the material of the Moon is very high, thus
making the contact zone grow as quickly as possible. So letus assume that the
speed of sound in the Moon is the same as in solid carbon: 18350 ms-1 (nearly
four times faster than the speed of sound in steel). But even using these
generous estimates, by the time that Frank has been crushed the contact zone
has only grown to about 3.3 m in radius. The rest of the Moon (a roughly
spherical object with a diameter of 3476 km) is physically irrelevant to the
crushing25•
But in that case, the counterfactual analysis must treat the crushing of Frank
as a case of overdetermination - to be precise, a case of late preemption. If the
initial contact zone had not been there to crush Frank, the rest of the Moon
would have crushed him a fraction of a microsecond later. Even though the
24 If we treat the Moon's impact as a large asteroidal impact, the range of possible velocities of
impact is 11.2-72.8 kms-1 (Impact cratering, p205). The upper and lower limits on crushing
time are merely the range of times it would take for the Moon to close a 2 m gap at these
velocities.
25 Of course we should also be telling a similar story about the involvement of the Earth.
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contact zone of the Moon and the rest of the Moon are contained within the
same common sense object, they are as causally independent with regard to the
crushing process as individual rocks within a shower of rocks would be with
regard to a window-breaking event. Franks' crushing wasn't caused after all!
The upshot is that if we stop being naive about the objects involved in collisions
and try to key objecthood to our best understanding of physical dependence,
the sophisticated Lewis-style counterfactual analysis does an even worse job of
fulfilling our basic desideratum than the naive analysis. It doesn't pay to
emerge from the afterglow of ignorance about causation.
Here's a "Lewisian" response to the problem of single-object
overdetermination. So the analysis breaks down in cases of deep impact -
what matter? We can let lunar collisions and their like be problem cases, but
what relevance does this have to everyday run-of-the-mill causation? The
causal story told about such cases as the bonking of Frank may seem odd, but
we should just swallow this the odd result given that the counterfactual
analysis does such a splendid job of dealing with ordinary-size examples of
causation. Spoils to the victor!
Unfortunately, the same principles of physical dependence that say the
Moon crushing Frank must be a case of single object overdetermination also say
that many ordinary-size phenomena must be cases of single-object
overdetermination.
Consider a standard window. Rather than breaking it by striking it with a
standard rock, we will strike it with a standard long rod, with a length several
times larger than its diameter. Like the crushing of Frank by the Moon, we can
treat the breaking of the window by the long rod as a process of finite duration:
the window is whole when the rod first touches it, it undergoes some process of
structural failure, and when the window is perforated the breakage is
complete.26
26 Long rods are frequently used as impacting objects in experimental and theoretical
examination of impact. By virtue of being long, the propagation of stress disturbance
through the rod can be treated as propagation of disturbance through a semi-infinite body.
By virtue of being narrow by comparison with length, the stress disturbance in the bar can
be adequately modelled as a one-dimensional process. (See Impact dynamics, pp2-5 and
pp3Q-2 for discussions of the interplay between theoretical models and experimental
analysis; see pp160-1 for pictures of long-rod penetrators in action.)
For an account of what perforation means by comparison with penetration, see Impact
dynamics, pp155-7, see also Impact, pp240-2.
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Suppose the glass is 1 cm thick, and is about as strong as ordinary window
glass. The rod is made of steel, is 1 cm in diameter, and strikes the glass at
100 ms-I . At this speed of impact a steel ball bearing 1 cm in diameter would
have sufficient momentum to break the window. But more than a ball-bearing-
sized piece of the rod may be brought to bear on the window while the
breaking event is still in progress. How much of the rod could actually have
some physical relevance to the window-breaking event under these conditions?
The duration of the event is 10-4 s. The speed of sound in steel is 4877 ms-I ,
so the 1/contact zone" would have propagated approximately 49 cm down the
rod before the breakage had been completed. So if the long rod was about
55 cm long, 6 cm of the rod would be physically irrelevant to the breakage and
should not be considered part of the relevant object within the impact event. At
higher impact velocities, the contact zone will be proportionately shorter: 24 cm
at 200 ms-I , and 12 cm at 400 ms-I . If the rod was made of a different material
with a different characteristic speed of sound, the contact zone sizes would be
different again. For a copper rod, with a speed of sound of 3353 ms-I , the
contact zone sizes would be 34 cm at 100 ms-I , 17 cm at 200 ms-I and 8 cm at
400 ms-I .
Suppose that all six cases involve 55 cm-Iong rods. The simple counterfactual
analysis says in all six cases the rod striking the window causes the window to
break - but for the rod striking the window, the window would not have
broken. But this analysis wrongly ascribes physical involvement to the entire
rod, which is simply not the case. Greater or lesser amounts of the rods are
simply not physically relevant to the window being broken. But if we admit
that only part of the rod could be involved in each breakage, the counterfactual
analysis provides no causal story in any of the six cases - if the physically
involved part of the rod had not broken the window, the remaining part of the
rod would have. All six cases are actually instances of single-object
overdetermination. Single-object overdetermination is everywhere, not just in
deep impact.
Let's recap and sum up. In simple, paradigmatic cases of physical
dependence such as impacts, Lewis-style counterfactual analyses of causation
fail to assign relations of causal dependence due to overdetermination
problems. The failure is ontological rather than epistemological. It isn't that we
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can't know that causation is going on in these cases. Under the basic Lewis-
style analysis it simply isn't true that there is causation going on.
These failures are evidence that causal dependence fails to track physical
dependence under a Lewis-style analysis. This conclusion is supported by the
overdetermining dumbbell gedankenexperiment, in which a Lewis-style analysis
assigns causal dependence in one set of physical circumstances and does not in
another, even though there are no relevant physical differences between the
two cases. The overdetermination problem is being generated by the common-
sense individuation of objects within events.
We could try and bring causal dependence back into line with physical
dependence by giving up common-sense individuation of objects within events
in favour of keying object individuation to physical involvement. But this just
results in many more overdetermination problems arising than under the naive
Lewis-style analysis. Consider the bonking of Frank. So long as we can claim
that the entire common sense object "the Moon" is physically involved in
Frank's crushing, a Lewis-style analysis can say that Frank's crushing was
caused. But when we acknowledge that this claim is physically implausible,
modify it in accordance with our best relevant understanding of physical
dependence (the dynamics of colliding solids), and claim that only a small part
of the Moon is physically responsible for the crushing of Frank, we immediately
have a case of single-object overdetermination. In fact, single-object
overdetermination crops up allover the case; ironically, more so in cases where
we are absolutely certain there is a causal story to be told than elsewhere.
So it does not seem to be the case that we can treat the Lewis-style
counterfactual analysis"as if" it was intended to fulfil our basic desideratum.
Causal dependence simply does not track physical dependence in such an
analysis. Some other analysis of causation is required.
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Transference
Prehistory and general considerations
Although Lewis-style counterfactual analyses may represent the current
philosophical orthodoxy on causation, a recurrent notion has been that
causation resolves to the transference of energy or momentum. The suggestion
has been "in the air" more than "in the print", but several attempts have been
made to formulate an analysis over the past 140 years.
Modern transference analyst David Fair notes that the "necessary and
sufficient conditions" analysis of causation presented by Curt Ducasse seems to
be on the right track towards a transference analysis.27 Yet Ducasse explicitly
criticises the transference analysis in the 1951 book Nature, mind and death28 and
somewhat more elliptically in an earlier work, Causation and the types of
necessity.29 Ducasse's target appears to be Charles Mercier, a respected
psychiatrist and part-time philosophical gadfly. Mercier's 1916 book On
causation with a chapter on belief0 provides much of the philosophical
groundwork for Ducasse's own analysis, with the notable difference that
Mercier thinks the relation between cause and effect should be cashed out in
terms of transferences of energy.31 50 it seems that Ducasse's analysis resembles
transference analyses because it originally was a transference analysis.
Mercier appears to have stolen the notion of transference from the eighth
edition of John5tuart Mill's A system of logic ratiocinative and inductive,32 where
Mill criticises a transference analysis proposed by Alexander Bain in Bain's 1870
27 pp224-31, Fair, David: i'lCausation and the flow of energy", pp219-50, Erkenntnis vol 14
(1979)
28 pp138-42, Ducasse, Curt J: Nature, mind and death (La Salle: The Open Court Publishing
Company, 1951)
29 Ducasse, Curt J: Causation and the types ofnecessity 2nd edition (New York: Dover
Publications, 1969). Originally published in 1924.
30 Mercier, Charles: On causation with a chapter on belief (London: University of London Press,
1916)
31 For example, On causation with a chapter on belief, pp80-2
32 pp348-53, Mill, John Stuart: A system of logic ratiocinative and inductive, Robson, J M; editor:
The collected works ofJohn Stuart Mill Volumes VII-VIII (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1974)
31
work Logic.33 Ducasse's criticism of the transference analysis seems to be (at
least initially) based on discussions by Ernst Mach of the relation between the
conservation of energy and causation in his book History and root of the principle
ofconservation ofenergy34 and his later article "On the principle of the
conservation of energy".35 Mach also identifies a precursor of the transference
analysis presented by Wilhelm Wundt in 1866.36
A more detailed discussion of the prehistory of the transference analysis is
beyond the scope of this thesis.37 We shall be concerned with the modern
version of the analysis reinvented by Jerrold Aronson in two 1971 papers, "On
the grammar of cause" and "The legacy of Hume's analysis of causation",38 and
developed by Aronson, Fair and Adrian Heathcote during the 1970s and
1980s.39
The transference analysis clearly seems to be a good candidate for an
analysis of causation which fulfils our basic desideratum - energy and
momentum transfers are species of physical dependence, so causal dependence
resolves to a species physical dependence. But not all physical dependence may
be causal dependence under the modern analysis.
Fair notes that some instances of causal dependence, such as "stoppings", are
not to be interpreted as energy transfers. For example, I press a switch on the
monitor of my computer, and the screen goes blank. I appear to have caused
the screen to go blank, and it seems the screen's going blank physically
depending on my flicking the switch, yet energy and momentum was not
transferred from the switch to the screen. Fair still thinks such phenomena are
causal- it should best be interpreted as causation by virtue of raising a
33 See the introduction to Bain, Alexander: Logic 2nd edition (London: Longmans, Green &
Co, 1895). Bain's analysis could fairly be said to also anticipate the conserved quantity
analyses of Dowe and Salmon.
34 Mach, Ernst: History and root of the principle ofconservation ofenergy (Chicago: The Open
Court Publishing Company, 1911). Originally published in 1872.
35 Mach, Ernst: "On the principle of the conservation of energy", pp137-85, Mach, Ernst:
Popular scientific lectures 3rd edition (Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1898)
36 History and root of the principle ofconservation ofenergy, pp39-40
37 For a more detailed discussion see Smith, Tony: "Energy, psychiatrists and mysterious
chemicals: the lost history of the transference analysis", MA thesis (Chapel Hill: University
of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, forthcoming)
38 Aronson, Jerrold: "On the grammar of cause", pp414-30 Synthese vol 22 (1971); Aronson,
Jerrold: "The legacy of Hume's analysis of causation", pp135-56, Studies in history and
philosophy ofscience vol 2 (1971)
39 We will not discuss the similar analysis developed 1?y Hector-Neri Castaneda.
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"potential barrier" which stops energy transference from taking place along the
wires leading from the electricity source to the monitor.4o
There are at least two ways we could interpret Fair. One is to assume that all
physical dependence is associated with causal dependence. In that case, the
transference analysis needs to be supplemented by a "potential barrier"
analysis. Since we have no satisfactory account of potential barriers above and
beyond an enumeration of different phenomena we currently think count as
potential barriers, the "supplemented" transference analysis is incomplete and
programmatic in character. (This is Fair's conclusion.41) Alternatively, we might
assume that not all physical dependence is associated with causal d~pendence
- causal dependence involves energy transfers and some other dependence
resolves to raising and lowering potential barriers. In effect, we could claim
there are two or more different brands of cement of the universe, causation and
something else. Therefore, although the transference analysis might provide a
satisfactory account of causal dependence, the full analysis of physical
dependence is still programmatic and incomplete.
Since our basic desideratum does not require all physical dependence to
resolve to causal dependence or vice versa, we shall not discuss potential
barriers. We shall limit our attention to the core notions of energy and
momentum transference. Does causal dependence track physical dependence
under this analysis (or portion of an analysis)?
Rather surprisingly, it doesn't. We shall try and develop a best possible
version of the transference analysis, and see whether it surmounts various
objections to the transference analysis. We shall conclude that while the
analysis seems to give a satisfactory account of causal interactions, it fails to
give a satisfactory account of the connections between different interactions.
40 "Causation and the flow of energy", pp244-5
41 "Causation and the flow of energy", pp248
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Gasking on manipulability
Aronson presents the basic structure of the modern transference analysis in
"On the grammar of cause" as an alternative to the manipulability analysis of
causation presented by Douglas Gasking.42
Gasking argues that Humean regularity analyses of causation are
incomplete. The Humean argues that A causes B means that events of type B
regularly follow events of type A. Yet much of our causal talk involves
instances of simultaneous causation - a feature of event causes another feature
of the same event. For example, we want to say that the cause of an iron bar
glowing is that the iron is currently at a temperature of 1000 C. Which feature is
cause, and which feature is effect?
One approach might be to deny that the explanatory relationship between
the glowing bar and the temperature of the bar is causal at all. We might
reconstruct such an approach from David Lewis's "Events':
Why did Xanthippe become a widow? Because she was married to Socrates at the
time of his death. (Noncausal.) Because Socrates was made to drink hemlock.
(Causal ... ) Why did Fred talk or walk then? Because he talked (noncausal) and he did
that because he had just heard a joke he couldn't keep to himself (causal).43
Similarly, we might say that the bar is glowing because it at a temperature of
1000 C but deny this is a causal explanation. The causal explanation might be
that it had been in a furnace for the previous 15 minutes.
But Gasking's approach is to accept that the relationship between the
temperature and the glowing is causal and then attack the inadequacy of the
regularity analysis of causation in these contexts. Gasking presents an
alternative analysis of causation, which links a statement about the causes of
something with "a recipe for producing it or for preventing it":
When we have a general manipulative technique which results in a certain sort of
event A, we speak of producing A by this technique. (Heating things by putting them
42 Gasking, Douglas: "Causation and recipes", pp479-87, Mind vol 64 (1955)
43 p269, Lewis, David: "Events", pp241-69, Lewis, David: Philosophical papers volume II
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986)
34
on a fire.) When in certain cases application of the general technique for producing A
also results in B we speak of producing B by producing A. (Making iron glow by
heating it.) And in such a case we speak of A causing B but not vice-versa. Thus the
notion of causation is essentially connected with our manipulative techniques for
producing results. Roughly speaking: "A rise in the temperature of iron causes it to
glow" means "By applying to iron the general technique for making things hot you
will also, in this case, make it glow".44
So causation statements are properly manipulation-by-agents statements. The use
of the word"cause" in contexts where there are no agents to speak of, such as
the sentence"gravity causes unsupported objects to fall" involves, in Gasking's
words, a "sophisticated extension from its more primitive and fundamental
meaning".45
The most plausible interpretation of Gasking's "sophisticated extension" is
that statements such as "gravity causes unsupported objects to fall" are polite
fictions. We use the term "cause", here in the same way as we use the term
"design" in statements such as "the human body contains number of design
flaws and compromises". We know what is meant by the latter statement -
some structures in the human body do not function as well as some different
structures would in the same body. But - various heretics excepted- we do
not mean by such a statement, even by implication, that the human body was
designed poorly by its designer. Similarly, the use of the term "compromise" in
this context should not be taken as meaning that certain features of the body
appear in modern humans as a result of protracted bouts of negotiation in
smoke-filled rooms. So any causal statements about non-agent-dependent
relations between events are at best enlightening metaphors and at worst
literally false and misleading locutions.
The Russell-Quine thesis
So under a manipulability analysis, what role should causal statements such as
"gravity causes unsupported objects to fall" play in natural sciences such as
physics, chemistry or biology? One sensible answer to the question is none. The
manipulability analysis is a road to what we might call the Russell-Quine thesis
44 "Causation and recipes", p483
45 "Causation and recipes", p487
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- that the notion of cause plays no worthwhile role in science, or at least a
mature science. We can find a strong statement of the thesis in Bertrand
Russell's "On the notion of cause":
... I wish, first, to maintain that the word "cause" is so inextricably bound up with
misleading associations as to make its complete extrusion from the philosophical
vocabulary desirable; secondly, to inquire what principle, if any, is employed in
science in place of the supposed "law of causality" which philosophers imagine to be
employed ...46
A slightly more tolerant version appears in Willard Van Orman Quine's
"Natural kinds":
We have noticed that the notion of kind, or similarity, is crucially relevant to the
notion of disposition, to the subjunctive conditional, and to singular causal
statements. From a scientific point of view these are a pretty disreputable lot. The
notion of kind, or similarity is equally disreputable ...47
In general we can take it as a very special mark of the maturity of a branch of
science that it no longer needs an irreducible notion of similarity and kind. It is that
final stage where the animal vestige is wholly absorbed into the theory. In this career
of the similarity notion, starting in its innate phase, developing over the years in the
light of accumulated experience, passing then from the intuitive phase into theoretical
similarity, and finally disappearing altogether, we have a paradigm of the evolution of
unreason into science.48
So for Russell, causal talk in science is just rot. For Quine, causal talk is rot that
makes useful fertiliser for the eventual flowering of a scientific discipline. For
Gasking, such talk of "causes" is part of the province of "popular science":
interesting rot talked by educated laymen and "some scientists in their less
strictly professional moments."49
Aronson agrees with Gasking that the regularity analysis fails to determine
causal asymmetry in cases of simultaneous causation. Yet Aronson cannot
46 pi, Russell, Bertrand: "On the notion of cause", ppl-26, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
vol 13 (1912)
47 p167, Quine, Willard Van Orman: "Natural kinds", pp159-70, Boyd, Richard; Gasper,
Philip; Trout, JD; editors: The philosophy ofscience (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991)
48 "Natural kinds", p170
49 "Causation and recipes", p487
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agree with Gasking's manipulability analysis of causation, because the analysis
has a "pernicious outcome"50 - the Russell-Quine thesis. So a further analysis
of causation is required in order to save both the causal and scientific status of
statements such as "gravity causes unsupported bodies to fall" - the
transference analysis.
Aronson argues that anthropomorphic locutions are not the fundamental
form of causal statements. Rather, borrowing a concept from JL Austin, the
word "cause" is a dimension word - "the most general and comprehensive term
in a whole group of terms of the same kind, terms that fulfil the same
function"51 - for simple transitive verbs such as "knock", "push" or "pull". In
other words, statements such as:
John knocked the book on the floor
can be transformed into:
John caused the book to be on the floor
with only a slight loss of specificity of meaning. If cause is a dimension word
for these kind of verbs, then the fundamental sense of causal statements cannot
be that they are manipulation exemplars, because:
... the notion of manipulation is connected with concepts that serve to modify
intelligent behaviour; but transitive verbs can be used without being modified by
adverbs of manner such as "skilfully", "delicately", "intentionally", etc.52
Aronson thus concludes that expressions involving the "mechanical" transitive
verbs are our exemplars of causal expressions.
This line of argument, though quite clear and evocative, is a tactical mistake
on Aronson's part. His debate with Gasking appears to be semantic, a
disagreement over the actual sense of causal locutions in everyday talk. Gasking
thinks the correct analysis of the meaning of "cause" is manipulation by agents;
Aronson, agent-independent mechanical processes.
50 "On the grammar of cause", p414
51 "On the grammar of cause", p417
52 "On the grammar of cause", p419
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In fact, Aronson is concerned with an ontological failure of the regularity
analysis. The reason why "the heat of the bar makes it glow" is causal and "the
glowing of the bar makes it hot" is not causal is not that the latter statement is
linguistically aberrant. Rather, there is a real causal asymmetry between being
at a certain temperature and glowing; an ontological feature of causation which
is not captured by the regularity analysis and which appears to be independent
of manipulation by agents. (Aronson is forced to continually reiterate in later
works that questions of ontology, not grammar are the thrust of "On the
grammar of cause".53)
So what is this asymmetric ontological feature of causation underlying the
appearance of mechanical transitive verbs in our causal talk? Simply put, it is
the transference of a physical quantity, such as energy, momentum, heat or
velocity from and to objects. In the case of the iron bar, high levels of energy in
the bar are dissipated by the emission of photons. So a quantity of energy (heat
in the bar) is transferred away from the iron bar as radiation (the glow from the
bar), and thus we can say the heat of the bar caused the bar to glow. But no
energy is transferred from the radiation to the bar, so we cannot say the
glowing of the bar caused the bar to be hot. (In contrast, Gasking's short
explanation for the asymmetry is that human beings have a manipulative
technique for making iron glow by heating it, but not for making it hot by
glowing it.54)
The transference analysis of causation does not provide a direct route to the
Russell-Quine thesis - causal statements such as "gravity causes unsupported
objects to fall" refer to the sorts of physical dependence treated of in the
sciences. In the case of a body falling in vacuum towards the Earth, energy is
being transferred from the Earth's gravitational field to the body, which
manifests in the body as an increased level of kinetic energy. Under the
transference analysis, scientific causal statements are not metaphorically causal
- when true, they are as causal as our everyday statements about things being
made to happen, such as "heating an iron bar to 1000 C causes it to glow".
53 pp294-5, Aronson, Jerrold: "Untangling ontology from epistemology in causation", pp293-
305 Erkenntnis, vol 18 (1982) and pp249-50, Aronson, Jerrold: "Conditions versus
transference: a reply to Ehring", pp249-57 Synthese vol 63 (1985)
54 "On the grammar of cause", p427
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We say that the transference analysis does not provide a direct route to the
Russell-Quine thesis rather than does not lead to the thesis, because of the
problem of Quine. Quine quickly rejected his dismissal of causation in "Natural
kinds" - that causal talk in science was a simple instance of kind talk and
would be rejected along with all the other disreputable kind talk as soon as a
science had reached an adequate level of sophistication - in favour of what
appears to be a transference analysis of causation in The roots of reference:
Of these two wayward idioms, the causal and the dispositional, the causal is the
simpler and the more fundamental. It may have had its prehistoric beginnings in
man's sense of effort, as in pushing. The imparting of energy still seems to be the
central idea. The transfer of momentum from one billiard ball to another is
persistently cited as a paradigm case of causality. Thus we might seek a
simpleminded or root notion of causality in terms of the flow of energy. Causes and
effects are events such that all the energy in the effect flowed from the cause.55
This certainly looks like a rehabilitation of the notion of cause in scientific talk
by Quine, especially when he goes on to say:
Let us sort out the good and the bad features of this notion of cause. A possible
objection is that it is too special, applying only to physics. My answer is materialistic.
Causality is a relation of events, and all events, mental and social ones included, are a
matter ultimately of the action of physical forces upon particles. My concern here is
different from Hume's; his was with the epistemological basis for a causal relation,
while mine is with the ontological nature of the causal relation as an object of scientific
theory. All will agree, materialists and others, that causal efficacy within the material
world, at any rate, is compounded of microphysical forces, despite our incapacity to
single out all those components in every particular case.56
Hence we find·Aronson citing Quine as a proponent and defender of the
transference analysis.57
Yet Quine can hardly be called a great fan of causation:
A third ... objection, and one that I can share, is that my appeal to energetic world
lines is not sophisticated enough. On what basis can an earlier and later bit of work be
55 pS, Quine, Willard Van Orman: The roots ofreference (La Salle: Open Court, 1973)
56 The roots of reference, p6
57 "Untangling ontology from epistemology in causation", pp293
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associated as two manifestations of one and the same continuing bit of energy? The
very distinction between matter and energy wavers in modern physics, and even the
notion of the identity of an elementary particle from moment to moment has fallen on
evil days, what with quantum jumps. Now I take this consideration to suggest simply
that a notion of cause is out of place in modem physics. Nor can this come as a
surprise.58
Really, Quine still holds the Russell-Quine thesis. If we must talk of cause, best
to talk of it in terms of energy transfers - but better would be not to talk of it at
all! Rather than being an analysis of causation, Quine's transference account is a
step along the way to a dissolution of causal notions in the sciences. Thus, we
find critics of the transference analysis such as Douglas Ehring claiming that
Quine objects to the transference analysis.59 Even Fair states on the basis of
Quine's statements that rather than being a proponent and defender of the
transference analysis Quine "has suggested (and rejected) explaining our ideas
of causality in terms of energy flOW." 60 We can contrast this with Aronson's
position:
Since the notion of "cause" is so related to transitive verbs, I think those who maintain
that "cause" should be removed from scientific and philosophical discourse are, ipso
facto, committed to the removal of transitive verbs - which occur often enough in the
sciences - as well.
... However, even if such a task were successful in "eliminating" transitive verbs
and "cause" from our vocabulary, it seems that scientists (and others) would continue
to speak of the various sources of quantitative change. Physicists would still insist on
talking about energy and momentum transfer; and, as I have pointed out above, this
talked is wedded to conservation principles. For these reasons, alone, removal of
"cause" (and its more specific counterparts) from science and philosophy is a price, I
believe, that scientist and nonscientist alike would not be willing to pay.61
58 The roots of reference, p6
59 p255, Ehring, Douglas: "The transference theory of causation", pp249-58, Synthese vol 67
(1986)
60 "Causation and the flow of energy", p237
61 "On the grammar of cause", p428-9
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Aronson's analysis
Lets look at the ontological details of the Aronson's transference analysis.
Aronson's first move is to distinguish between natural changes in objects and
unnatural changes. A natural change is a change an object undergoes when it is
left to its own devices, independently of other influences. Such changes are not
causal. An unnatural change is a change resulting from an external influence.
Such changes may be causa1.62
Aronson provides an example of such a natural change: the inertial
persistence of motion of objects in the absence of external influences. Such
objects change their position, but such changes are not causal. Similarly,
Aronson notes:
... Galileo regarded circular motion about the center of the Earth to be "entirely
natural and self explanatory". Newton would reject a request for a causal explanation
of constant linear motion and Einstein would not search for the cause of motion along
a geodesic.63
This provokes a question: what do scientists' attitudes about the self-
explanatory nature of some phenomena have to do with whether those
phenomena are causal or not? The answer lies in Aronson's desiderata for
developing the analysis - providing a causal basis for a theory of scientific
explanation.
In an earlier paper, "Explanations without laws",64 Aronson reacts against
Hempel's deductive-nomological (D-N) theory of explanation. Simply put, a D-
N explanation is a modus ponens of an initial condition on an instantiation of a
general law. Let Ea be some statement describing an event in need of
explanation. Let L be a law, a universal generalisation of the form V'x(Cx ~ Ex).
Let Ca be some initial condition. So, where Ca~ Ea is an elimination instance of
V'x(Cx ~ Ex) I the explanation takes the form of the inference:
62 "On the grammar of cause", pp420-2
63 "On the grammar of cause", p421
64 Aronson, Jerrold: "Explanations without laws", pp541-57, Journal of philosophy vol 66 (1969)
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(1) Ca
(2) Ca~ Ea
(3) :. Ea
Aronson argues that not all explanations take this form. Simple statements
containing transitive verbs - such as "John knocked the book on the floor" are
also explanatory in this context, without being lawlike. "On the grammar of
cause" can therefore be seen as providing both a justification why such
statements are explanatory - they are causal- and an argument why causal
locutions are not simply instances of lawlike regularities of succession.
So given that the purpose of Aronson's transference analysis is to provide
some basis to a theory of explanation, it follows that those phenomena which
do not require explanation need not be assumed to be causal. Natural changes
are "self-explanatory". So for the purposes of Aronson's theory of explanation,
his analysis of causation need not treat them as causal.
(Of course, this is hardly a knock-down argument that natural changes are
not causal. Later on we shall discuss arguments by Phil Dowe65 that an
adequate analysis of causation does require such natural changes to be causal.)
Having drawn the distinction between natural and unnatural changes,
Aronson then gives three conditions which must be fulfilled for causation to
take place:
(1) In "A causes B", liB" designates a change in an object, a change which is an
unnatural one.
(2) "In IIA causes B", at the time B occurs, the object that causes B is in contact with
the object that undergoes the change.
(3) Prior to the time of the occurrence of B, the body that makes contact with the
effect object possesses a quantity (eg velocity, momentum, kinetic energy, heat,
etc) which is transferred to the effect object (when contact is made) and
manifested as B.66
65 Dowe, Phil: "What's right and what's wrong with transference theories", pp363-74,
Erkenntnis vol 42 (1995)
66 liOn the grammar of cause", pp421-2
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These conditions could readily be generalised so that A or B refer to several
objects. A favourable characteristic of this analysis is that the overdetermination
problems which lead us to reject the counterfactual analysis simply do not arise.
Consider the overdetermining dumbbell. In the connected case energy or
momentum is transferred from the dumbbell to the window, and the window
undergoes an unnatural change, so the window breakage is causal. In the
disconnected case, energy and momentum is transferred from the rocks to the
window, and the window undergoes an unnatural change, so the window
breakage is still causal. In the case of the bonking of Frank we can conclude that
Frank's being crushed (an unnatural change in Frank) is caused by the contact
zone of the Moon (because energy and momentum from the contact zone is
transferred to Frank). The rest of the Moon outside the contact zone does not
cause Frank's being crushed, because no energy is transferred from that part of
the Moon to Frank. The fact (or rather the counterfactual circumstance) that the
rest of the Moon would crush Frank if the contact zone was not there has no
bearing on the causal status of Frank's being crushed. Everything appears to be
as it should be - so far, so good for the transference analysis.
The transference analysis (as discussed so far) claims that there is far less
causation going on in the universe than a Lewis-style counterfactual analysis
does. To illustrate the point, let's borrow Quine's "paradigm case of causality"
and consider a white billiard ball striking a red billiard ball at rest. But to avoid
complicating factors such as the causal involvement of a billiard table, let's
assume that the red is hanging motionless in, and the white is moving at a
constant velocity through, interstellar space. This is illustrated in figure 4.
43
t1
t4
Figure 4 - billiard balls and causation
Both the moving white and the stationary red trace out spatiotemporal regions
in the universe which possess certain properties (such as whiteness in the case
of the white, redness in the case of red, and in the case of both - we hope -
being made of some kind of ivory substitute). So any section of the
spatiotemporal path of either ball counts as an event under a Lewis-style
counterfactual analysis. So any two contiguous but non-overlapping
spatiotemporal regions along the path of, say, the white (before the white hits
the red), will be causally related. With reference to figure 4, we would conclude,
that the white's behaviour at tl was a cause of the white's behaviour at t2-
ceteris paribus, but for the white moving at a certain velocity at tl, it would not
be moving at a certain velocity at t2. Similarly, the red's behaviour at tl would
be a cause of the red's behaviour at t2, even though the motionless hanging of
the red in interstellar space amounts to what Lewis describes as a thoroughly
uneventful course of events. 67 Of course, the collision with the white with the
red will be a cause of the red's behaviour at t3 and the white's behaviour at t3.
And as per our considerations of the circumstances at tl and t2, the link
between the white at t3 and the white at 4 will be causal, and the link between
the red at t3 and the red at t4 will be causal.
67 UEvents", pp260-I
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Someone adopting the interpretation of events in which events are changes68
but who also adopted a Lewis-style counterfactual analysis of causation might
take a different view of this scenario. She might hold the link between the red at
t1 and the red at t2 is not causal since the red undergoes no changes over this
period - thus there are no distinct events for there to be a causal relation
between.
Under the transference analysis presented thus far, the only causation going
on in this scenario is at the point of collision. The only changes that the red or
the white are undergoing between t1 and t2 are inertial persistences of motion
(or perhaps in the case of the red inertial persistences of lack of motion), which
are paradigmatic examples of natural changes. But causation only involves
objects undergoing unnatural changes.
A digression on relata
Is it a good thing or a bad thing that Aronson's transference analysis holds the
there is less causal dependence in the world than the counterfactual analysis
would have us believe? Does this point make one analysis comparatively better
than the other? The answer we want to give here is that this discrepancy will
only matter in so far as it affects the way that the analyses fulfil our basic
desideratum. It would not matter that the transference analysis says there is far
less causal dependence about, so long as that causal dependence shows up in
the right places. At this point, we have a prima facie case that under the
transference analysis causal dependence does show up in the right places and
thus we should prefer the transference analysis.
At this point, we should examine an argument that these considerations
don't matter a damn when it comes to comparing the relative worth of the two
analyses. The argument hinges on the fact that causal dependence under a
Lewis-style counterfactual analysis is a relation between events, and causal
dependence under the transference analysis is a relation between objects. So if it
is the case that causation is properly a relation between objects, the
counterfactual analysis is trivially false; if between events, the transference
68 As per, for example, Ducasse, Curt J: "On the nature and the observability of the causal
relation", pp125-36, Sosa, Ernest; Tooley, Michael; editors: Causation (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1993).
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analysis is trivially false. The question of which is a better analysis resolves to
the question of the true relata of the causal relation.
This causal relata "problem of comparison" could be sidestepped fairly
easily if we can show that there is no relevant difference between events and
objects in causal contexts. But the problem of comparison is supported by both
our intuitions that events and objects are ontologically rather different beasties,
and the way we talk about events and objects.
Events have locations and durations, objects just have locations. Similarly,
events have spatial parts and temporal parts. Consider a battle for control of
three hills that lasts for three days. The battle can be broken up into three
spatial parts (we can refer to the battles for each of the hills), and can be broken
up into three temporal parts (we can refer to the first day of the battle, the
second, and the third). On the other hand, objects seem to have spatial parts,
but no temporal parts: the whole of an object exists at any time the object is
present, not just a temporal part of the object; and when we refer to an object
we refer to the whole object, not just a temporal part of that object. We can
borrow an example of this from Bennett:
Someone who says "the [Trans-Canada Highway] is one the other side of town"
means that a certain (spatial) part of it is there, but if someone says that Vermeer's
"Girl in a red hat" is in the National Gallery, we don't take this as afafon de parler for
the statement that a temporal part of the picture is there, some of its earlier parts being
in Delft.69
But might this ontological distinction between objects and events be being
overplayed? For example, Andrew Newman argues that events are just Fregean
objects, in that they occur only once and are not predicated of anything.70 Thus,
any causal relation between events is trivially a causal relation between objects.
But this won't do, because the counterfactual analysis we are considering
asserts that events are properties of spatiotemporal regions. So events are
predicated of regions, and thus these events just aren't Fregean objects, they are
Fregean concepts. The "concept correlate" of an event - the object we end up
referring to when we try to refer to an event - would therefore be a Fregean
69 Events and their names, pl14
70 p530, Newman, Andrew: "The causal relation and its terms", pp529-50, Mind vol 98 (1988)
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object, but that is no real help. For Newman's thesis to work events rather than
event-correlates need to be objects.
A better response is that our common sense view of objects is just out of date
- a relic of our view that time is peculiarly different from space. This view
leads us to think that it might be useful to draw a special distinction between
things which are extended only through the three dimensions of space (objects)
and things which also have an explicit time index (events). But surely we can
take the various facts of general and special relativity to show that there is no
important distinction between any of the four dimensions of spacetime. Hence
if there is any profit to be made from talking of objects at all, we should really
consider them as having four-dimensional extension - like events, they are
related to four-dimensional spatiotemporal zones; like events they are the sort
of things that should be said to have temporal parts.
Ontolog.ically, there are several ways we might cash out this four-
dimensional view of objects: one suggestive version is supplied by Bennett:
... we can be helped to understand the notion of a thing in space if we if we analyze it
in terms of qualitative variation of space. The basic idea is that for there to be an atom
in a given region of space is for that region to be thus rather than so. This project of
understanding the contents of space in terms of the attributes of spatial regions is
neutral with respect to time: it could be deployed in terms of regions at instants or
regions throughout periods. But ... if for any reason we are thinking' of the atom as
being temporally extended and thus as having temporal parts, then the natural and
perhaps inevitable procedure is to analyze the notion of an atom in terms of attributes
of spatiotemporal zones.71
On such a view, objects are pretty much like Lewisian events - perhaps, just
are events. The only distinction between the events of the Lewis-style
counterfactual analysis and objects is that events are properties of
spatiotemporal regions, but need not be every property of their particular
region, whereas the natural interpretation of an object taken as a qualitative
variation of a spatiotemporal region is that the object is every qualitative
variation in that region. Hence objects are (or are related to) a particular subset
of events: those that are full contents of regions, or, to borrow some more
71 Events and their names, pl17
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terminology from Bennett, concrete events.72 So the problem of comparison
seems to be defused.
If we adopt a different analysis of events, we can still defuse the problem.
Suppose we held that events are changes. Then we find ourselves arguing that
events can not be objects for the following reason due to Donald Davidson:
Occupying the same portion of space-time, event and object differ. One is an object
which remains the same object through changes, the other a change in an object or
objects. Spatiotemporal areas do not distinguish them, but our predicates, our basic
grammar, our ways of sorting do.73
But if events are changes in objects, then there are few distinctions between
Aronson's object relata and an event relata. Consider Aronson's first two
conditions:
(1) In "A causes B", "B" designates a change in an object, a change which is an
unnatural one.
(2) "In"A causes B", at the time B occurs, the object that causes B is in contact with
the object that undergoes the change.74
On the literal reading of condition (I), effects just are events - they are changes
in objects.
The question then is what A designates. Is it an object? In this case the
transference analysis has mixed relata (objects and events), and the problem of
comparison with an analysis which only incorporates events may still stand.
But consider the situation where A itself has been caused. As good an example
as any is "heating an iron bar to 1000 C causes it to glow". The hot iron being
hot is thus a change in the iron bar and (A) thus designates an event. On this
reading the apparent object relata of Aronson's transference analysis reduces to
an event relata and there is no causal relata problem of comparison with the
counterfactual analysis. Obviously, there may be problems for this reduction in
instances of first causes - instances where A designates something uncaused.
72 Events and their names, p103
73 p176, Davidson, Donald: "Reply to Quine on events", pp172-6, LePore, Ernest;
McLaughlin, B; editors: Actions and events: perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985)
74 "On the grammar of cause", pp421-2
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But any analysis of causation with event relata that takes events to be changes
in objects will also have peculiar relata problems in statements of the form"A
causes B" where A is a first cause. So there doesn't seem to be any special
problem of comparison related to cases of first causes.
What happens if we take a less natural reading of Aronson's first condition?
Perhaps what Aronson meant to say was" ... 'B' designates an object undergoing
a change .. .". This would bring the language of condition 1 into line with that in
condition 2, which is full of talk of objects and objects undergoing changes. In
this case, following Davidson's distinction, we might take the transference
analysis as genuinely having a non-event relata (objects rather than changes),
and the problem of comparison arises again.
But this doesn't seem to amount to much of a problem after all. Our earlier
result still holds: except in the case of first causes, A and B in statements of the
form"A causes B" will refer to objects undergoing changes. But it is impossible
for there to be an object undergoing a change without there being a change in
an object. So in all standard causal situations events supervene on objects
undergoing changes: every causal sequence described in terms of a set of events
could be given a parallel description in terms of a set of objects undergoing
changes.
This line of argument is followed by Fair in his presentation of the
transference analysis:
The causal relation of ordinary language apparently takes as arguments events,
physical objects, (instantiated) properties, actions, mental states, and facts ... We must
reduce this ontology so described to an ontology of physical objects described in terms
of physical magnitudes in order to be able to apply the physics ...
The ontological aspect of this reduction is often fairly straightforward; we concern
ourselves with the physical objects comprising what are described as events, actions,
mental states, and facts and with the objects exemplifying what are described as
properties.75
75u Causation and the flow of energy", p233
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So the distinction between object relata and event relata is innocent. It is just a
matter of terminological choice whether we present our analysis in terms of
events, objects, or both.76
The problem of comparison is easily circumvented: in the worst-case
scenario we just translate all the object talk into event talk (or vice versa) and
see how the analyses square off in particular cases. And as we have seen, the
transference analysis so far appears to be improvement over the counterfactual
analysis when it comes to fulfilling our basic desideratum.
Developing the transference analysis
Some work needs to be done to tighten up the basic transference analysis
supplied in "On the grammar of cause". First, we should be more precise about
which quantities are being transferred. Aronson notes that the transference
analysis is associated with conservation principles:
When change is thought of in quantitative terms, it becomes quite natural to ask for
the origin of that change (or new quantity). So in seeking the cause of a change that
takes place, we are essentially seeking its source or contributor. But this is another
way of saying that quantities (eg momentum and energy) within a system are
conserved.77
If this is the case, then velocity cannot be one of the transferred quantities.
Consider a billiard ball striking another object and stopping. If velocity were
conserved, that object would move away at the velocity of the billiard ball,
regardless of the mass of the object. This is not what we observe in collisions.
What is conserved in collisions is momentum: the product of mass and velocity
of objects involved in the collision.
76 This argument resembles a view of Reichenbach's reported by Anthony Quinton - that
every ordinary singular statement in which reference is made to an individual can be
interpreted in terms of objects or events. For example, "George VI was crowned in
Westminster Abbey in 1937" (where the property of being crowned at a certain time and
place is ascribed to George VI) could equally well be reported in terms of "event-
properties" ascribed to events, such as "An event that happened in Westminster Abbey in
1937 has the event property of being a crowning of George VI". See pp198-9, Quinton,
Anthony: "Objects and events", pp197-214, Mind vol 88 (1979)
77 "On the grammar of cause", pp426-7
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Another criticism is due to Fair. Under the transference analysis, the
asymmetry of the causal relation is due to the transference of a quantity from
the cause to the effect. If we are indiscriminate about what sort of quantities are
being transferred, we will find the asymmetry pointing in the wrong direction.
Define the quantity "negenergy" as the energy lost in an interaction. The
direction of causation governed by transference of this quantity is from effect to
cause.78 We follow Fair in supposing that the relevant quantities for
transference are energy and momentum (both linear and angular), which prima
facie are transferred from cause to effect, and are also governed by conservation
principles. Thus we should modify Aronson's conditions for causation:
(1) In "A causes B", "B" designates an unnatural change in an object
(2) In "A causes B", at the time B occurs, the object that causes B is in contact with
the object that undergoes the change
(3) Prior to the time of the occurrence of B, the body that makes contact with the
effect object possesses a quantity (energy or momentum) which is transferred to
the effect object (when contact is made) and manifested as B.
We shall call a transference analysis which fits these modified conditions an
Aronson-Fair analysis.
A further amendment also seems advisable. The issue in question is the
physical scale at which causation occurs. The conditions obeyed by an Aronson-
Fair analysis refer to unnatural changes in objects and energy or momentum
transfers from one object to another object. Yet objects vary dramatically in
physical scale. An electron is an object. A billiard ball is an object. Frank is an
object. The Moon is an object. A galaxy is an object. The universe is an object.
All these objects undergo unnatural changes.79 So all these objects enter into
causal relations - presumably, the same sort of causal relations. So Aronson-
Fair, as developed so far, is what we will call a scale-invariant analysis of
78 "Causation and the flow of energy", p239
79 Arguably, even the universe. Some cosmological theories posit that our universe is
structurally stabilised by being joined by wormholes to other universes. Energy levels in
the various universes are balanced out by energy transfers through the wormholes. If these
theories are correct, then our entire universe undergoes unnatural changes - it is
interacting with the other universes.
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causation. Scale-invariant means simply that the sorts of causal relations hold
between the relata of the analysis at every physical scale the relata can occur at.
But scale-invariance surely poses a problem for an analysis of causation in
which causal dependence tracks to physical dependence. Few if any physical
phenomena manifest themselves at such a maximally wide variety of physical
scales as, for example, the scattering of an electron off an electron and the
scattering of a galaxy off another galaxy. Is the same sort of energy or
momentum transference really taking place in the case of the electrons and the
case of the galaxies?
We are faced with a dilemma: either one of these cases is causal and the other
isn't (which we want to deny), or the notion of energy and momentum
transference Aronson-Fair appeals to is massively disjunctive (which is also
unattractive).
Well, perhaps the notion of energy and momentum transfer is not all that
disjunctive. Maybe we could get by with two separate notions, drawn from two
sources familiar to the educated layperson: quantum theory and classical
relativistic theory. At the scale of the electron scattering off the electron, energy
and momentum transfers are governed by the rules of quantum physics: in this
case, primarily by quantum electrodynamics (the fundamental theory of the
electromagnetic interaction). At the scale of the galaxies colliding, the energy
and momentum transfers are governed by relativistic mechanics.
(At the scale of billiard balls and Frank we typically apply the rules of
Newtonian mechanics, but acknowledge that what is really governing the
transferences is relativistic mechanics. The use of Newtonian mechanics is
driven by purely epistemic motives - it is a usefully precise approximation in
most cases involving billiard balls and people, and it is considerably more
convenient to use than relativistic mechanics. We do not use it because of an
ontological motivation: for example, that at the scale of billiard balls Newtonian
rules apply, and relativistic rules do not.)
What seems more likely is that we have to make do with one notion of energy
and momentum transfer: the notion drawn from quantum theory. This
conjecture is argued for by Adrian Heathcote in his 1989 paper 1/A theory of
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causality: causality = interaction (as defined by a suitable quantum field
theory)". 80
Heathcote supports the general principles of the Aronson-Fair transference
analysis, but believes there are problems about which notion of energy or
momentum transference is being appealed to in the analysis, and some
ambiguity over the scale that causation really takes place at.81 Heathcote
presents the case that an adequate analysis of causation needs to fulfil certain
desiderata: that there should be no causal paradoxes (or that the fabric of
spacetime is causally "well-behaved"), that causal influence does not propagate
faster than the speed of light, and that causal influence always flows from cause
to effect, from past to the future. In a formidable feat of erudition, Heathcote
then sets out to demonstrate that an analysis of causation in which causal
interaction reduces to the physical interactions defined by a suitable quantum
field theory fulfils these desiderata (or at least does not obviously contradict
them).82
We will not argue for Heathcote's position. We don't feel qualified to argue
the point. We shall just accept Heathcote's conjecture that it is possible to
produce an Aronson-Fair-style transference analysis in which the notion of
energy transference appealed to is drawn from quantum theory.
But what of the relativistic notion of energy transference we would like to
adopt for macroscopic causal phenomena such as billiard balls, Frank and
galaxies? Heathcote, following Douglas Currie, argues that such a notion of
energy transference can not provide a satisfactory analysis of causation:
Take a theory of relativistic classical particles (not based on a [quantum field theory]);
one might think that it would be possible to have the particles interact by collisions.
Since the theory is relativistic we would expect that all of the intuitive requirements
that we placed on causality would hold, ie, that causal propagation would be into the
interior of the forward light cone. One would then not need to tie causality to field
80 Heathcote, Adrian: IIA theory of causality: causality = interaction (as defined by a suitable
quantum field theory)", pp77-108, Erkenntnis vol 31 (1989)
81 IIA theory of causality: causality = interaction (as defined by a suitable quantum field
theory)", p84
82 IIA theory of causality: causality = interaction (as defined by a suitable quantum field
theory)", pp82-99. In fact, our discussion will show in passing that the third desideratum is
actually violated by the quantum energy/momentum transference model.
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theories in particular. However, though the relativity gives the correct schematic
restrictions on causality to avoid paradoxes, the particle nature of the theory turns out
to prevent a proper definition of causality. The relevant theorems were proven by
Douglas Currie in a paper in 196383 ... - a paper which deserves to be better known
by both philosophers and mathematicians. Essentially Currie showed that in the
relativistic Hamiltonian formulation of classical particle mechanics particles cannot
interact - their world lines are all straight, they cannot be accelerated and hence their
velocities are constant. In short relativistic Hamiltonian theory can only apply to free
particles. Hence one cannot think of relativistic particles affecting one another,
therefore there is no causality. This is a very surprising conclusion. The only way out
is to go over to a quantum theory of fields.84
Once again, we shall not argue for this position. We shall just accept that it is
the case. Rather unfairly - since the failure to substantiate the point is ours -
we shall refer to the thesis that the only suitable notion of energy and mass
transference is that provided by quantum theory as the Heathcote conjecture.
We believe that an adequate Aronson-Fair transference analysis must respect
the Heathcote conjecture.85 There is no disjunction between the notions of
energy or momentum transference at different scales, there is only quantum
energy/momentum transference.86 Since transference only occurs at the
83 The reference given by Heathcote is to Currie, Douglas: "Interaction contra classical
relativistic Hamiltonian particles mechanics," pp1470-88, Journal ofmathematical physics vol
4 (1963)
"A theory of causality: causality = interaction (as defined by a suitable quantum field
theory)", p103
85 And, probably, so does Aronson. See "Conditions versus transference: a reply to Ehring",
p250, where Aronson claims that" ... the transference model is committed to reducing
complex, "macroscopic" cases of making things happen to combinations of fundamental
processes of transference." On the following page, the examples given of these
fundamental processes are the exchange of messenger particles as governed by the forces
described by quantum field theories.
86 It makes most sense to talk of energy/momentum transference rather than energy
transference or momentum transference once we adopt the quantum notion of transference.
Under quantum theory, the momentum of a particle is generally related to the energy of a
particle by the equation:
where "E" is energy, "mrest" is the rest mass of the particle, "p" is momentum and "c" is
the velocity of light. But momentum is possessed by all entities in the quantum realm,
including wavelike objects with zero rest mass such as photons. The momentum of such an
entity is determined by the equation:
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quantum scale, an adequate Aronson-Fair analysis is not scale-invariant.
Causation properly takes place only at the quantum scale.
Does this fling us back onto the other horn of our dilemma, that the collision
of galaxies (and indeed the bonking of Frank and the gentle clack of billiard
balls on green baize) is not causal under an adequate Aronson-Fair analysis?
We say no. The solution must be to accept that when we refer to an everyday
unnatural change, such as a white striking a red, we are not directly referring to
a single, simple causal relation as our commonsense talk of changes and objects
might lead us to believe. The causal dependence will be the sum of a very
complex set of quantum-scale transferences.
First consider the case of the scattering of an electron from another electron.
Two electrons approach each other, each with some range of momentum and
energy.87 The electrons then interact via the electromagnetic interaction. As a
first approximation, this involves the exchange of a virtual photon (the
quantum of the electromagnetic field) between the two electrons. Two electrons
then move apart from one another, with different energy/momenta than the
two approaching electrons.
The situation is more complex in the case of the billiard balls because billiard
balls are not solely made up of electrons. The atoms comprising the molecules
hp=-A
where "h" is Planck's constant and II A II is the wavelength of the photon (or other such
wave). In such objects, the relation between energy and momentum is even simpler:
E=pc
Thus any transference of energy at this scale will also involve a transference of momentum,
and it seems pointless to continue drawing a distinction between the transference of energy
and the transference of momentum.
87 We cannot be more precise than this. The Heisenberg uncertainty principle:
(where &c is the uncertainty in position of a particle, dp is the uncertainty in momentum
and h is Planck's constant) dictates that if we precisely specify the position of a particle
such as an electron then we cannot precisely specify the momentum of that particle. This is
not due to technological limitations on our capabilities to observe the electron's position.
There simply is no fact of the matter about the electron's precise momentum within a small
enough area of space. (See pp54-7, Davies, Paul: The forces ofnature (Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press, 1979)
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comprising the billiard balls contain many other electrically-charged particles,
such as protons, which also interact with the electrons via the exchange of
virtual photons. We will only mention the electrons in the description of the
white striking the red - this will be sufficient to demonstrate the complex
flavour of the dependence.
At the initial"point" of interaction at the initial IIinstantII of contact of the
white and the red, the electrons in the outer surface of the red and the outer
surface of the white exchange virtual photons. The resultant energy/momenta
of electrons in the outer surface of the red and the white brings these electrons
into closer proximity with electrons deeper inside the balls and further
exchanges of virtual photons take place. The resultant energy/momenta of
electrons in the deeper levels brings them closer to electrons at even deeper
levels, and so forth. A cascade of energy/momentum transfers occurs through
the electrons in the red.
Behind this initial wave of energy/momentum transfers, more and more
energy/momentum is being pumped into the red through the point of contact
with the white by the continued close proximity of the electrons in the white to
the electrons in the red. A similar state of affairs is pertaining in the white.
Eventually, enough energy/momentum is transferred by the electromagnetic
interactions between the electrons in the balls in order that the statistical sum of
energy/momenta of the electrons within the balls carries the balls out of
contact.
Note that an Aronson-Fair analysis which respects the Heathcote conjecture
must relax conditions 2 and 3, insofar as those conditions require the relevant
objects to be in contact while causation is taking place. What is instead required
is that the objects are exchanging quanta, such as virtual photons. This is not a
bad thing for the analysis. Consider the north poles of two magnets being
pushed together. The magnets repel each other, but do not need to come into
contact with each other for repulsion to take place. If we were to strictly apply
the contact clauses of the conditions, we would not be able to say that this was a
causal phenomenon. If we specify that causation is the linking exchanges of the
quanta of the electromagnetic field - in this case, virtual photons - the
analysis still allows this phenomenon to be causal, which seems correct.
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So it is possible to give an account of the macroscopic causal phenomena we
observe purely by reference to the quantum notion of energy/ momentum
transference: we merely have to refer to many, many separate instances of
transference. Even if the Heathcote conjecture is true, the causal status of
macroscopic physical interactions is preserved.
In fact, by limiting our notion of energy and momentum transference to
quantum energy/momentum transference we gain a much clearer causal
analysis of macroscopic interactions than we would otherwise. Consider the
bonking of Frank. If we try to interpret this example with an Aronson-Fair
analysis which appeals to a Newtonian or relativistic notion of energy or
momentum transference, it would make sense to treat the relevant objects
(Frank, the Moon and the Earth) as if they were single mass points. Hence we
would conclude that the entire Moon and the entire Earth playa causal role in
Frank's crushing. But for causal dependence between the Moon and Frank to
track physical involvement between the Moon and Frank, causal involvement
should be limited to the contact zones of the Moon and Frank (while there still
is something that we could dignify with the name Frank). It isn't clear why this
should be the case under an Aronson-Fair analysis which does not accept the
Heathcote conjecture. There is no such problem if we limit the notion of energy
and momentum transference to that of quantum theory. The contact zones
propagating through the relevant objects just are the quantum-scale cascades of
energy/ momentum transfers between charged particles inside the Moon and
Frank.
So, in summary, an adequate transference analysis of causation is most likely
to be an Aronson-Fair analysis which respects the Heathcote conjecture.
A (mostly) surmountable problem
Unfortunately, even an Aronson-Fair analysis which respects the Heathcote
conjecture faces some significant problems. Some can be overcome; some we
can be less sanguine about.
The first version of a problem which can mostly be overcome is originally
raised by Fred Dretske and is discussed by Aronson in "On the grammar of
cause". In ordinary language we often say things cause other things to stop.
This might seem to cause problems for a transference analysis. If a motor
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scooter runs into a wall and is stopped, what did the wall transfer to the
scooter?
Even at this early stage of development of the analysis - when many more
physical quantities than energy or momentum might instantiate a causal
transfer - Aronson finds lacking the answer that inertia or rest are transferred.
Inertia or rest don't seem to be the sort of quantities that could be possessed or
passed on. At first Aronson argues that the motor scooter hitting the wall is an
instance of causation, but the actual direction of causation is opposite to that
suggested by language: the scooter actually transfers kinetic energy to the wall
in the form of heat and deformation in the wall. But then Aronson argues that
the wall also transfers momentum to the scooter. In fact, in cases of collisions
between two bodies, A and B, causal relations come in pairs: one runs from
cause A to effect B, and another from cause B to effect A.88
It seems easier to understand this defence in an adequate Aronson-Fair
analysis. Go back to the white striking the red. As a working hypothesis it
seems reasonable to say that the virtual photons that instantiate the
transference of momentum between the electrons at the point of contact could
just as readily have originated from an electron in the red as they do from an
electron in the white.89 Similarly, throughout the virtual photon cascades in the
red and the white, some virtual photons will be originating from the deeper
electrons, and some from the shallower electrons. So it really does appear that
we have quantum transferences proceeding in both directions, which we can
interpret as summing to two macroscopic transferences, one from the white to
the red and one from the red to the white. If the truth of our working
hypothesis is granted, then Aronson's solution appears to be correct.
John Earman extends the basic Dretske problem.90 Earman notes that the
transference analysis attempts to give an objective basis to the asymmetry of
causation which is independent of anthropomorphic manipulation. Therefore,
the analysis should be observer independent. But special relativity shows us
that the direction of transference in collisions is observer dependent.
88 "On the grammar of cause", p424
89 If this seems like an unnecessary equivocation, it is because we shall soon argue that it is
not reasonable to accept this hypothesis.
90 Earman, John: "Causation: a matter of life or death", pp5-25, Journal ofphilosophy vol 73
(1976)
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We can illustrate this with our billiard balls. Consider an observer moving in
the same frame of reference as the white before impact. She will observe a
stationary white, which a red moves towards and knocks away. For that
observer, the red has transferred momentum to the white. Consider another
observer moving in the frame of reference of the red before impact. He will see
the white move up and knock the red away. For that observer, momentum will
be transferred from the white to the red. Hence whether the white caused the
red to move or the red caused the white to move will be observer dependent.
There are several responses that transference analysts have or could make to
this example. One might be to question whether observer dependence really
does conflict with there being an objective basis to causal asymmetry. Similarly,
Fair's response is to bite the bullet and accept Earman's contention that the
asymmetry of momentum and energy transfers is observer-dependent in
relativistic contexts. But Fair argues that this phenomenon supports the
transference analysis, since intuitively it seems that causal asymmetry is also
observer-dependent in these contexts.91
Appeals to intuition are tempting, but intuition is ever a fickle guide to such
matters. Heathcote and Aronson prefer to argue against Earman's contention.
Heathcote does not deal with the objection directly, but appears to think that
the problem will be solved by adopting the correct notion of
energy/momentum transference.92 Aronson's response is along the same lines
as his solution to the Dretske problem: causal relations come in pairs, and a
body at rest is quite capable of transferring energy or momentum to a body in
motion.93 We think that so long as our working hypothesis about the origins of
virtual quanta in quantum interactions is true, Aronson's reply is correct for an
adequate Aronson-Fair analysis.
The basic idea behind Dretske and Earman's objections appearG to be that in
the case of macroscopic bodies, the classical momentum of a body (p) is given
by the equation:
p=mv
91 "Causation and the flow of energy", p240
92 "A theory of causality: causality =interaction (as defined by a suitable quantum field
theory)", p84
93 "Untangling ontology from epistemology in causation", pp298-9, and pp57-9, Aronson,
Jerrold: A realist philosophy of science (New York: St Martin's Press, 1984)
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where "m" is the body's mass and "v" is the body's velocity. In the cases of the
wall struck by the scooter, the white in the white's frame of reference and the
red in the red's frame of reference, the objects mentioned have a velocity of
zero, so by the equation they have a momentum of zero. If so, how could they
transfer momentum to something else?
Well, the answer is supplied by the quantum picture of the electromagnetic
interaction. Electrons in any motion state are surrounded by a swarm of virtual
photons.94 Just because one electron in an interaction is more or less at rest and
the other is more or less in motion, it doesn't mean that the virtual photon
transferring momentum between the electrons comes from the electron more or
less in motion. The macroscopic sum of these exchanges add up to there being a
causal dependence of the body in motion on the body at rest as much as there is
a dependence of the body at rest on the body in motion.
So we appear to have successfully fended off the Dretske-Earman objections
and defended Aronson's contention that there are paired causal dependences in
instances of collisions. But there is a bug in our argument. Our working
hypothesis suggests that virtual photons transfer energy /momentumfrom one
electron to another. There is a temporal directionality of transfer that underlies
the causal asymmetry of cause and effect. Yet there is no such directionality
involved in the exchange of a virtual photon in an electromagnetic interaction
(nor in the exchange of any virtual particle mediating one of the other quantum
interactions).
Some quantum interactions do display the required sort of directionality for
Aronson's causal asymmetry. Consider the glowing of the heated iron bar. Here
excited electrons decay from higher to lower energy orbitals95 around the iron
atoms. This produces real photons which carry energy/momentum away from
the iron bar, and then knock electrons in the retina of our eyes from lower
energy orbitals into higher energy orbitals. Enough of this sort of thing
produces the macroscopic phenomenon of the hot iron bar glowing. Real
94 The forces ofnature, pp124-7
95 An orbital is a likely position that an electron can be found in around an atom. It is not a
precise location: an electron in any orbital could be found·anywhere in the vicinity of the
atom, except, typically, at the centre of the nucleus (provided restrictions of the Pauli
exclusion principle are respected). But different orbitals dictate different volumes of space
that the electron is more or less likely to be in. Electrons more between orbitals by virtue of
emission or absorption of photons.
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photons have enough of an independent existence from the objects that emit or
absorb them for us to profitably describe as moving from or to objects. Hence
we can refer to them as being "emitted from" or "absorbed by" without doing
too much damage to the language we are describing the phenomena with.
Virtual photons, on the other hand, do not lead such an independent
existence. Their lifetime is governed by the Heisenberg uncertainty principle
and can be calculated by the formula:
where" v" is the frequency of the photon.96 In this time, the virtual photon is
able to move a distance equivalent to one of its own wavelengths before it is
either captured by another charged particle (producing the electromagnetic
interaction we have been discussing within the billiard balls) or is reabsorbed
by the emitting particle (producing the phenomenon of a charged particle
interacting with its own electromagnetic field, known as "self interaction").
Unfortunately, over this timescale it is impossible to determine which
charged particle is "emitting" and which charged particle is "absorbing" the
virtual photon.97 As per the constraints imposed by the Heisenberg uncertainty
principle on knowing the precise location and the precise momentum of a
quantum-scale particle, this failure to distinguish which particle emits the
photon and which absorbs the particle is not due to technological constraints on
our ability to conduct precise enough observations to distinguish the difference.
There simply is no fact of the matter about which particle emits and which
particle absorbs the virtual photon.98
So the grounds for Aronson's contention that in cases of macroscopic
collisions we find equidirected pairs of asymmetric causal relations are
undermined. An adequate Aronson-Fair analysis should be more inclined to
96 The forces ofnature, pp124-6
97 The forces ofnature, pp127-8
98 Another way of expressing this point is that over small distances photons have a
propensity to travel faster or slower than c (c is interpreted as the average speed of light in a
vacuum). See p96, Feynman, Richard: QED: the strange theory of light and matter (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1985).
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state that there is a symmetrical causal relation between the two colliding
objects.99
It might be objected that some of the interactions between the charged
particles in the billiard balls might involve real photons. These interactions are
truly directional, and could sum to equidirected asymmetric causal
dependences. (By this line of argument, there are three causal relations afoot in a
collision: two equidirected asymmetric dependences and a symmetrical
interdependence.) Yet asymmetry would still not be guaranteed in causal
dependence. Consider causal phenomena such as radioactive decay,lOO which
are based on the weak interaction rather than the electromagnetic interaction.
This interaction is not mediated by exchanges of photons, but rather by three
other bosons: the W+, W- and ZOe In our universe, the interaction is almost
exclusively mediated by virtual versions of these bosons. Real versions of these
particles are extremely unlikely to appear of their own accord, and are
extremely difficult to produce by artificial methods. lOl So virtually all
radioactive decay involves causally symmetric dependence.
So we are forced to retrench the adequate Aronson-Fair analysis slightly: it
does not provide quite the account of causal asymmetry in simultaneous
causation that it was intended to provide. Is this a major problem?
Perhaps not. We still have an account of causal asymmetry in the paradigm
case of the hot iron causing a glow, because this involves real photons. We have
a solution to the Dretske-Earman examples, because the existence of a
symmetrical causal relation between rest object and moving object gives as
good a grounds for the rest object having causal influence on the moving object
as the existence of an equidirected pair of asymmetric causal relations.
Aronson might be concerned that such a retrenched analysis would not
provide an adequate basis for a theory of scientific explanation. We want to say
that the hot iron explains the glowing, but we do not want to say that the
99 So to some extent Heathcote's desiderata for an analysis of causation are violated by the
quantum notion of energy/momentum transference. In some causal interactions - those
involving virtual quanta - there is no fact of the matter about whether causal influence
propagates into the future or the past.
100 Cited by Aronson as a causal phenomenon: see "Conditions versus transference: a reply to
Ehring", p251
101 For a good account of the difficulties involved, see Watkins, Peter: Story of the Wand Z
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1986)
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glowing explains the heat of the iron. The existence of a causal asymmetry
between the heating and the glowing provides rather a nice ground for the
explanatory asymmetry. If most causal dependence turns out to be
symmetrical, might we not lose our account of explanatory asymmetry?
Well, consider the cases where the causal dependence is symmetrical. The
red and the white cause each other to move. But in this case we are inclined to
believe that the impact of the red explains the motion of the white as much as
the impact of the white explains the motion of the red. Consider the weak
interaction. Does the transmutation of a proton into a neutron explain the
nearby transmutation of an electron into a neutrino, or vice versa? Either
explanation seems fine. Given that explanatory symmetry is manifest in these
cases, perhaps causal symmetry doesn't amount to much of an problem for
Aronson on these grounds.
Bouncing Frank
The next problem is considerably less clearly overcome by an adequate
Aronson-Fair analysis, and certainly not by an Aronson-Fair analysis which
does not respect the Heathcote conjecture. The argument is that an Aronson-
Fair analysis gives an inadequate account of "causal connectivity" for an
analysis of causation in which causal dependence tracks physical dependence.
Let us consider a similar problem case to the bonking of Frank. This time we
are interested in the bouncing of Frank. As in the case of the bonking of Frank,
the Moon (securely wrapped in duct tape) strikes the Earth. This time, rather
than standing under the impact point, Frank is on the other side of the Earth,
directly opposite the point of impact, steadily leaping up and down.
Now clearly the Moon striking the Earth counts as an instance of causation
on an Aronson-Fair analysis which does not respect the Heathcote conjecture.
Both bodies undergo unnatural changes, both bodies are in contact, and both
bodies transfer energy and momentum to one another. Frank's bouncing counts
as an instance of causation. The surface of the Earth is holding Frank up,
preventing him from sinking to the centre of the Earth under the influence of
the Earth's gravitational pull. The soles of Frank's boots are doing a similar job,
preventing the Earth from sinking to the centre of Frank. At the beginning of
Frank's leap, the Earth and Frank are in contact. When Frank leaves the ground,
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a small quantity of energy and momentum has been transferred to Frank by the
Earth, and a near equal small quantity of energy and momentum has been
transferred to the Earth from Frank.
Now consider two cases. In the first, an observer notes that Frank's last leap
occurs after the Moon has struck the Earth, but just before the growing contact
zone resulting from the impact has encompassed the part of the Earth that
Frank is leaping from. In the second, the observer notes that Frank' last leap
occurs just fractionally after the contact zone encompasses the point from which
Frank is leaping, ("Just fractionally after" is intended to capture the
circumstance that there is still a reasonably contiguous surface of the Earth for
Frank to be leaping from, and the additional impulsive loading supplied by the
Earth to Frank is not so great that it interferes with the leaping process by, for
example, breaking Frank's legs.)
The physical circumstances of Frank's last leap will be considerably different
in each case. In the first case, so long as Frank is putting pretty much the same
effort into the leap as in the previous leaps, the distance leapt vertically will be
pretty much the same as in each of the previous leaps. In the second case, the
Earth that Frank leaps from contributes much more momentum and kinetic
energy to Frank than it did in the previous leaps. Effectively, the Earth acts like
a giant springboard. Frank will travel considerably further vertically upwards
on his final bounce. (He will not travel further downwards. Unlike a normal
springboard, the Earth - or, as is more likely, the remains of the Earth - will
be rapidly rising up behind Frank and will swat his shattered body from the
sky fairly soon after he begins to fall back.)
So we have a dramatic difference between these two instances of the
bouncing of Frank. It is fairly clear why there is a difference in height in Frank's
last bounce in each case. In the big last leap case the impact of the Moon on the
Earth is physically contributing to the height of Frank's leap by adding to the
impulsive loading supplied by the Earth on Frank, and in the normal leap case,
the Moon's impact does not physically contribute to the impulsive loading
supplied to the Earth. To follow the basic desideratum that causal dependence
tracks physical dependence, we should insist on saying that the impact of the
Moon is causally connected to Frank's last bounce in the second case, and not
causally connected in the first.
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Unfortunately, the basic conditions of an Aronson-Fair analysis don't allow
us to say this. No explicit guidance is provided on the circumstances under
which it is correct to say"given A is causally connected to Band B is causally
connected to C, then A is causally connected to C". (For brevity's sake, from
now on we will symbolise "is causally connected to" as "~ ".)102
There may be implicit guidance on this issue. One natural interpretation of
the Aronson-Fair conditions is that A is never causally connected to C, because
the B that is being appealed to in "A~ B" is different from the B that is being
appealed to in "B~ C". Consider the bouncing of Frank. The analogue of
"A~ B" is the Moon striking the Earth, transferring momentum and energy and
producing rather violent changes in the Earth - the various impact phenomena
we have discussed in earlier sections. The analogue of "B~ C" is the Earth
transferring momentum to Frank in the course of his leap. So in the first
instance B refers to a change in an object (the impact phenomena experienced by
102 Lest we be accused of multiplying philosophical terminology unnecessarily, note that a
failure of causal connectivity is not the same thing as a failure of causal transitivity.
Under a transitive analysis of causation (such as a Lewis-style counterfactual analysis),
if we have the causal relation A~ B and the causal relation B~ C, then we have the causal
relation A~ C. It has been argued that causal relations can fail to be transitive in this
manner. To paraphrase an example recently used by Douglas Ehring, let A be Davidson
putting potassium salts in a fireplace, let Bbe a purple fire in the fireplace a little later, and
let C be the death of Elvis as a result of the fire still later on. Davidson's actions cause the
purple fire, so we have A~ B. The purple fire causes Elvis's death, so we have B~ C. So
by transitivity we have A~ C - Davidson's actions caused Elvis's death. But Ehring
argues that this is absurd. All Davidson did was make the flames purple. Elvis would have
bumed to death even if the fire wasn't purple. So Davidson isn't a cause of Elvis's death
(Causation and persistence: a theory ofcausation, pp76-7). Michael McDermott provides a
similar case: My dog bites off my right forefinger. The next day I set off a bomb by pressing
the detonator button with my left forefinger - but I would have used my right forefinger if
I had a right forefinger to use. The dog bite caused me to use my left forefinger. Pressing
the button with my left forefinger caused the bomb to explode. But the dog bite isn't a
cause of the explosion. (See McDermott, Michael: "Redundant causation", pp523-44, British
journal for the philosophy ofscience vol 46 (1995).)
Neither of these putative cases of failure of transitivity involve failures of connectivity.
The potassium salts did make the flames purple. The purple flames did bum Elvis to death.
My right forefinger was missing when I pressed the detonator button. What we have is
rather a failure of salience: the purpleness was present in the flames but was not at all
efficacious in bringing about Elvis's death; the finger was missing, but this was not
efficacious in bringing about the explosion. Indeed, failures of transitivity presuppose that
connectivity is satisfied in a given situation. If the purple fire had burnt out and a
subsequently lit non-purple fire had killed Elvis, we would not be worried about a failure
of transitivity (similarly, if the dog had bitten off my finger, but someone else had pressed
the button the following day). Under these non-connective circumstances, the question of
transitivity does not even arise.
We will not insist on adequate transitivity. Je n'ai pas temp. Je n'ai pas temps. But we will
insist that an analysis of causation must be adequately connective.
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the Earth) and in the second instance B refers to the object itself (the Earth).
Given this ambiguity between references to B, we conclude that there is no
causal connection between A and C under these circumstances, or indeed under
any circumstances, since such an assertion would involve some ambiguity over
the nature of the intervening B.
This interpretation of connectivity renders Aronson-Fair style transference
analyses inadequately connective. We would conclude that in both cases of the
bouncing of Frank the impact of the Moon would play no causal role in the
height of Frank's last leap. But clearly there is a difference in each case. This
difference is also clearly linked in one case to a physical contribution of the
impact of the Moon to the leap and in the other case to a lack of such a
contribution. So causal dependence comes adrift from physical dependence. So
the basic desideratum that transference analyses are supposed to preserve is
violated.
This interpretation of causal connectivity in Aronson-Fair is closely linked to
the interpretation of causal relata in Aronson-Fair analyses which states that
causal relations have mixed relata: the antecedent of the relation is an object, the
consequent of the relation is a change in the object. But as we have argued
earlier, we need not adopt this interpretation of causal relata. Both A and B in
"A--.:; B" could be interpreted as changes in objects, or, equivalently, as objects
undergoing changes. The same is true of Band C in "B --.:; C".
So under this interpretation of relata, we appear to have rescued causal
connectivity in the case of the bouncing of Frank in which the contact zone of
the Moon-Earth collision has spread to Frank's jumping-off point. The Moon
(A) is causally connected to the Earth (B), which we can treat of as an object
undergoing change (the various impact phenomena). The Earth (B), an object
undergoing change in the form of the impact phenomena is causally connected
to Frank (C), another object undergoing change (the leaping). There is no
ontological ambiguity in the nature of B in the two circumstances"A --.:; B" and
"B --.:; C", so there is no bar on "A --.:; C".
Unfortunately, such an interpretation makes Aronson-Fair analyses
excessively connective. The fact that the B term in A --.:; Band B--.:; C refers to one
and the same change in an object (or one and the same object undergoing one
and the same change) cannot be sufficient to establish A--.:; C if we wish to
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preserve the basic desideratum that causal dependence tracks physical
dependence. For the purposes of demonstration, suppose that such a fact is
sufficient. Now consider the case of the bouncing of Frank where the contact
zone of the Earth-Moon impact has not reached Frank's jumping-off point.
Clearly we have A-:; B (the Moon-Earth causal connection) and B-:; C (the
Earth-Frank causal connection). B in each case is one and the same object
undergoing one and the same change (the Earth undergoing various impact
phenomena). So, by hypothesis, the impact of the Moon is causally connected to
Frank's last leap. But in this case there is no physical contribution made by the
impact of the Moon. Once again, causal dependence has come adrift from
physical dependence. The appeal to the presence of one and the same
intervening object undergoing one and the same change is too blunt an
instrument to adequately establish connectivity between different causal
dependences in a transference analysis.
The moral is that the basic Aronson-Fair analysis lacks the resources to give
the correct answers to questions of causal connectivity. The case of the
bouncing of Frank shows us that in some cases a later physical dependence is
connected to an earlier physical dependence, and in some cases it is not. On one
reading of Aronson-Fair, there are no corresponding causal connections
between these dependences. On the other plausible reading of Aronson-Fair,
there are too many causal connections. So as it stands, Aronson-Fair fails the
connectivity requirement for an analysis of causation motivated by the basic
desideratum that causal dependence should track physical dependence.
To rehabilitate Aronson-Fair we need to provide an explicit account of causal
connectivity that captures the difference between the two cases of the bouncing
of Frank. To preserve our basic desideratum that causal dependence tracks
physical dependence, this account should be sensitive to the physical
differences between the two cases. The physical difference in this case is very
clear. In the case of Frank's big last leap, the spreading contact zone of the
impact of the Moon with the Earth has reached Frank's jumping-off point
before Frank's last leap. In the case of Frank's normal last leap, the contact zone
has not reached the jumping-off point before Frank's last leap.
Can we rescue the situation by moving to an Aronson-Fair analysis which
respects the Heathcote conjecture? As we saw earlier, such an analysis seems to
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tie the progressive causal involvement of macroscopic bodies in collision to the
progressive propagation of impact phenomena through those bodies, which
appears to be precisely what we need to solve the connectivity problem. But
our concern is that this might trade the macroscopic connectivity problem for a
quantum-scale connectivity problem.
It seems plausible to us that when electrons are in a particulate mood, they
behave like they are single mass points. Intuitively, we would claim causal
influence must always be able to propagate through a point, connecting an
interaction on one side of the point with an interaction of the other side of the
point. Yet the factors which underlie interaction in these circumstances, such as
the Heisenberg uncertainty principle, suggest that there might not be any such
fact of the matter about the quantum objects connecting the interactions. Worse
still, if the electron is in a wavy mood, and not behaving like a single mass point,
would a disturbance in one area of the waveform be immediately connected
with a disturbance somewhere else in the waveform? If not, the electron - and
other similar quantum particles - might be subject to the same connectivity
problems as any macroscopic object.
We are acutely aware that a satisfactory answer to these problems might
involve a satisfactory solution to the various measurement problems of
quantum theory. Given that we are in no position to offer such a solution (and
as a matter of general principle look somewhat askance at philosophers who do
offer such solutions), we are reluctant to claim that an Aronson-Fair analysis
which respects the Heathcote conjecture can provide a satisfactory solution to
the connectivity problems.
The genidentity of energy/momentum
Perhaps there is a relatively simple solution to the connectivity problem. In
another 1971 paper by Aronson, "The legacy of Hume's analysis of causation",
Aronson places another constraint on causal dependence.
But ... is there an element to the causal relation in addition to mere sequence of
events? The answer is "Yes!" - the causal relation is more than sequence in that the
cause and effect are not only objects or events which are constantly conjoined, but the
cause object [A] possesses a quantity (momentum, energy, force, etc) which is
transferred to the effect object [B] ... A's momentum was transferred to B at the instant
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it made contact with B. Since such a process involves numerical identity of that
particular quantity throughout the sequence of events, it can be seen that,
ontologically, this type of causation is more than mere sequence of events. l03
"Numerical identity" is intended to mean something more than that an equal
amount of the quantity appears in one form or another throughout the relevant
process. l04 Aronson means that the additional momentum acquired by B is one
and the same momentum lost by A. This is the same notion of identity, or
"genidentity" appealed to in considerations of personal identity. Aronson's
arguments throughout "The legacy of Hume's analysis of causation" re-
emphasise that this is the notion of identity being used. The genidentity
requirement is preserved in more advanced versions of the analysis - Fair
thinks this genidentity of energy and momentum is essential to causal
connection, and is even prepared to specify the conditions for this genidentity:
Explicit definitions allow their specifications for particular objects at a time. A closed
system over some time interval of such a class of objects is one which can be
surrounded by a surface across which no gross energy or momentum flows over that
interval. That is, the partial derivatives of energy and momentum are zero over the
boundary for all objects. As long as we can be sure that the system remains closed, the
conservation laws tell us that both quantities will be conserved relative to the system
for the duration that the objects possess them and in all interactions within the system.
Assuming we can identify these objects themselves through time, various
specifications of closed systems allow the identification of energy and momentum
through time in both coarse and fine-grained ways.105
This may be a very important move on Fair's part. Genidentity is normally
associated with things rather than properties of things or quantities possessed
by things. If Aronson's notion that a quantity such as energy/momentum can be
genidentical cannot be sustained, perhaps we can retreat to Fair's notion that
the relevant identity considerations resolve to the genidentity of the objects
possessing this quantity. The notion of genidentity of energy/momentum is
103 "The legacy of Hume's analysis of causation", p145
104 Fair appears to think that Aronson means something different here: that all the energy
transferred away from the cause object must end up in the effect object. ("Causation and
the flow of energy", p239) Really, Aronson is talking about the identity of the energy, not
its exact quantity.
105 "Causation and the flow of energy", p234
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also retained in later work by Aronson (but Aronson still holds in these later
works that the quantity is genidentical).106
So how does this help with connectivity problems? Well, we now seem to
have an ontological criterion for distinguishing between the causal status of the
two cases of the bouncing of Frank. In the case of the normal last leap, the
Moon's energy/momentum has not arrived at the leaping-off point in time to be
transferred to Frank. The only quantity being transferred to Frank is the Earth's
energy/momentum (to be scrupulously precise, the energy/momentum of a
part of the Earth). Hence the lunar impact is not causally connected to Frank's
last leap. In the case of the big last leap, some of the Moon's
energy/ momentum has reached Frank's jumping-off point, manifest in the form
of the edge of the spreading contact zone. So some of the Moon's
energy/momentum is transferred to Frank, and the lunar impact is causally
connected to Frank's last leap. So if the coherence of the notion of the
genidentity of energy/momentum can be established, an adequate Aronson-
Fair analysis might be shown to be adequately connective.
Might be shown. Arguably, the genidentity criterion still leaves an adequate
Aronson-Fair analysis inadequately connective. Assume the genidentity
criterion does hold in our universe. Now consider our electron-only model of
macroscopic interactions: electrons exchange virtual photons which alter the
energy/ momenta of the electrons, bringing the electrons into closer contact
with other electrons so that further exchanges take place, producing a cascade
through the macroscopic body containing the electrons. Yet the electrons at the
contact point need not exchange all and only all their energy/ momenta in the
initial interaction. So the energy/momenta exchanged between electrons in the
outer surface of one object and the deeper electrons need not entirely be
energy/momenta from electrons in the other object. The amount of
energy/ momenta from the other object will, more likely than not, be diffused as
the energy/momenta exchange cascade propagates through the object. In the
case of Frank's big last leap, so many such exchanges will take in the cascade
that it is extremely likely that none of the original energy/momenta will be
manifest in the fringe of the contact zone that reaches Frank's jumping-off
106 For example: "The genidentity of these quantities throughout a physical interaction dictates
that they can only be transferred or exchanged from one part of a system to another when
interaction takes place." ("Conditions versus transference: a reply to Ehring", p249)
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point. So even if the genidentity of energy/momentum holds, an adequate
Aronson-Fair analysis still may not be adequately connective.107
Perhaps this bug could be fixed. But before bothering to do so, we would
want to have some assurance that the genidentity of energy/momentum really
is a feature of our universe. What grounds do we have for supposing that it
holds?
Fair's identity conditions suggest that the genidentity of energy/momentum
is associated with conservation principles. Aronson is more explicit-
genidentity of energy/momentum is required by the conservation of energy and
momentum.
Aronson considers an explanation (by Feynman again) why apparent
instances of non-simultaneous action at a distance such as the electromagnetic
or gravitational interactions do not involve violations of the conservation of
energy or momentum.10B The Sun attracts the Earth which moves towards the
sun. The Earth thereby acquires momentum. For momentum to be conserved,
the sun must also acquire an equal and opposite momentum. If there was some
delay in the Earth acquiring momentum, then the momentum acquired by the
Sun would not be cancelled out, and for some time interval momentum would
not be conserved. Yet there is some delay before the Earth acquires that
momentum. The Feynman explanation is that during the interregnum between
the Sun acquiring the momentum and the Earth acquiring an equal and
opposite momentum, the momentum of the sun is cancelled out by an equal
and opposite momentum possessed and propagated through the gravitational
field of the Sun. Aronson draws the following conclusion:
107 Such examples are raised by Ehring in the context of the transitivity of causation: the initial
energy supplied in an initial interaction in a chain of interactions may be entirely dissipated
by the time the last interaction takes place. So under the transference analysis the initial
interaction is not be a cause of the final interaction. But by transitivity, the initial interaction
should be a cause of the last interaction (liThe transference theory of causation", pp256-7).
Aronson's response ("Conditions versus transference: a reply to Ehring", p254) is to
accept that transference is not transitive (an issue we are neutral on), but deny that this is a
problem, since causation is not transitive (another issue we are neutral on). However,
Aronson's acceptance of Ehring's point that energy might be dissipated is tantamount to
accepting that the transference analysis is not adequately connective in cases such as the
bouncing of Frank (which we are prepared to be disturbed about).
lOB liThe legacy of Hume's analysis of causation", p146
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Note how ... one and the same quantity - viz, momentum - is transmitted at 186,000
miles a second from its source to the object affected, and that at each stage of this
transmission the momentum occurs in various forms. In other words, instead of
saying the momentum of one object is annihilated and the same amount is recreated
in another at a later time - thus, violating conservation principles - we speak of the
momentum of a particle being converted into field momentum and then, again, into
particle momentum. In this way, momentum is conserved. But if we accept Hume's
doctrine of identity being a fiction while admitting of the existence of momentum, a
violation of the conservation of momentum would occur each time a causal relation
occurred in a mechanical situation.l09
Even more succinctly (in "On the grammar of cause", commenting on the same
Feynman passage):
This suggests a definite connection between our notion of "cause" and conservation
principles. The ancient maxim, Ex nihilo, nihil fit tells us that if a quantity comes into
being, there must be some source of that quantity.110
In other words, energy or momentum that shows up in one part of a causal
situation is energy or momentum from some other part of the system. It is a
natural move then to suppose that the relevant energy and momentum is one
and the same energy and momentum from the other part of the system.
Ancient maxims are all very well and good. But does our current best
understanding support the notion of the genidentity of energyI momentum? D
Dieks argues that even in classical physical theories the energy and momentum
conservation principles are merely global constraints on the total energy and
momentum in a system. No genidentity of quantities is required. lll
Another cause for concern is that quantum energyI momentum transferences
appear to be associated with (sufficiently brief) violations of the conservation of
energyI momentum. For example, consider this discussion of the
electromagnetic interaction by Paul Davies:
109 liThe legacy of Hume's analysis of causation", p147
110 "On the grammar of cause", p426
111 See p88, Dieks, D: "Physics and the direction of causation", pp85-110, Erkenntnis vol 25
(1986)
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· .. in order to create an electron-positron pair, a gamma ray photon needs an energy at
least equal to their combined rest mass (about 1 MeV). However, if the photon has less
energy than this, virtual pair creation can still occur. What this means is that the photon
suddenly turns into an electron-positron pair, which then annihilates a brief moment
later and creates another photon. Because it all happens in a microscopic region of
space the particles are also allowed to suspend the law of conservation of momentum
(recall [the Heisenberg uncertainty principle] Llxilp ~ h ), so the annihilation process
only recreates a single photon rather than the two or more that must appear after the
annihilation of a real electron-positron pair.112
Or consider this passage by Peter Watkins:
When considering time intervals familiar to us in daily life, the conservation of energy
is exactly obeyed. However, when we consider extremely short time intervals the
uncertainty principle requires that there be a large uncertainty in the energy so energy
conservation can be violated for short periods. The "books" have to be balanced over
longer periods but large amounts of energy can be "borrowed" if the time interval is
short.113
In the case of the electromagnetic interaction, this "borrowing" takes the form
of virtual photons. But where does this borrowing take place from? Not
necessarily from an "originating" electron or a "destination" electron as Ex
nihilo, nihil fit would lead us to believe. Energy/momentum conservation is
being briefly violated: there is more energy/momentum involved than just that
of the two electrons. This suggests that the conservation of energy/momentum
does not necessitate the genidentity of transferred quantities of
energy/ momentum.
This only establishes that it is consistent with our understanding of the
conservation principles and quantum physics in general that these quantities
are not genidentical. Dieks makes the stronger claim that the genidentity of
these quantities is not compatible with our understanding of quantum theory.114
The example used is Planck's law for the distribution of energy in black body
radiation:
112 The forces ofnature, pI24
113 Story of the Wand 2, pii
114 "Physics and the direction of causation", pp88-9I
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... it is essential that the elements of energy possess no identities of their own. That is,
the interchange of two energy elements must be considered as not changing the
situation in any way; the physical states before and after the interchange are literally
identical. This is not just one possible way of viewing things. If it is supposed that the
states are different, although it may not be ascertainable experimentally, the statistics
used in the derivation become different and this leads to a wrong form of the
radiation law (viz, Wien's law instead of Planck's law). The mere ascription of an
identity to the energy elements therefore entails consequences which are observably
wrong.115
Unfortunately, Dieks' exposition doesn't make it clear that these "energy
elements" are the same things as the supposedly genidentical quantities of
energy/momentum of an adequate Aronson-Fair analysis. No matter: Dowe
expands on this point, arguing that genidentity is not the sort of relation that
could apply to any quantity such as energy/ momentum.
The idea is simple; we have already alluded to it. Genidentity is a notion that
applies to stand-alone things, such as people. If quantities of
energy/momentum are such things, then those quantities might qualify for
genidentity. But these quantities are not stand-alone things. They are possessed
by things (electrons, photons, and so forth), but they do not stand alone as
things in their own right. These quantities are best interpreted as properties of
things. It makes no sense to talk of the genidentity of properties over time.116
The only thing that could rescue the notion of genidentity of
energy/momentum is Fair's reduction of the genidentity of energy/momentum
to genidentity of the objects possessing energy/momentum. But there is a big
bad bug in this tactic. Under an adequate Aronson-Fair analysis,
energy/momentum transference takes place at the quantum scale. The objects
that properly possess the quantities of energy/momentum are quantum-scale
entities such as electrons, photons and quarks. The genidentity of objects fails at
this physical scale.
Dieks states this is the case, noting that:
115 "Physics and the direction of causation", p89
116 "What's right and what's wrong with transference theories", pp368-71
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For instance, if two electrons are scattered it is impossible to tell which one of the
incoming electrons is the same as a chosen one of the pair of outgoing electrons. Even
stronger, not only is it impossible to answer the question experimentally, but the mere
supposition that the answer is possible (that is, the supposition that the electrons
possess an identity of their own) leads to contradictions. This peculiar situation, which
is in strong conflict with classical intuitions, obtains quite generally. Also, if there is no
interaction between the electrons, quantum theory tells us that there is no genidentity
of the various particles. This means that if we make repeated measurements of the
positions of n electrons we find at each measurement n places; but according to
quantum theory it is not permitted to regard any two places in subsequent
measurements as belonging to the path of one and the same particle.117
Wesley Salmon also makes this point as part of a criticism of Dowe's closely-
related conserved quantity analysis of causation. lIB
Given that this is the crucial problem for the adequate Aronson-Fair analysis,
we shall give a brief account of why we know genidentity fails at the quantum
physical scale in this universe.
First consider a IIclassical" case involving two billiard balls in the absence of
any other objects. We observe the white to have a certain momentum at
position wand the red to have a certain momentum at position x. Then a little
later we observe the white to have a certain momentum at position y and the
red to have a certain momentum at position z. How did the billiard balls move
from wand x to y and z in order that the white and the red have the
momentum observed at y and z?
Well, there are a number of possible paths the balls could take. The white
could have proceeded directly from w to y and the red could have proceeded
directly from x to z. Alternatively, the white and the red could have moved
towards each other, collided, and moved apart, eventually arriving at positions
y and z. A moment's reflection shows that there are an infinite number of such
possible paths involving collisions.
117 "Physics and the direction of causation", p89
lIB See p468, Salmon, Wesley: "Causality and explanation: a reply to two critiques", pp461-77,
Philosophy ofscience vol 64 (1998)
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The balls will only take one of these possible paths. We could even determine
which unique path was taken by the red and the white by examining the
momentum measurements taken at the four positions w, x, y and z. Finally, we
can be certain that whatever paths were taken, the white does not end up at z
and the red does not end up at y, because we observe the ball at y to be white
and observe the ball at z to be red.
Now let's consider the energy/momentum of two electrons, observed at w
and x and then at y and z. First, we will insist that one of the electrons observed
at either w or x is genidentical to one of the electrons observed at either y or x,
and the other electron observed at either w or x is genidentical to the other
electron observed at either y or z. Our equivocation signals an immediate
epistemological problem. Electrons, unlike billiard balls, cannot be
distinguished on the basis of their colour, or other properties. So it is not
impossible that the electron at w could be genidentical to the electron at z
(contrary to the case of the billiard balls).
Once again, there are an infinite number of possible paths the electrons could
take to reach y and z. The electron at w could proceed directly to y, and the
electron at x could proceed directly to z. Or the electrons at wand x could
proceed in some other directions but exchange a virtual photon and still end up
at y and z respectively. Or along the way the electrons could have exchanged
three virtual photons, and so forth. To complicate things further, the exchanged
virtual photons could have briefly formed virtual electron-positron pairs
between the "times" of "absorption" and "emission" by the real electrons.
Of course, due to the epistemological problem of distinguishing the
electrons, it is possible that the electron at w could have proceeded directly to z
and the electron at x proceeded directly to y, and so forth.
So which possible path did the electrons take? Trying to determine this by
analogous means as in the case of the billiard balls ("reading off" the actual
path from the original momentum measurements at wand x) is thwarted by an
ontological problem. For a start, the uncertainty principle tells us that there is
no precise fact of the matter about the energy/momenta of the electrons at w
and x or y and z. In fact, determining a unique path that the electrons take is
also ruled out by the uncertainty principle - it would effectively involve
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precisely specifying the energy/momenta of the electrons at every point of their
"trajectory" on the way to y and z.
Given these considerations, it should not be surprising that it is only a
probabilistic matter that the two electrons at wand x end up at y and z at all. To
be precise, given the presence of two electrons at wand x we can calculate an
amplitude that two electrons will be found at y and z. (An amplitude is the
square root of the probability of a quantum event.)119
The differences between the classical motion of the billiard balls and the
quantum motion of the electrons do not end here. The amplitude of the
electrons turning up at y and z is not equal to the amplitude of one of the
possible paths the electrons can take. The actual amplitude is given by the sum
of the amplitudes of all the possible paths the electrons could take: proceeding
directly to y and z, exchanging a virtual photon along the way, exchanging two
virtual photons, etc.120
Now we come to the failure of the genidentity assumption. If there are two
distinct electrons which maintain their identity, then there are two distinct
events which could underlie the energy/momenta measurements which we
make at y and z. In one event, the electron at w has ended up at y and the
electron at x has ended up at z. In the other, the electron at w has ended up at z
and the electron at x has ended up at y. The probability of electrons ending up
at y and z will thus be determined by adding the probability of one event to the
probability of the other - the square of the sum of the amplitudes of the
possible paths of electrons travelling from w to y and x to z is added to the
square of the sum of the amplitUdes of the possible paths of electrons travelling
from w to z and x to y.
But this is not consistent with the predictions of quantum electrodynamics
(the theory of the electromagnetic interaction). We find that the probability of
119 See QED: the strange theory of light and matter
120 The possible path that contributes the most to the overall amplitude of the electrons
moving to y and z is the path in which the electrons proceed directly to y and z. The other
paths contribute less to the sum of amplitudes because they involve junctions or couplings
between particles - such as an electron emitting a virtual photon. Every such coupling
reduces the amplitude of that particular path by a factor of approximately 102. The
amplitude of the possible path involving the exchange of a single virtual photon involves
two such couplings, so the amplitude of that path is approximately 104 times smaller than
the direct path. (QED: the strange theory of light and matter, pp90-7)
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electrons ending up at y and z with particular energy/momenta is given by the
square of the sum of the amplitudes of all possible paths of electrons from w
and x to y and z, including both those in which the electron at wends up at y
and those in which the electron at wends up at Z.121 Now we have a simple
modus tollens. If the electron at w is genidentical with one of the electrons at y
or z and the electron at x is genidentical with the other electron at y or z
(regardless of whether or not we could tell which electron is which) we could
make certain predictions about the probabilities of electrons ending up at y and
z with particular energy/momenta. These predictions turn out not to be the
case. So it is not the case that genidentity holds for electrons, since the
probability of electrons turning up at y and z turns out to be the square of the
sum of the paths, not the sum of the squares. This result can be generalised to
cover all other quantum scale objects.
So Fair's notion of genidentity of transferred quantities fails. The genidentity
of transferred quantities of energy/momenta cannot be reduced to the
genidentity of the objects that those quantities are exchanged between, because
an adequate Aronson-Fair analysis respects the Heathcote conjecture. Thus the
objects that quantities of energy are being exchanged by are objects at the
quantum physical scale, such as electrons. But the genidentity relation fails at
this physical scale - if it did hold, the world would be observably different
from the way it actually is.
Following Dieks and Dowe, we also see that the genidentity relation fails to
coherently apply to quantitative properties of objects. So it is not the case in this
universe that causation involves the transference of genidentical quantities of
energy/momenta. If this is the case, an adequate Aronson-Fair analysis fails to
supply an adequate solution to the problem of connectivity. If an analysis of
causation fails to provide an adequate account of connectivity, causal
dependence under that analysis fails to track physical dependence. So, rather
121 To be accurate, this would only be the case if electrons were not polarised. In the actual
situation, where electrons do have a polarity, we subtract the amplitude of the possible path
along which the electron at w proceeds directly to z (and x to y) from the amplitude of the
path in which the electron at w proceeds directly to y (and x to z). This amplitude is then
added to the difference between the amplitude of the electron at w proceeding to y
exchanging a single virtual photon along the way with the electron at x proceeding to z,
and the amplitude of the electron at w proceeding to z and exchanging a single virtual
photon along the way with the electron at x proceeding to y, and so forth. So when we talk
of the actual amplitude being the square of the sums, this is shorthand for the square of the
sums and the differences.
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surprisingly, the best possible version of the transference analysis of causation
fails to fulfil our basic desideratum.
Where to from here? There is an analysis of causation which prima facie
provides an excellent account of causal connectivity - the process analysis of
causation, most famously developed by Wesley Salmon. Let us investigate
whether this analysis of causation is supportable and can fulfil our basic
desideratum.
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Processes Salmont
Interaction and connection,
production and propagation
An intriguing feature of our discussion of the failure of the transference
analysis has been the ontological relocation of the mystery of causal
connections. In manipulability and counterfactual analyses (and other analyses
which interpret causation in terms of the necessary and sufficient conditions for
an event to be brought about, as given by Ducasse and JL Mackie) causal
relations connect more or less persistent things in sequences. The mystery that
these analyses seek to solve is the nature of the "linking relation". The
transference analysis provides quite a plausible account of what constitutes the
linking relation - exchange of virtual photons or other such virtual particles
carrying energy/momentum from thing to thing. The mystery of causal
connections turns out to be the nature of the linking-thing connecting the causal
interactions. We have seen that denying that any such thing connects causal
interactions produces an analysis which is inadequately connective. Allowing
any object undergoing a change to provide the link produces an analysis which
is excessively connective. And we cannot maintain in an Aronson-Fair analysis
that this link is the genidentity of quantities of energy/momentum.
Given that the failure of the transference analysis to adequately fulfil our
basic desideratum derives from its failure to provide a satisfactory account of
linking-things, it seems likely that an adequate analysis of causation would
need to give an explicit account of causal linking-things as well as causal
linking-relations. The obvious candidates for such an analysis are the various
process analyses of causation developed by Phil Dowe and Wesley Salmon.
The defining attitude of a process analysis is the conviction that we need to
account for two separate features of causation. Firstly, there is the power or
efficacy that causation has to influence states of affairs, which Salmon refers to
as the productive aspect of causation:
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When we say that the blow of a hammer drives a nail, we mean that the impact
produces penetration of the nail into the wood. When we say that a horse pulls a cart,
we mean that the force exerted by the horse produces the motion of the cart.122
Secondly, there is a propagative, or persistent quality to causation which
connects these productive episodes:
Experiences which we had earlier in our lives affect our current behaviour. By means
of memory, the influence of these past events is transmitted to the present. A sonic
boom makes us aware of the passage of a jet airplane overhead; a disturbance in the
air is propagated from the upper atmosphere to our location on the ground ... As all
these examples show, what happens at one place and time can have significant
influence upon what happens at other places and times. This is because causal
influence can be propagated through time and space.123
Clearly, the propagation of contact zones through the Moon (in the case of the
bonking of Frank) and the Earth (in the case of the bouncing of Frank) are also
instances of this sort of causal propagation.
A process analysis thus generally posits two basic causal mechanisms in its
ontology: causal interactions, which constitute the productive episodes; and
causal processes, which constitute the linkages between productive episodes.124
(As we shall discuss presently, in Salmon's first process analysis the productive
episodes are not solely constituted by causal interactions - hence the slight
caveat "generally".)
Clearly, some of the versions of the transference analysis that we have
discussed in the previous chapter could readily be classified as process
analyses.125 These transference analyses also provide convenient examples of
the problems an adequate process analysis of causation needs to overcome.126
122 p285, Salmon, Wesley: "Causality: production and propagation", pp285-301, Salmon,
Wesley: Causality and explanation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998)
123 "Causality: production and propagation", pp286
124 p248, Salmon, Wesley: "Causality without counterfactuals", pp248-60, Salmon, Wesley:
Causality and explanation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998)
125 Dowe frequently claims this: see, for example, p179, Dowe, Phil: "Process causality and
asymmetry", pp179-96, Erkenntnis vol 37 (1992) and p195, Dowe, Phil: "Wesley Salmon's
process theory of causality and the conserved quantity theory", pp195-216, Philosophy of
science vol 59 (1992)
126 As before, an "adequate" analysis is an analysis in which causal dependence tracks
physical dependence.
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The first challenge is that the account of processes needs to be adequately
connective. One version of the Aronson-Fair analysis which does not assert the
genidentity of quantities of energy or momentum would formally qualify as a
process analysis. Transference of quantities of energy or momentum is the
account of causal interactions; being one and the same interposing object
undergoing one and the same physical change is the account of causal
processes. Yet the case of the bouncing of Frank shows us that this account of
processes is excessively connective, so it is not an adequate process analysis.
The second challenge is that the account of processes needs to be based on
some feature of this world. An Aronson-Fair analysis which asserts the
genidentity of transferred quantities of energy or momentum formally qualifies
as a process analysis. Transference of quantities of energy or momentum
provides the account of causal interactions; transmission of genidentical
quantities of energy or momentum from interaction to interaction provides the
account of processes. Arguably, genidentity of transferred quantities would
provide an adequately connective account of processes. Unfortunately,
genidentity does not apply to quantitative properties, and genidentity of
properties can not be reduced to genidentity of the relevant objects the
quantities are being transferred between, because genidentity does not apply to
the relevant objects in this universe. So this process analysis also fails.
The third challenge - which is also the challenge most frequently discussed
by process analysts - is that not every "thing" which might legitimately be
said to connect two causal interactions should be considered to be a causal
connection between the interactions. Intuitively, the gist of this problem is quite
easy to grasp. For example, consider a standard rock being hurled through the
air and colliding with a standard window. Intuitively, the rock flying through
the air seems to qualify as a connection between causal interactions (in this case,
someone hurling the rock, and the window breaking). The flying standard rock
should be a causal process under a process analysis of causation. But suppose
the sun is shining while the rock is being hurled through the window. The rock
casts a shadow on the rock-thrower's hand. As the rock travels through the air,
the shadow travels down the thrower's body and along the ground towards the
window. Just before the rock hits the window, the shadow travels up the wall
the window is located in, and on to the window. When the rock hits the
window, the shadow is being cast on the point of contact of the rock with the
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window. The shadow, like the rock, is a persistent thing. The shadow connects
the same two causal interactions as the rock. But intuitively we wouldn't want
the shadow to count as a causal connection between the hurling of the rock and
the breaking of the window. The shadow should-n't be a causal process. Some
filtering conditions are required to distinguish the causal connections from
connections like the shadow.
There are several ways we could block the possible causal status of a shadow
under a process analysis, although perhaps there is not much of a difference
between each move. First, we could deny that the shadow really is a thing, it is
the absence of a thing - indeed, only a relative absence of a thing. It is a
reduction in illumination in a localised area. If a shadow isn't a thing, afortiori it
couldn't be a linking thing.
The idea has some merit, but is rarely pursued. The reasons appear to be
semantic: whether or not shadows fall under the ontological category of things,
we quantify over shadows in ordinary language. The shadow of the gnomon on
a sundial has a localised position, a direction, and we can draw inferences from
our observations of it; we talk of it in much the same way as the hands on a
clock, which usually count as things. Eliminating the causal connectivity of
shadows by denying their metaphysical thinghood just doesn't seem worth the
ensuing disruption of ordinary language. But Dowe does comes very close to
using this line of argument:
Another problem Fair faces is Salmon's objection that it is not possible to distinguish
energy transmission from a regular appearance of energy giving the example of a
spotlight "spot" moving along a wall. However, one must question whether energy
can legitimately be ascribed to a spot. The energy referred to is manifested by the
segment of wall, and the segment of wall does not move.127
Similarly, we might argue that the features of the shadow are actually features
of the objects along the shadow's path.
Another strategy is to accept that shadows are things, but deny that they are
processes. There is a certain tactical danger in employing this move. The term
"process" in the sense used in Salmon and Dowe's process ontologies is mostly
a term of art: any intuitive understanding of the term derives from its frequent
127 "Wesley Salmon's process theory of causality and the conserved quantity theory", p214
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characterisations in terms of our everyday understanding of things moving
through space and persisting through time. If we were to draw a sharp
distinction between processes and everyday things such as shadows, we might
find ourselves wondering if we understood "process" at all.
The standard move is therefore to accept that the shadow is a process, but
deny that it is a causal process. The standard parlance is that the shadow is a
pseudo process. This causal process/pseudo process distinction is probably
equivalent to either a thing/not-a-thing or an any-old-thing/process
distinction, but stubs fewer intuitive toes.128
So, an adequate process analysis of causation is going to have to provide a
detailed account of the distinction between pseudo processes and causal
processes - indeed, independently of our desideratum Dowe argues that this
is the chief task of the process analyst of causation.129 At the very least, the
various different accounts of the causal/pseudo distinction will provide us
with a taxonomic device for distinguishing between the various process
analyses.
Salmont- basic principles and
prehistory
In the previous chapter, we said we were surprised that the best formulation of
the transference analysis failed to fulfil our basic desideratum. This surprise
was largely due to the dearth of credible alternative bases for an adequate
analysis of causation. If an analysis of causation which reduces causal
dependence to energy/momentum transfers fails to track physical dependence,
what on Earth would?
But perhaps there is a credible alternative. Consider this comment by Davies
on the apparent violations by virtual particles of the temporal asymmetry of
cause and effect:
128 On the other hand, see p324, Dowe, Phil: "Causality and conserved quantities: A reply to
Salmon", pp321-33, Philosophy ofscience vol 62 (1995), where Dowe argues that the
causal/pseudo distinction can be cashed out in terms of varieties of objects for the
"conserved quantity" process analysis.
129 See Dowe, Phil: "Causation, causal processes", Stanford encyclopedia ofphilosophy
(http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/causation-process/, last modified 9 December 1996)
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If the time order of the emission and absorption of virtual quanta cannot be measured
does it not imply something similar to instantaneous transfer of information between
the particles? Could we not use virtual photons to send real messages faster than
light? The answer is no. Nature has arranged for quantum theory and relativity to co-
exist with wonderful consistency. To convey information using electromagnetic
signals we need at least one whole wave to encode it. However, we have seen that
virtual photons cannot travel beyond a distance of one wavelength, so they are useless
for messages. Only real photons can carry information. Apparent causality violation
by virtual photons is a Pyrrhic victory against relativity, because in the absence of
information transfer, the difference between cause and effect is transcended.130
Of course, this observation is no help to Aronson, Fair or Heathcote with regard
to establishing an asymmetric cause-effect dependence in quantum interactions.
Under the transference analysis, causal dependence does not reduce to
information transfer but rather to energyI momentum transfer. Quantum
theory therefore tells us that under such an analysis there is no temporal fact of
the matter about what is cause and what is effect in quantum scale interaction.
This is hardly a Pyrrhic victory.
But the observation does suggest another plausible mechanism by which
causal dependence could track physical dependence. Suppose that causation is
correctly analysed in terms of the flow of information - a popular notion in the
physical sciences.131 If information is physically instantiated, then causal
dependence between things might track physical interactions between things,
because physical interactions would be the means by which information is
transferred between things. Similarly, a satisfactory account of what kinds of
physical things can genuinely instantiate information might solve the problem
of connectivity and the other challenges faced by a process analysis of
causation.132
130 The forces ofnature, pp127-8
131 The view is by no means restricted to Davies. See, for example, the discussion of the causal
consequences of Bell's inequality in pp162-76, Pagels, Heinz: The cosmic code: quantum
physics as the language ofnature (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984).
132 Even at this stage of formulating such a programme, a potential problem in fulfilling our
basic desideratum should be apparent. Physical dependence is associated with virtual
quanta. Yet according to Davies virtual quanta cannot carry information. So if a particular
instance of physical dependence involves virtual quanta, that dependence would not be
causal, since causal dependence involves the transfer or transmission of information,
neither or which can be associated with virtual quanta.
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The first process analysis of causation we shall discuss - historically, the
first of two distinct process analyses developed by Wesley Salmon - is just
such an information transfer analysis. The demarcation between causal and
pseudo processes is cashed out in terms of the ability to transmit a mark, where
a mark is the sort of thing which could be used as a signal. Similarly, causal
interactions are taken to be instances of marking.
This first process analysis (which we shall refer to as "Salmon1") is
developed and outlined in a raft of articles and books beginning with "Causal
and theoretical explanation"133 in 1975 and concluding with "Causal
propensities: statistical causality versus aleatory causality" in 1990.134 As might
be expected of such a work in progress, the role and nature of the critical
concepts in the analysis evolve considerably.135 The "mature" version of
Salmon1 is consequently very rich and complex.
Since some light is cast on the dark comers of Salmon1 by examination of the
development of Salmon's thought on causation (and the development of
Salmon's thought is an interesting topic in its own right), we will give a
detailed semi-historical presentation of the evolution of Salmon1. There are also
technical benefits to such an approach. Many of the complexities arise from
attempts to fill lacunae in the analysis, or responses to criticisms of earlier
versions of such attempts. A historical analysis of Salmon1 therefore serves as a
useful description of what a credible process analysis of causation could not
involve. Any such description will be useful for our interests - determining
whether some variety of process analysis our basic desideratum.
The prospects for our interests seem bright: Salmon eventually claims to
have located causal dependence in physical dependence:
133 Originally titled "Theoretical explanation", but reprinted as Salmon, Wesley: "Causal and
theoretical explanation", pp108-24, Salmon, Wesley: Causality and explanation (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1998). All page references are to the latter source.
134 Originally appearing as Salmon, Wesley: "Causal propensities: statistical causality versus
aleatory causality", pp95-100, Topoi vol 9 (1990) and reprinted in pp200-7, Salmon, Wesley:
Causality and explanation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998). All page references are
to the latter source.
135 Arguably, Salmon} comprises three separate process analyses - each analysis
distinguished by successive attempts to give a satisfactory account of causal interactions.
Since all three analyses share the mark criterion, and therefore are all information transfer
analyses, we prefer to refer to them as successive stages of the development of Salmon}.
This better serves to distinguish Salmon's early thoughts on process analyses from his later
development of a process analysis, Salmon2, which is not an information transfer analysis.
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... I have sought a physical relation that constitutes a causal connection; I have
suggested that causal processes fill the bill ... causal connections exist in the physical
world, and not just in our minds. Moreover, causality is neither logical nor
metaphysical; causality is physical- it is an objective part of the structure of our
world.136
If this could be shown to be true, then our desideratum will be fulfilled - or at
least a process analysis will not be subject to the problems of a Lewis-style
counterfactual analysis, where one set of physical dependences proves to be
causal and another not causal, even though there are no relevant physical
differences between the two sets of circumstances.
Yet although Salmon thinks that it is a good thing that causal dependence
tracks physical dependence (indeed, reduces to physical dependence), this is not
the fundamental desideratum driving the development of Salmon1 or even
Salmon2. Like Aronson, Salmon is primarily interested in developing a theory
of scientific explanation - roughly speaking, that all scientific explanation
supervenes on the causal structure of the world. Since one of the goals of
science is to provide an explanation for all physical dependences, all physical
dependences should be causal dependences.
Of course, a theory of explanation need not be causal. Hempel's deductive-
nomological theory is an example. Salmon's original conception of scientific
explanation is also acausal- indeed, it might be well be described as an
attempt to banish loose talk of causes from scientific explanations.
Like Aronson, Salmon also reacts against Hempel's deductive-nomological
theory of explanation, where an explanation of an event is a modus ponens of
an initial condition on an instance of a lawlike generalisation linking those
conditions with that event. Salmon also reacts against Hempel's inductive-
statistical theory, in which, roughly speaking an explanation is an inductive
inference from an initial condition and a strong statistical correlation between
the event to be explained and the initial condition to a high probability that the
event occurs. Salmon's alternative "statistical relevance" (S-R) theory of
explanation is that something explains something else when the explaining
136 p24, Salmon, Wesley: IIA new look at causality", pp13-24, Salmon, Wesley: Causality and
explanation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998)
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thing stands in a particular kind of statistical relevance relation to the thing
needing to be explained:
Adopting the S-R approach, we begin with an explanatory question in a form
somewhat different from that given by Hempel. Instead of asking, for instance, "Why
did x get well within a fortnight?" we ask, "Why did this person with a cold get well
within a fortnight?" Instead of asking "Why is x a B?" we ask, "Why is x, which is an
A, also a B?" The answer - at least for preliminary purposes - is that x is also a C,
where C is relevant to B within A. Thus we have a prior probability P(B/A) - in this
case, the probability that a person with a cold (A) gets well within a fortnight (B).
Then we let C stand for the taking of vitamin C. We are interested in the posterior
probability P(B/A. C) that a person with a cold who takes vitamin C recovers within a
fortnight. If the prior and posterior probabilities are equal to one another, the taking of
vitamin C can play no role in explaining why this person recovered from the cold
within the specified period of time. If the posterior probability is not equal to the prior
probability, then C may, under certain circumstances, furnish part or all of the desired
explanation.137
A major problem for the 5-R approach is that not every statistical correlation of
this sort is explanatory. For example:
A rapidly falling barometric reading is a sign of an imminent storm, and it is highly
correlated with the onset of storms, but it certainly does not explain the occurrence of a
storm.138
Now it is startlingly easy to identify what is going on in this case if we are
allowed to use causal talk in our explanations. The falling barometric reading
does not explain the onset of the storm because the reading does not cause the
storm. The correlation between the storm and the barometric readings arises
because each phenomenon has a common cause - a drop in atmospheric
pressure. So the drop in atmospheric pressure explains both the storm and the
barometric ~eading.Unfortunately, there is no room for such causal talk in the
5-R theory as roughly outlined.139
137 pp34-5, Salmon, Wesley: Scientific explanation and the causal structure of the world (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1984)
138 Scientific explanation and the causal structure of the world, p43
139 And also in its full formal development - Salmon notes that the S-R theory in its first
presentation is "purely statistical and acausal". See Scientific explanation and the causal
structure of the world, pI9I
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Yet the S-R theory has some resources to deal with this problem. Let A be a
series of days in some locale. Let Bbe the occurrence of a storm. Let C be a
recent sharp drop in the barometric reading. We find that C is relevant to B
within A - ie:
p(BIA.C):;; p(BIA)
Yet we do not want to count C as an explanation for B. We can escape this
problem by noting that where D is a drop in atmospheric pressure, we find
that:
p(BIA.C.D) =p(BIA.D)
In words, it is statistically irrelevant to the occurrence of a storm in the presence
of a sharp drop in atmospheric pressure that the drop in pressure was measured
by a barometer. So the barometer reading is not explanatory after all. In Salmon's
terminology, the drop in pressure "screens off" the barometric reading.
On the other hand, the drop in atmospheric pressure is not screened off by
the barometric reading. We find:
p(BIA.C.D)"* p(BIA.C)
Barometers sometimes break and register a fall independently. So the drop in
pressure is statistically relevant to the onset of the storm, and explains the onset
of the storm.140
Given that the screening-off relations are at hand for the S-R approach, it
might be argued that we do not need extra causal talk to supplement our
explanations. It might be argued further that causal relations reduce, upon
analysis, to statistical relations between events. Indeed, this is Salmon's early
approach to causation. So in a sense there is a Salmono analysis of causation-
that talk of causal relations can be analysed in terms of statistical relations, or
possibly replaced by talk about statistical relations - although Salmon himself
never explicitly works out such an analysis in any detail.141
140 This presentation follows closely that given in Scientific explanation and the causal structure of
the world, pp43-4
141 Salmon expounds the hope that such an analysis can be carried out (perhaps along the lines
of the analysis presented by Reichenbach in Reichenbach, Hans: The direction of time
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1956)) in p55 and p81 of Salmon, Wesley:
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The relationship between causal dependence and statistical dependence
undergoes a sea change in the 1975 paper, "Causal and theoretical
explanation". Here Salmon attempts to augment the S-R approach to
explanation - he feels something needs to be said about causal relevance as
well. The precise nature of Salmon's project is curiously unclear. We find in the
introduction to the article:
I shall agree from the outset that causal relevance (or causal influence) plays an
indispensable role in scientific explanation, and I shall attempt to show how this
relation can be explicated in terms of the concept of statistical relevance ... The theme
of this essay will be the centrality of certain kinds of statistical relevance relations in
the notions of causal and theoretical explanation.142
The implication appears to be that causal relevance reduces to statistical
relevance. Yet the body of the article suggests a diametrically opposed
programme, as does the conclusion:
According to the present account, statistical dependencies are explained by, so to
speak, filling in the causal connections in terms of spatiotemporally continuous causal
processes ... Causal or theoretical explanation of a statistical correlation between
distinct types of events is an exhibition of the way in which those regularities fit into
the causal structure of the world -an exhibition of the causal connections between
them that give rise to the statistical-relevance relations.143
This ambivalence as to the "direction of reduction" is not just a mark of "Causal
and theoretical explanation being located on the cusp of Salmono and Salmon1.
The ambiguity persists throughout Salmon1. Generally Salmon appears to be
claiming that causal relevance gives rise to statistical relevance, but sometimes
causal interactions are characterised in terms ofstatistical relationships, and
sometimes all causal phenomena seem to be fundamentally statistical. These
later ambiguities in Salmon1 may partially amount to residues of Salmono.
Statistical explanation and statistical relevance (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press,
1971) and reiterates that this was his first hopes for an analysis of causation in Scientific
explanation and the causal structure of the world, pp44-5 and "Causal propensities: statistical
causality versus aleatory causality", p201.
142 "Causal and theoretical explanation", pp109
. 143 "Causal and theoretical explanation", p122
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A second potential source of confusion is the close relationship between
statistical correlations in observational data and the probabilistic behaviour of
things. The sea change in Salmon1 is that statistical correlations between
observations no longer constitute causation; they constitute evidence that
causation is going on. But the underlying causal mechanisms can themselves be
irreducibly probabilistic.
Salmon's favourite example is Compton scattering of light from electrons. A
high-energy photon is absorbed by an electron. The"excited" electron then
emits another high-energy photon. Although the total energy of the emitted
photon and post-emission electron will equal the total energy of the incident
photon and preabsorption electron, there is no way, even in principle, of
predicting with certainty the individual energies of the emitted photon and
post-emission electron.144
Salmon's interpretation of such cases is that the underlying causal
mechanisms themselves are probabilistic (not just our observational data). To
be precise the mechanisms possess propensities - real tendencies, or
dispositions, for particular situations to come about. So in a case of Compton
scattering we might say that the excited state of the electron did not determine
the energy of the emitted photon - rather, the excited electron had a range of
propensities to emit a photons, and in this case the propensity to emit a photon
of this particular energy was actualised.
The statistical frequency data we use to determine relations of statistical
relevance between probabilities of events are generated by the strength of the
propensities of the underlying causal mechanisms.145 Returning to the
barometer example, we find that:
p(BIA.D) *p(BIA)
where the probabilities are long-run frequencies derived from meteorological
observations (our statistical data). The long-run frequencies, however, are
produced by the strong propensity for storms to occur on days where there has
144 See, for example, pp133-4, Salmon, Wesley: "Why ask 'why'?", pp125-41, Salmon, Wesley:
Causality and explanation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).
145 See p14, Salmon, Wesley: "Dynamic rationality: propensity, probability, and credence",
pp3-40, Fetzer, James; editor: Probability and causality: essays in honor of Wesley C Salmon
(Dordrecht: D Reidel Publishing Company, 1988)
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been a sudden drop in atmospheric pressure, and the weaker propensity for
storms to occur on any old day.
So in the mature Salmon1 statistical correlations really do reduce to the
underlying causal set-up - to precise, to the strengths of the underlying
propensities. But often as not the only information on the strength of the
underlying propensities that we have is drawn from our observation of the
generated long-run frequencies in statistical data. So although statistical
correlations are generated by causal mechanisms, frequently the nature of the
underlying causal mechanisms can only be analysed in terms of the statistical
correlations (which gives the impression that the causal mechanisms resolve to
the statistical correlations).146
A further source of potential confusion is Salmon's desideratum for
developing process analyses. Salmon's primary goal is neither the reduction of
causation to statistical correlation nor the reduction of statistical correlation to
causal mechanisms. The prize is a theory of scientific explanation. The basis for
this theory is the S-R approach. Salmon1 is to be interpreted as an augmentation
to S-R, not a replacement for S-R. Both statistical relevance and causal relevance
are required for satisfactory explanations: both have fundamental significance
for Salmon. Salmon makes this point explicitly in a late paper, "Causality and
explanation: a reply to two critiques"147:
My main motivations in working out a theory of causal explanation as a successor to
my theory of statistical explanation were the convictions, first, that causality is an
essential ingredient in scientific explanation, and second, that causal relations cannot
be explicated wholly in terms of statistical relations. These points still seem sound. In
[Scientific explanation and the causal structure of the world] I characterised scientific
explanation as a two-tiered structure, consisting of statistical relevance relations on
one level and causal processes and interactions on the other ... I would now say (1)
that statistical relevance relations, in the absence of connecting causal processes, lack
146 This is not to say that our understanding of propensities only comes from our frequency
observations (see "Dynamic rationality: propensity, probability, and credence", p25), nor
that propensity weighting must slavishly follow observed frequencies. Our theoretical
understanding of a particular phenomenon may allow us to make propensity predictions.
These predictions may then be checked against the observed frequencies (if such
observations are available). As with any such experimental set-up, if the observed
frequencies do not match those predicted by our theoretical weighting of propensities,
there may well still be much to do before the theory is discarded.
147 Strictly speaking, this 1998 paper refers to Salmonz rather than Salmon}.
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explanatory import and (2) that connecting causal processes in the absence of
statistical relevance relations, also lack explanatory import. In various discussions I
have focused on (1) to the virtual neglect of (2) ... [T]his was a mistake. Both are
indispensable.148
Salmon's comments here about causal explanation being a successor to
statistical explanation might seem to vitiate the point we are trying to make. But
Salmon clearly states in Scientific explanation and the causal structure of the world
(the mature version of Salmon1) that his aim is to supplement S-R, and that at a
"fundamental level" S-R provides important insights into the nature of
scientific explanation.149 It seems that Salmon was at least partially of his
Salmon2 frame of mind during the exposition of Salmon}. Hence some
confusion may arise over whether causal relevance is more fundamental than
statistical relevance (or vice versa) because both are being occasionally treated
(at least in spirit) as fundamental- but fundamental to explanation, not one
another.
Common causes
Let's return to "Causal and theoretical explanation". Salmon's concern is
instances of "common causes", such as the sudden fall in barometric reading
and the subsequent storm. Salmon notes that in such cases (letting A be the
storm, B be the prevailing weather conditions, and C the barometric reading)
both the reading and the prevailing weather conditions are statistically relevant
to the storm:
p(AIB) > P(A) and p(AIC) > P(A)
Yet we find that the prevailing weather conditions "screen off" (or render
statistically irrelevant) the barometric reading from the storm, ie:
p(AIB.C) =p(AIC) 150
On the other hand, the barometric reading does not screen off the weather
conditions from the storm. Note that we can tell an exactly parallel story about
the statistical relevance of the storm to the barometer. We find:
148 "Causality and explanation: a reply to two critiques", pp475-6
149 Scientific explanation and the causal structure of the world, p45
150 "Causal and theoretical explanation", pp120-1
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p(BIA) > P(B) and p(BIC) > P(B)
Yet the prevailing weather conditions screen off the storm from the barometer:
p(BfA. c) = p(BIC)
We can conclude that the barometric reading doesn't explain the storm, and the
storm doesn't explain the barometric reading, but the common cause - the
prevailing weather conditions - does explain the reading and does explain the
storm.
The point of departure from Salmono is that rather than taking the above
statistical relevance relations as explicating our loose talk of "common causes",
Salmon asks why these statistical relevance relations hold in such cases. The
answer is that the statistical relevance relations track causal relevance, which is
to be understood as the presence or absence of causal processes connecting the
events. A causal process connects the prevailing weather conditions (the
common cause) to the barometric reading, and a causal process connects the
weather conditions to the storm, but no causal processes connect the storm and
the barometric reading.
At this stage of development of Salmon1, causal processes are described
relatively informally. The basic requirement for a process is that it is a
spatiotemporally continuous entity. The characterisation of a causal process is
given mostly by example:
There are many causal processes in this physical world; among the most important are
the transmission of electromagnetic waves, the propagation of sound waves and other
deformations in various material media, and the motion of physical objects. Such
processes transpire at finite speeds no greater than that of light; they involve the
transportation of energy from one place to another, and they can carry messages.151
The "transportation of energy" observation both resembles a transference
analysis of causation and foreshadows the Salmon2 conserved quantity
analysis.152 Yet Salmon thinks the ability to carry messages is more fundamental
to whether a process is causal or not. Drawing on an idea by Reichenbach, the
151 "Causal and theoretical explanation", p114
152 As Salmon retrospectively notes in Causality and explanation, p123
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ability to carry messages is cashed out in terms of the ability to transmit a
mark.153 Once again, the characterisation of marks is given by example:
... [We] can mark a beam of light by placing a red filter in its path. A beam of white
light, encountering such a filter, will lose all of its frequencies except those in the red
range, and the red color of the beam will thus be a mark transmitted onward from the
point at which the filter is placed in its path.154
Pseudo-processes can be distinguished from causal processes by their inability
to transmit information:
In the context of relativity theory, it is essential to distinguish causal processes, such as
the propagation of a light ray, from various pseudo-processes, such as the motion of a
spot of light cast on the wall by a rotating beacon. The light ray itself can be marked
by the use of a filter, or it can be modulated to transmit a message. The same is not
true of the spot of light. If it is made red at one place because the light beam creating it
passes through a red filter at the wall, that red mark is not passed on to the successive
positions of the spot. The motion of the spot is a well-defined process of some sort, but
it is not a causal process. The causal processes involved are the passages of light rays
from the beacon to the wall, and these can be marked to transmit a message. But the
direction of message transmission is from the beacon to the wall, not across the
wall. 155
So many of the signal features of Salmonl have been introduced in "Causal and
theoretical explanation": we have an account of common causes, explanatory
statistical relevance typically tracks causal relevance, causal mechanisms are to
be understood in terms of causal processes, and causal processes are
demarcated from pseudo processes by their ability to transmit marks. As yet,
however, there is nothing more than an informal account of what it means for a
mark to be transmitted, and there is no account of causal interaction. Without
an account of interaction, at this stage of development Salmonl is not truly a
process analysis of causation.
Nor is it much help in solving our connectivity problems. Consider the
bouncing of Frank. On the information we have been given so far, both the
153 "Causal and theoretical explanation", pl14
154 "Causal and theoretical explanation", pl14
155 "Causal and theoretical explanation", pl14
95
contact zone of the lunar impact spreading through the Earth and the Earth
itself would count as processes. So even in the case of Frank's normal last leap,
where the contact zone has not reached Frank's jumping-off point, there seems
to be a connecting causal process between the impact and the leap. We need
some account of why the spreading contact zone is the relevant causal process .
to invoke to explain why there is no connectivity in the case of the normal last
leap.
Although this point needed to be addressed, Salmonl still need not have
developed into a true process analysis from this point. Salmon's main goal is
merely to provide an account of the causal underpinnings of the statistical
relevance relations relevant to scientific explanation. It could be argued that by
providing an account of "direct cause" statistical relevance (connection of two
circumstances by a causal process) and "common cause" statistical relevance
(connection by independent causal processes to a common circumstance), he
has already provided enough of an account of causation to support his theory
of explanation. Of course, Salmonl does develop into a true process analysis
with a detailed account of causal interaction. But "Causal and theoretical
explanation" does not appear incomplete without such an account.
1/At-at"
Salmon provides a more formal characterisation of causal processes in the 1977
paper"An 'at-at' theory of causal influence".156
Once again we find that the line of demarcation between causal processes
and pseudo processes is that causal processes transmit marks and pseudo
processes do not. The paradigm example of marking a causal process is again
placing a red filter in the path of a beam of light.157
For the first time in Salmonl, instances of marking - such as interposing a
red filter in the beam of light - are identified with causal interactions.158 No
156 Originally appearing as Salmon, Wesley: IIAn 'at-at' theory of causal influence", pp21S-24,
Philosophy ofscience vol 44 (1977), and reprinted in pp193-9, Salmon, Wesley: Causality and
explanation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998). All page references are to the latter
source.
157 IIAn 'at-at' theory of causal influence", p197
158 IIAn 'at-at' theory of causal influence", p19S
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detailed account of causal interactions is provided, but the as-yet-primitive
notion plays a crucial role in the explication of causal processes.
This explication is extremely simple. A mark that has been introduced into a
process by a single interaction at point A is transmitted to point B if and only if
it occurs at B and at all stages of the process between A and B without
additional interactions.159 Consider the beam of light. It is marked by a causal
interaction with the red filter - it becomes red. The beam of light remains red
from then onwards without further interactions. So the beam of light is a causal
process. Now consider a moving red spot of light cast by the red beam of light
on a wall. The red spot, as noted in "Causal and theoretical explanation"160, is a
well-defined process of some sort - it certain seems to be something more than
a .piece of spatiotemporal junk - and displays redness like the beam of light.
Yet the redness of the spot is produced by an interaction between the beam of
light and the wall at every point of the trajectory of the spot across the wall. So
according to the "at-at" theory the spot does not transmit a mark, and is not a
causal process.
The term "at-at" is due to the parallel between this account of transmission
of marks causal propagation and Russell's "at-at" theory of motion. To move
from A to B is simply to occupy the intervening points at the intervening
moments - being at the intervening points at the corresponding instants.161
Similarly, transmission of a mark by a process from A to B involves the mark
being at the intervening positions at the corresponding times in the absence of
any further interaction.162
Now Salmon1 prima facie provides an account of why Frank's big last leap is
causally connected to the lunar impact and the normal last leap is not. The edge
of the spreading contact zone of the lunar impact is a mark - a stress
disturbance in the structure of the Earth. In the case of the big last leap, we find
this stress disturbance at every intervening position at the corresponding times
between the surface of the lunar duct-tape wrapping and Frank. In the case of
the normal last leap, there is a spatiotemporal gap. So in the case of the big last
159 "An'at-at' theory of causal influence", p197
160 "Causal and theoretical explanation", p11S
161 "An 'at-at' theory of causal influence", p198
162 Salmon gives a rather nice account of the parallel case of transmission of marks in "Why
ask 'why?'?", p130
97
leap, the Moon transmitted a mark to Frank, and in the normal last leap it did
not.
Causal interactions = conjunctive
forks
Although we might not have needed an account of causal interactions after
"Causal and theoretical explanation", certainly something needs to be said now.
Otherwise the account of processes provided by Salmon is simply incomplete.
The first important contribution on this issue is Philip von Bretzel's suggestion
in "Concerning a probabilistic theory of causation adequate for the causal
theory of time"163 that we understand causal interactions in terms of the
analysis of common causes.
The von Bretzel paper is concerned primarily with an amendment to
Reichenbach's probabilistic analysis of causation, and the use of such an
analysis to give a causal account of the asymmetry of temporal direction. Yet
many of the features of Reichenbach's analysis of causation carry across to
Salmon1- cashing out the pseudo/causal process distinction in terms of mark
transmission, for example - so many of von Bretzel's points can be transferred
to Salmon1.
Outlining the details of Reichenbach's analysis of causation is, fortunately,
beyond the scope of this thesis. In brief, von Bretzel's concern is that a crucial
theorem used by Reichenbach to establish a temporal direction from his causal
analysis - the principle of the local comparability of time order - is explicated
in terms of temporal concepts, and hence is unacceptably circular.164
The problem before von Bretzel, then:
163 von Bretzel, Philip: "Concerning a probabilistic theory of causation adequate for the causal
theory of time", pp173-90, Synthese vol 35 (1977), reprinted pp385-402, Salmon, Wesley;
editor: Hans Reichenbach: logical empiricist (Dordrecht: DReidel Publishing Company, 1979).
All page references are to the latter source.
164 "Concerning a probabilistic theory of causation adequate for the causal theory of time",
p389
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... is how to define a non-temporal way of ordering the events of the causal net so that
causes may be distinguished from effects. To do this it is necessary to introduce the
concept of a conjunctive fork. 165
A conjunctive fork (the concept and terminology once again originates with
Reichenbach166) is a state of affairs composed of three distinct events A, Band C
where C is a common cause of A and B. It is precisely the same type of common
cause we have been discussing in the case of the barometer reading and the
storm.
A conjunctive fork is characterised by the following probability relations:
(1) ptA. BIC) =p(AIC) x p(BIC)
(2) p(A. BI<=) = p(AI<=) x p(BI<=)
(3) p(AIC) > p(AI<=)
(4) p(BIC) > p(BI<=) 167
We can derive from these relations the following inequality:
P{A.B) > P{A) x P(B)
The import of this inequality is that the existence of a common cause as defined
by the conjunctive fork makes the joint occurrence of two distinct events much
more likely than would otherwise be anticipated.168 If, for example, sudden
drops in barometric readings (A) and storms (B) were independent phenomena,
the probability of a storm occurring just after an abrupt drop in barometric
reading (P(A.B)) would be equal to the product of P(A) and P(B). In fact P(A.B)
is much larger than that, because A and B are not completely independent
phenomena. They have a common cause - the drop in atmospheric pressure.
165 "Concerning a probabilistic theory of causation adequate for the causal theory of time",
p390
166 The direction of time, p159
167 I have used the notation given by Salmon in "Causality: production and propagation",
pp158-9. The von Bretzel notation ("Concerning a probabilistic theory of causation
adequate for the causal theory of time", p390) follows Reichenbach's presentation in The
direction of time, p159 and the notation used by Salmon throughout Statistical explanation and
statistical relevance.
168 "Concerning a probabilistic theory of causation adequate for the causal theory of time",
p391
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We can also derive from the four relations the previously-discussed
screening-off relations, ie:
p(AIB.C) =p(AIC)
and:
p(BIA. c) =p(BIC)
The specification of direction of time follows rather simply. A conjunctive fork
comprising events A, B and a common cause C are open on one side and closed on
the other side. In any such fork C precedes A and B - the direction of time
points to the "open" side of the fork. This is much easier to show than to say,
and is demonstrated in figure 5.
Open side
A
C
Closed side
B
Temporal
direction
Conjunctive forks determine temporal direction by being
lIopenll to the future
Figure 5 - determination of the asymmetry of time by a conjunctive fork
Another way of expressing this point is that there is no "principle of the
common effect" parallel to the "principle of the common cause" as defined by
the conjunctive fork. Triads of events "closed to the future" but "open to the
past", such as two independent events A and B with a common effect E, simply
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do not form conjunctive forks. 169 (The argument, presumably, is that there are
no such configuration of events with probability values that fulfil the conditions
for a conjunctive fork. 170) This is shown in figure 6.
A
Closed side
E
Open side
B
The two events A
and B and their
common effect
Eappear to be open
to the past, but do
not form a
conjunctive fork
and thus do not
provide a temporal
direction
Figure 6 - common effects do not determine temporal directions
On the other hand, Reichenbach and von Bretzel allow that in the case of two
events A and B with both a common effect E and a common cause C, the events
A, Band E do form a conjunctive fork. But such conjunctive forks are not open
to the past - they are closed by the common cause C. So by von Bretzel's
criterion, neither the conjunctive fork A, Band E (which is closed on both sides)
nor the conjunctive fork A, Band C (which is closed on both sides) would
provide a temporal direction. Figure 7 illustrates this situation.
169 Originally a conjecture by Reichenbach, reaffirmed by Salmon in "Causality: propagation
and production", p292.
170 This appears to be the line taken by Salmon in Scientific explanation and the causal structure of
the world, p164. It just does not seem to be the case that in our world common effects
conspire to produce statistical correlations in prior independent causes. The asymmetry
thesis, therefore, should be understood as an empirically derived conjecture about the
world.
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AClosed side
E
C
Closed side
B
In this configuration,
A and B and their
common effect E do
form a conjunctive
fork, but since it is
closed on both sides,
it does not provide a
temporal direction.
Similarly, the
conjunctive fork of A,
B and their common
cause C is also closed
on both sides and
does not provide a
temporal direction.
Figure 7 - "closed" comm.on effects do not provide a temporal direction
In later papers, Salmon makes a stronger conjecture: even in such tetrads of
events as illustrated in figure 7, two events and a common effect do not form a
conjunctive fork. A corollary of this conjecture is that any conjunctive fork,
whether it is closed by a common event or not, points in the same temporal
direction.171 No proof of the conjecture is provided in the paper, however, and
to the best of our knowledge no such proof has ever been published.
A hitherto unstated point about conjunctive forks is that the causal
connections between the triad of events - the "arms" of the forks - are
171 See, for example, "Causality: propagation and production", p292-3. Indeed, this may not be
the sort of conjecture which is amenable to logical proof. Like Reichenbach and von
Bretzel's asymmetry theses, Salmon's conjecture is empirical. As he notes in Scientific
explanation and the causal structure of the world, pp166-7, probability values can be assigned
to a tetrad of events A, B, C and E such that both A, B and E and A, B and C do form
conjunctive forks. Yet there don't seem to be any examples of such a double fork in this
world. Salmon suspects that such an arrangement of events may violate some "basic
physical principle", but does not know what this principle might tum out to be.
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processes. Indeed the processes need to be causal processes rather than pseudo
processes. The rationale is never stated in any detail by von Bretzel, but would
appear to be based on the fact that pseudo processes (such as Salmon's example
of the moving spot of light) can propagate faster than the speed of light. If such
processes transmitted causal influence, then it would be the case that causal
influence from an event could be transmitted to events which happened earlier
than the event. In that case we could find correlations between events
associated with their common effects - there would be conjunctive forks which
are open to the past. Hence the asymmetry of temporal direction could not be
based on the asymmetry of conjunctive forks - because causal forks would not
be asymmetrically directed.
Hence von Bretzel needs to find a criterion to distinguish between causal
processes and pseudo processes in Reichenbach's analysis of causation (von
Bretzel does not explicitly deal with Salmon's at-at criterion172). He notes that
the typical move in such circumstances is to invoke a genidentity criterion.173 To
use Salmon's example of the rotating beacon and the spot cast on the wall, we
might say that the beacon is a causal process because it involves the same object
at all stages of the process. The moving spot does not involve the same object at
every stage: it comprises many different bits of wal1.174 However, von Bretzel
finds the notion of genidentity problematic, and prefers to try to give a criterion
in terms of the conjunctive fork and Reichenbach's principle of causal
betweenness.
Discussion of Reichenbach's analysis is beyond the scope of this thesis so we
will simply state some of von Bretzel's observations and conclusions rather
than his rationales. Much like Salmon in "An 'at-at' theory of causal influence",
von Bretzel notes that pseudo processes such as the moving spots are
continuously generated by mechanisms other than themselves: in von Bretzel's
words, they are derivative from causal processes - in the case of the spot,
172 This is rather odd. Von Bretzel appears to have been a student of Salmon's at the University
of Arizona, cites Salmon several times in the paper, and the paper is published the year
after"An I at-at' theory of causal influence" has been accepted for publication - von
Bretzel must have been aware of at-at.
173 Unlike Aronson or Fair, von Bretzel cashes out genidentity as holding between events
containing the same object (see "Concerning a probabilistic theory of causation adequate
for the causal theory of time", p396).
174 As we shall discuss in a later section, Dowe uses such a genidentity criterion to distinguish
causal processes from pseudo processes in his conserved quantity process analysis.
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derivative from the beams of light produced by the rotating beacon. This is
demonstrated in figure 8.
R4
R(n) =stages in the
rotation of the beacon
8(n) = stages in the
motion of the spot
81
Figure 8 - pseudo process of the moving spot is derived from the causal
process of the rotating beacon
The R-series of events is a causal process (stages in the rotation of the beacon).
The S-series is a pseudo process (stages of the motion of the spot). The lines
(R1,Sl), (R2,S2), (R3,S3) are also causal processes (beams of light connecting the
spot and the beacon).
So? The key assertion is that the forks (R2,Sl,R1), (R3,S2,R2), (Ri,S3,R2) are
conjunctive forks. R1, R2 and R3 are all common causes. They are also precisely
what we would want to identify as causal interactions - a beacon releasing
light. Indeed this is precisely the same sort of causal interaction as occurs in our
original example drawn from Gasking and Aronson of the glowing hot iron
bar. It is no surprise that von Bretzel concludes:
... causal interactions form conjunctive forks, and consequently, common causes. If
there were no interactions, there would be no common causes, and therefore, no
explanations for coincident statistical relevancies and no direction to either causal
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processes or time. The events which comprise the nodes of interaction between
different causal processes are therefore quite basic.175
Causal interactions =t conjunctive
forks
This conjunctive fork analysis of causal interactions obviously has great
potential for transfer to Salmon1. Since the conjunctive fork is simply a
statement of the common cause phenomenon discussed in "Causal and
theoretical explanation", it looks like Salmon1 can be provided with an account
of causal interaction to support the at-at account of processes (and a causal
theory of time) without having to posit any additional theoretical bells and
whistles. Salmon1 probably did take this form for some time - indeed, Salmon
frequently notes that von Bretzel alerted him to the direct relationship between
causal interactions and "causal forks".176 But no paper on Salmon1 is ever
published to this end. The beautiful theory of at-at processes plus conjunctive
fork causal interactions is spoiled by a couple of nasty little facts.
One of the facts is identified by Bas van Fraassen in The pragmatics of
explanation:177:
Salmon's point of departure is Reichenbach's principle of the common cause ... This
means that a correlation of simultaneous values must be explained by a prior common
cause C of events A and B. Salmon gives two statistical conditions that must be met by
a common cause C of events A and B:
(a) P(A. BIC) =p(AIC) x p(BIC)
(b) p(AIB.C) =p(AIC) "C screens off Bfrom A."
If p(BIC) "* 0 these are equivalent and symmetric in A and B.
... To assume Reichenbach's principle to be satisfiable ... is to rule out all
genuinely indeterministic theories. As example, let a theory say that C is invariably
175 "Concerning a probabilistic theory of causation adequate for the causal theory of time",
p400
176 For example, see Scientific explanation and the causal structure of the world, pxi, and "Why ask,
'why?'?", p141.
177 van Fraassen, Bas: "The pragmatics of explanation", pp143-50, American philosophical
quarterly vol 14 (1977)
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followed by one of the incompatible events A, B, or D, each with probability Y2. Let us
suppose the theory complete, and its probabilities irreducible, with C the complete
specification of state. Then we will find a correlation for which only C could be the
common cause, but it is not. Assuming that A, B, D are always preceded by C and that
they have low but equal prior probabilities, there is a statistical correlation between
<p =(A v D) and VI =(B v D) for p( <pI VI) =p( VlI<p) =Y2:;t p(<p). But C, the only available
candidate, does not screen off <p from VI: p(<pIC. VI) = p( <pI VI) = Y2:;t p(<pIC) which is
%. Although this may sound complicated, the construction is so general that almost
any irreducibly probabilistic situation will give a similar example.178
Salmon gives a rather more accessible description of the problem in "Causality:
production and propagation":
Consider a simple example. Two pool balls, the cue ball and the 8-ba11. lie on a pool
table. A relative novice attempts a shot that is intended to put the 8-ball into one of the
far corner pockets; but given the positions of the balls, if the 8-ball falls into one corner
pocket, the cue ball is almost certain to go into the other far comer pocket, resulting in
a "scratch". Let A stand for the 8-ball dropping into the one comer pocket, let B stand
for the cue ball dropping into the other comer pocket, and let C stand for the collision
between the cue ball and the 8-ball that occurs when the player executes the shot.
Assume that the probability of the 8-ball going into the pocket is Y2 if the player tries
the shot, and that the probability of the cue ball going into the pocket is also about Y2 •
It is immediately evident that A, B and C do not constitute a conjunctive fork, for C
does not screen A and B from each other. Given that the shot is attempted, the
probability that the cue ball will fall into the pocket (approx Y2) is not equal to the
probability that the cue ball will go into the pocket given that the shot has been
attempted and that the 8-ball has dropped into the other far corner pocket
(approx 1).179
Intuitively, the collision of the cue ball with the 8-ball is pretty clearly both a
causal interaction and a common cause of A and B. So not all common causes or
causal interactions could be conjunctive forks.
178 "The pragmatics of explanation", p146 (I have harmonised van Fraassen's notation with the
version we have been using to date.)
179 "Causality: production and propagation", pp293-4. See also Scientific explanation and the
causal structure of the world, pp168-9, and a different explication using the "irreducibly
probabilistic" example of Compton scattering in "Why ask ~why?'?",pp133-4.
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Deviating from the strict chronological sequence of development of Salmon1,
we can note a further problem with the thesis that causal interactions are
conjunctive forks: not every triad of events fulfilling the statistical conditions of
the conjunctive fork turns out to be an instance of a common cause, let alone a
causal interaction.
Salmon cites a case raised by Ellis Crasnow. A woman usually arrives at her
office at 9am and makes herself a cup of coffee. But sometimes she arrives
promptly at 8am and her secretary has already made her coffee for her. On
precisely these latter mornings she is met at the office by an associate who
works at a different office. That the coffee is made for her at the office (A) and
the associate shows up those mornings (B) is a coincidence that needs to be
explained. It could be noted that on ordinary mornings she catches the 8am bus
(C) and on the meeting mornings she takes the 7am bus (c ). Plausibly, the
events A, Band C fulfil the four statistical conditions for a conjunctive fork, yet
C is clearly not a cause of either A or B.180
It might appear that Salmon1 has more resources to deal with Crasnow's
example than van Fraassen's problem. Both Salmon and von Bretzel argue that
true conjunctive forks involve causal connections between the triad of events in
the form of causal processes. Hence the bus ride can be ruled out as being a true
common cause in Crasnow's example - it simply doesn't possess the right
connections. Yet such a strategy rules out conjunctive forks as causal
interactions. Interactions would be partially defined in terms of causal
processes, but under the at-at theory processes are defined in terms of causal
interactions. The circularity looks vicious.
180 This version of Crasnow's example is inspired by the 1981 paper "Causality: production
and propagation", pp293, but Crasnow examples first make their appearance in p217,
Salmon, Wesley: "Probabilistic causality", pp50-74, Pacific philosophical quarterly vol 61
(1980), reprinted in pp208-32, Salmon, Wesley: Causality and explanation (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1998). All page references are to the latter source.
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Causal interactions = interactive forks
The van Fraassen example is intended to show that common causes cannot
provide a basis for scientific explanation - a step along the way to the
conclusion that science contains no explanations at all.181 Salmon draws a
different moral- understandably, given that Salmon1 is intended to support a
theory of scientific explanation. There must be more than one kind of "causal
fork".182 This notion is first pursued in the 1977 paper, "Why ask 'why?'?".
Again, Salmon's primary aim in "Why ask 'why?'?" is to develop his theory
of scientific explanation. The focus is on the philosophical importance of the
principle of the common causes as a basis for scientific explanation. (Note the
dramatic change of emphasis from Salmono. In Statistical relevance and statistical
explanation, common causes are more-or-Iess problem cases - now they are
virtually the rock the theory is built on.)
Salmon claims that to understand common causes we need to distinguish
between causal interactions and causal processes. The initial characterisation is
by example: the transmission of light from one place to another or the motion of
a material particle to one place or another is a causal process; collisions of
billiard balls, or absorption or emission of photons, are causal interactions.
Salmon notes that interactions are the sort of things that we tend to describe as
events. (Given the earlier account of interactions being the means by which
marks are introduced, Salmon is probably thinking in terms of a "change"
interpretation of events.) In a further elaboration to the analysis of interactions,
Salmon notes that interactions are also associated with the beginning and end
of the propagation of a process - not just instances of modification of
processes. Causal processes are distinguished from pseudo processes by the
ability of causal processes to transmit causal influence, which Salmon interprets
as the transmission of marks. The transmission of a mark is to be understood in
terms of the at-at theory.183
At this point it might be expected that Salmon would give an account of
causal interactions, perhaps beginning with an explanation of why conjunctive
181 "The pragmatics of explanation", p149
182 Scientific explanation and the causal structure of the world, pxi
183 "Why ask 'why?'?", p130-1
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forks can't do the job. But si~ce Salmon's aim is supporting his theory of
explanation, the next stanza in the paper is framed as a discussion of "certain
configurations of processes with special explanatory import"184 - common
causes. The overall strategy is to give an account of direct explanatory relevance
(in terms of direct causal linkages by processes) and then give an account of
explanatory correlations in terms of spatiotemporal configurations of processes
where two states of affairs are not directly linked by a single process.
Using a semi-historical presentation, Salmon first treats of Reichenbach's
characterisation of common causes in terms of conjunctive forks, as described
by the four statistical conditions given in our discussion of von Bretzel. An
example of a conjunctive fork type of common cause would be increased rates
of leukemia amongst soldiers exposed to nearby atomic bomb blasts. This is to
be explained in terms of a large number of different radiation or fallout
processes being produced by the explosion, propagating outwards and then
interacting with different soldiers. Screening off occurs in this circumstance.
The incidence of leukemia in some soldiers exposed to the blast is statistically
relevant to the incidence of leukemia in other soldiers exposed to the blast, yet
the incidence in other soldiers is screened off by the blast.
Salmon notes van Fraassen's problem that not all common causes fulfil the
conditions of the conjunctive fork, and provides a concrete example in
Compton scattering. In Compton scattering, the sum of the energies of the
emitted photon (E1) and the post-emission electron (E2) will equal the total
energy of the excited photon (E). Suppose P(E1) and P(E2) are 0.1. If Compton
scattering formed a conjunctive fork, P(E1.E2) would equal 0.01. But P(E1.E2)
equals 0.1- because the electron will have energy E2 if and only if the energy
of the photon is E1.185 Clearly in such cases the common cause does not screen
the effects off from one another, because:
Salmon's conclusion is that there are two kinds of causal forks: conjunctive
forks which are exemplified by the leukemia case; and interactive forks which
184 "Why ask 'why?'?", p131
185 "Why ask 'why?'?", p132-3. Our expression of this example differs slightly from Salmon's
for purposes of explanatory brevity - Salmon treats E as the energy of the incident photon,
which is only approximately equal to the sum of the energies of the emitted photon and the
post-emission electron.
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are exemplified by Compton scattering, or our earlier-discussed pool shot. The
hitherto primitive notion of causal interaction is to be understood as the
incidence of an interactive fork.
The initial characterisation given for the interactive fork is statistical. The
interactive fork is a triad of events A, Band C connected by causal processes
and fulfilling a similar set of statistical conditions to the conjunctive fork, except
that the condition:
(1) P(A. BIC) = p(AIC) x p(BIC)
is replaced by the condition:
(1) P(A. BIC) > p(AIC) x p(BIC) 186
A further characterisation is also hinted at in terms of mutual modifications of
two processes at a spatiotemporal intersection:
What we want to say, very roughly, is that when two processes intersect, and both are
modified in such ways that the changes in one are correlated with the changes in the
other - in the manner of an interactive fork ... - we have a causal interaction.187
In later papers, Salmon discards the statistical characterisation of interactive
forks (and thus causal interactions). Dowe notes that Salmon "has never stated
any reasons" for this move.188 We shall soon discuss one apparent reason given
in "Causality: production and propagation". Salmon claims elsewhere to have
given an account of some of his concerns in "Causal propensities: statistical
versus aleatory causality".189 But we think the main problem with the statistical
characterisation of the interactive fork is the same circularity problem suffered
by the thesis that conjunctive forks are causal interactions. Suppose interactive
forks were statistical correlations. The statistical frequency data from which we
derive these correlations are generated by the underlying configurations of
causal processes. Yet under the at-at theory causal processes are defined in
186 "Why ask 'why?'?", p133-4 and pp140-1
187 "Why ask 'why?'?", p135
188 "Wesley Salmon's process theory of causality and the conserved quantity theory", p206.
Dowe proceeds to give four reasons of his own why the statistical characterisation is
untenable.
189 "Causality without counterfactuals", p252
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terms of causal interactions. So defining, or even characterising, causal
interactions in terms of statistical correlations looks dangerously circular.
At this point of the development all the basic structures of Salmon1 are in
place: an at-at account of causal processes, an interactive fork account of causal
interactions, and conjunctive forks. Further papers in Salmon1 tend to
concentrate on improving the characterisations and definitions of these
concepts.
Digression - against conjunctive
forks
Before outlining the main developments in latter papers, we will examine the
mature notion of the conjunctive fork in Salmon1. Why is it there? It plays no
role in the description of processes, it plays no role in the description of
interactions. Nor is it clear that any process analysis of causation needs the
conjunctive fork as a primitive notion.
It is tempting to argue that the presence of the conjunctive fork in Salmon1 is
purely a matter of historical contingency - The early Salmon1 is concerned
with common causes as characterised by the conjunctive fork, so the
conjunctive fork maintains a vestigial presence in the latter Salmon1. But this
would be more than a little harsh. The conjunctive fork maintains rather a lot of
causal functionality.
The most significant function is to provide a direction to causation. As
Reichenbach, von Bretzel and Salmon all note, conjunctive forks are only open
to the future if they are open at all. Interactive forks display no such temporal
asymmetry. This is, as we have noted before, an empirical observation. To use
an example provided by Salmon, if we encounter a pattern of symmetrical
ripples on a pond, we find that it has been produced by some happenstance at
the centre of the pond -like a dropped pebble - the influence from which
propagates out to the edges of the pond. We do not find a multiplicity of
happenings at the edges of the pond propagating influence towards the centre
of the pond. We find a common cause may produce a myriad of correlated
effects, but we do not find a collection of such correlated causes conspiring to
produce a common effect. But consider Compton scattering. We may find a
111
photon of energy E1 impacting an electron of energy E2 which then emits a
photon of E3, leaving the electron with energy E4, where E1+E2=E3+E4. We
could readily find instances of Compton scattering where the incident photon
and electron have energies of E3 and E4 respectively, and the emitted photon
and electron have energies of E1 and E2 respectively.190 There is no such cause
and effect asymmetry in the interactive fork parallel with that of the conjunctive
fork. 191 Thus conjunctive forks provide a convenient means by which Salmon1
can be used to provide a causal theory of time.192
The conjunctive fork also supplies Salmon with an answer to whether
causation is a general relation holding between classes of events, or a singular
relation holding between particular events. Under a Humean regularity
analysis, causation is a general matter. For there to be regular conjunction of like
circumstances, there must be more than one instance of conjunction of these
circumstances. Any singular causal statement such as " A caused B" is therefore
a disguised general statement: "things of the A kind cause things of the B kind",
or somesuch.
190 This is clearly a different kind of temporal symmetry from that which we discovered in an
adequate Aronson-Fair analysis. In that case there was no fact of the matter in an
interaction between two electrons about whether a virtual photon was absorbed or emitted
by a particular electron. Salmon seems to be merely asserting something parallel to the
view that in the case of our two electrons proceeding from w and x to y and z that the
measurements of energy/momenta at w and x could just as readily be found at y and z and
vice versa.
191 "Why ask 'why?'?", p141
192 There is some reason to suppose that Salmon also takes the asymmetry of the conjunctive
fork as a mechanism for determining the temporal asymmetry of explanation. We find in
p345, Salmon, Wesley; Salmon, Merrilee: "Alternative models of scientific explanation",
pp333-46, Salmon, Wesley: Causality and explanation (New York: Oxford University Press,
1998) (originally published in 1979) a hint that the temporal asymmetry of explanation is to
be understood in terms of a causal theory of explanation and the temporal asymmetry of
causation.
We find a much more explicit connection in pp174-5 of the 1991 paper Salmon, Wesley:
"Explanatory asymmetry: a letter to Professor Adolf Griinbaum from his friend and
colleague", pp164-77, Salmon, Wesley: Causality and explanation (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1998) . Here, citing Reichenbach's principle of the common cause, he
notes that the view seems to be correct that the "anisotropy of time, anisotropy of causality,
and anisotropy of explanation all go together." Salmon must here be thinking in terms of
the conjunctive fork. It is never quite clear whether Salmon thinks that the asymmetry of
conjunctive forks might provide a solution to the other traditional problems of explanatory
asymmetry - why does the height of the tower explain the length of the shadow but the
length of the shadow not explain the height of the tower? We have a suspicion that such a
strategy might underlie the criticism of van Fraassen in Salmon, Wesley; Kitcher, Philip:
"Van Fraassen on explanation", pp178-90, Salmon, Wesley: Causality and explanation (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1998). But there is no direct evidence in the text.
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Salmon notes that a singular causal process can transmit causal influence
between (roughly speaking) a single cause and a single effect. Such singular
statements as "A caused B" are therefore not disguised generalisations under
Salmon1. However, the conjunctive fork is defined in terms of statistical
frequencies and thus refers to sets of causes and effects. The conclusion is that
the debate over singular versus general causation is therefore explained by
causation being a partly singular and partly general phenomena: the former
aspect provided by causal processes, the latter by conjunctive forks. 193
Despite these useful features of the conjunctive fork, it does not seem to be
either clearly conceived or thoroughly at home in the ontology of Salmon1. We
find in "Why ask 'why?'?" and later work such as the 1981 paper "Causality:
production and propagation" that conjunctive forks are to be associated with
the productive aspect of causality. Conjunctive forks playa role in the
production of independent causal processes from a special set of background
conditions.194 Here Salmon is clearly thinking about cases like the atomic bomb
blast producing radiation processes. Yet if anything could be said to produce
these processes, it must be a set of causal interactions: nuclear fission, nuclear
fusion, decay of radioactive byproducts, radiation from unstable isotopes of
elements produced by irradiation from the preceding sources, and so forth. The
conjunctive fork does not appear to be a certain kind of basic causal mechanism
which underlies a certain set of statistical relevance relations. At best it is a
description of a certain configuration of basic causal mechanisms which has
useful explanatory import.
Similarly, not all instances of conjunctive forks as described by Salmon
involve production of processes. To adapt one of Salmon's examples, consider
Bill and Stephen who go for a walk through the woods and for lunch sample
the local fungi. Later that day, both Bill and Stephen come down with similar
horrendous stomach cramps. It seems highly improbable that both chaps would
193 See Scientific explanation and the causal structure of the world, p182 and "Causality: production
and propagation", p300. This general character of statistical correlations may also indicate
another reason why Salmon moves away from a statistical characterisation of the
interactive fork. A causal interaction involving a spatiotemporal intersection of two
processes undergoing persistent modification at the point of intersection seems a
thoroughly singular set of affairs. Yet the statistical characterisation of the interactive fork
seems precisely as general as that of the conjunctive fork. See also Dowe's "Wesley Salmon's
process theory of causality and the conserved quantity theory", p207.
194 "Causality: production and propagation", p298, see also Scientific explanation and the causal
structure of the world, p179
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON 113
independently suffer stomach cramps on the same afternoon. We naturally
suspect that Bill's cramps (A) and Stephen's cramps (B) have a prior common
cause which makes it much less improbable that Band C should come about on
the same afternoon - the lunch of pretty mushrooms (C).195 Salmon claims that
this set of affairs forms a conjunctive fork. We are inclined to agree with him.
Yet the causal processes here must certainly be Bill and Stephen. Bill and
Stephen do not pop into existence as a result of the lunch of mushrooms.
Intriguingly, this "walk in the woods" variety of conjunctive fork displays a
much less convincing degree of temporal asymmetry than the "atomic blast"
variety. It may be inconceivable that perfectly circular ripples propagate from
the edges of the pond to a point in the centre. It does not seem so enormously
odd that two friends with tummy troubles might go for a walk in the woods,
both eat a mushroom with antinausea effects, and stroll away feeling much
more healthy. Or, to keep the symmetry more exact, the two friends might both
stop to vomit and then feel much better once their stomachs had been emptied.
Let's pursue this latter kind of "common cause" a little further. Consider a
closely-related example. A doctor is treating a patient for acute gastrointestinal
discomfort. Suddenly, the doctor realises she has seen these symptoms before.
Checking the patient records, she finds that she has treated five different
patients with these symptoms over the past 10 years. Each patient has
presented in autumn. Each patient has been an outdoorsy type. Pursuing a
sudden hunch, she checks a guide to the local fauna, and discovers that the
Amanita reichenbachia mushroom sprouts in the local woods during autumn,
and if eaten produces precisely the symptoms she has been treating her patients
for.
Would this set of circumstances'constitute a conjunctive fork? It is tempting
to say no: the five patients do not "sup together out of a common pot",196 nor do
the patients presenting for treatment amount to simultaneous events for which
we search for a common (meaning one-and-the-same) cause.197 Such a construal
would describe the second mushroom poisoning case as five separate patient
presentations (A, B, C, D and E) connected by five different causal process to
195 "Causality: production and propagation", pp289-90
196 "Causality: production and propagation", p299
197 The direction of time, pp158-9
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five different A reichenbachia ingestions (F1, F2, F3, F4 and Fs) with no fork
structure.
But there is something profoundly unsatisfying about this move. If we were
to treat F as a type of event - eating A reichenbachia - then, so long as we don't
add in Salmon and von Bretzel's extra requirement that the relevant events are
connected by causal processes, there seems no question that any triad like
(A,B,F) would be any less a conjunctive fork than Bill and Stephen falling ill
after their walk in the woods. In addition, it seems that an adequate account of
general causation (which Salmon suggests conjunctive forks provide) would
count A reichenbachia as a genuine general causal correlation.
The A reichenbachia poisoning case seems to be an inverse version of
Crasnow's example. In Crasnow's example, existence of probabilities fulfilling
the conditions of the conjunctive fork produce spurious causal correlations.
Causal processes are introduced to the analysis of the fork to eliminate the
spurious correlations. In A reichenbachia, probabilities exist which fulfil the
conjunctive fork, and we have what seems to be a clear causal correlation
between independent events, yet when we introduce the causal processes the
correlation is made spurious.
We can find A reichenbachia analogues for many other classic examples of the
conjunctive fork. Salmon gives the example of two students handing in
identical papers. We can exclude the possibility that they copied from each
other. We infer there is a common cause: a paper in a sorority or fraternity file,
for example. The file paper, and the two students' papers form a conjunctive
fork. 19B Let's extend this example by noting that it is becoming more and more
common for papers to be posted on the internet. It is entirely common for
internet sites to be mirrored by other internet sites. Two students hand in
identical papers. We think we can confirm that they did not copy from each
other: one lives in Argentina, one lives in Turkey. Then we discover that they
have internet access. We determine from traffic records that they could not have
contacted each other, but discover that they have both found the paper on the
internet. But they copied the paper from different mirror sites. Treat the two
mirrored papers as the same paper type, and we have a conjunctive fork. Add
the causal processes in and the correlation is spurious.
19B "Causality: production and propagation", p289
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The problem with these two cases is that types of causes look like they
should produce genuine causal correlations as much as single causes. Let's call
this the principle of the like cause. Suppose we wish to rule out such cases as
conjunctive forks. We do so by asserting that the effects in a conjunctive fork.
must be linked by causal processes to a single token cause - a common cause.
One danger of such a strategy is that it would seem to rule out classical
examples of conjunctive forks as merely being like causes. Bill and Stephen may
sup from the same pot, but is that a truly common cause? Do they have to eat
from the same mushroom? Do they have to swap mouthfuls of the same
mushroom?
It could also be argued that the strategy of ruling out like causes as
conjunctive forks is incoherent. Remember that the conditional probabilities
cited in the four conditions for the fork are derived from long-run frequencies.
Can data for such probabilities be generated without appealing to cause types?
In the case of the atomic blast, it looks like it might be possible. Consider
condition 1:
P(A.BIC) = p(AIC)X p(BIC)
So long as a bomb blast (C) involved exposure of enough servicemen, it seems
that we can derive the conditional probabilities of being a serviceman
contracting leukemia (A) given exposure, being another serviceman contracting
leukemia (B) given exposure, and two different servicemen contracting
leukemia given exposure (A.B), by reference to a single bomb blast.
Clearly, however, the probabilities are not derived from reference to a single
serviceman A and a single serviceman B. There seems something ad hoc about
restricting probability derivations to token causes when we are forced to make
these derivations from type effects.
Now consider the barometer example. Here it is surely the case that the
conditional probabilities of a drop in barometric reading (A) given a drop in
atmospheric pressure (C), a storm (B) given a drop in atmospheric pressure,
and a drop in barometric reading and a storm given a drop in atmospheric
pressure have been derived by reference to many different drops in
atmospheric pressure as well as many different barometric readings and
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storms. In fact we might argue that this kind of derivation of probabilities from
many different "trials" involves better data acquisition methods than the
atomic blast example, and we should have better confidence in the values of the
probabilities that we derive in this case. There is definitely something dissonant
about restricting conjunctive forks - via interpolation of causal processes - to
cases of token causes, when the statistical relations that the fork must obey have
been derived by reference to type causes.
Let's summarise what we think has gone wrong: Reichenbach's concept 9f
the conjunctive fork does not provide an analysis of the principle of the common
cause, it provides a characterisation of the principle of the like cause. The
conjunctive fork describes a statistical correlation between type causes and type
events, not all of which are common causes.199 Unfortunately, it fails as a
criterion for determining whether a general causal relation holds between types
of events because it holds in cases of spurious causal connections, such as
Crasnow's example. When the definition of the conjunctive fork is expanded in
Salmonl to include reference to connecting causal processes, and thus rule out
Crasnow examples, genuine causal correlations s':!ch as A reichenbachia are
rendered spurious. So even when amended, the conjunctive fork fails as a
characterisation of general causation.
We have noted that the conjunctive fork does not appear to be a basic causal
mechanism in Salmonl. We have also noted that even in a world like ours only
some types of conjunctive fork appear to be associated with irreversible
processes (this association being taken as evidence for conjunctive forks only
being open to the future). This casts serious doubt on the conjunctive fork
forming the basis of a causal account of either temporal asymmetry or temporal
explanatory asymmetry. At best, we might say that conjunctive forks are
accidentally associated with asymmetries.
Our conclusion is that the conjunctive fork is an optional extra to the
Salmonl process analysis of causation. Arguably, Salmon also comes round to
this opinion. In the late Salmon1 paper "Causal propensities: statistical causality
versus aleatory causality" (1990), he argues that satisfactory accounts of
causation place primary emphasis on causal mechanisms (processes and
199 It is a shame that Reichenbach died before presenting The direction of time for publication.
The problem we have identified might well have been identified in the dialogue between
author, editor and referees, and no doubt addressed by Reichenbach in the final text.
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interactions) "but does not disdain statistical regularities". Conjunctive forks
are clearly identified as a form of statistical regularity.200 Placing secondary
emphasis on conjunctive forks surely shows some disdain for their ontological
status. Perhaps the key to the continued presence of the conjunctive fork in
Salmonl is, as ever, Salmon's ultimate goal of a theory of explanation. Statistical
regularities - including the conjunctive fork - may not have enormous
ontological significance, but they do have great explanatory significance.
Indeed, as suggested in "Causality and explanation: a reply to two critiques",
they may have explanatory status which is not reducible to the underlying
ontology.
Ontological interactive forks
Let's return to the development of Salmonl. In the 1981 paper "Causality:
propagation and production" we find a reiteration of the earlier themes. Causal
processes are associated with the propagation of causal influence, which is
explained in terms of 'the at-at theory of transmission of marks. Causal
interactions are interactive forks.
The probability relations associated with the interactive fork are given (as per
"Why ask 'why?'?"), but the actual characterisation of the interactive fork is no
longer statistical. Salmon claims only that many cases of causal interactions are
associated with the probability relations201 and in a supporting footnote,
Salmon also remarks that the probability relations do not form part of the
definition of either causal interactions or interactive forks. 202
Salmon's diffidence is partially explained by the phenomenon of the perfect
fork. A perfect fork is a causal fork where the conditional probabilities of A
given C or B given C are either 0 or 1. As Dowe puts it, such forks are
deterministic limits of causal forks. 203 These forks are significant because, for
example, in the case where:
P(A.BIC) =p(AIC)x p(Blc) =I
200 "Causal propensities: statistical causality versus aleatory causality", p207
201 "Causality: production and propagation", p295
202 "Causality: production and propagation", p30I
203 "Wesley Salmon's process theory of causality and the conserved quantity theory", pI98
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the fork may represent a limiting case of either a conjunctive fork or an
interactive fork (even though such a fork violates condition 1 of the "Why ask
'why?'?" statistical characterisation of the interactive fork).204 If the interactive
fork can not be distinguished from the conjunctive fork on purely statistical
grounds it can not be given a purely statistical characterisation.205
The new characterisation is ontological. The ontological characterisation of
the interactive fork locates the fork at spatiotemporal intersections of two
processes. Yet there is more to an interactive fork (and hence causal interaction)
than mere intersection. Firstly, the intersection must be between two casual
processes, not two pseudo processes nor a causal process and a pseudo process.
Secondly, the two intersecting processes acquire a persistent modification at the
point of intersection which persists beyond the point of intersection.206 A space-
time diagram of such a causal interaction would take the form of an X, and the
interactive fork can thus be referred to as an "X-type" interaction.207
Strictly speaking, where Salmon refers to "spatiotemporal intersections of
processes", we should substitute "spatiotemporal intersections or interfaces of
processes". The exclusive talk of intersections ,appears to stem from Salmon's
favourite examples of causal processes. When the beam of white light passes
through the red filter and is marked by becoming red (an example of a causal
interaction), the obvious intuitive claim is that there is a spatiotemporal region
jointly occupied by both the beam of light and the filter. So there is at least a
prima facie case for this interaction involving an intersection of processes. But
consider another "macroscopic" example of a causal interaction: the white
billiard ball striking the red. Clearly we should class this as a causal interaction
under Salmonl, yet clearly - apart, perhaps, from some surface mingling of the
contact zones - we never find the white inside the red or the red inside the
204 "Causality: production and propagation", pp297-8
205 The perfect fork is significant only as a problem case in Salmonl. Since conjunctive forks
determine temporal direction and interactive forks do not, one must determine (by other
means than statistical considerations) whether a perfect fork is a deterministic limit of a
conjunctive fork or an interactive fork before using it to determine a temporal direction.
206 We must be careful of loose talk here. "Beyond" implies there is a temporal direction to the
interactive fork, but as Salmon notes, interactive forks display no temporal asymmetry.
Strictly speaking, we should say that two processes intersect and each process has different
characteristics on each side of the intersection.
207 The term X-type is actually introduced by Salmon in the later (1984) work Scientific
explanation and the causal structure of the world, p181, but it is clear from the characterisation
of the interactive fork in "Causality: production and propagation" that they are X-type
interactions.
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white. It is much more accurate to describe this interaction as involving a
spatiotemporal interface rather than an intersection.
The interface interpretation is even more warranted at the quantum physical
scale. Consider Compton scattering. When the electron"absorbs" the incident
photon, it is not the case that there is a photon sloshing around inside the
electron like water in a sponge. The "post-absorption" electron is simply a more
energetic electron that the "pre-absorption" electron. Similar circumstances
obtain in beta decay, where a proton "emits" a virtual W boson which then
decays into a positron and a neutrino (and the proton becomes a neutron). W
bosons do not lurk hideously in nucleons waiting to be emitted, and electrons
and positrons do not lurk hideously within the bosons waiting to be emitted.
They only exist on the other side of the "interface" with the "originating"
particle.20B
Let's apply this version of Salmon1 to the bouncing of Frank. Consider
Frank's big last leap. This can be expressed in terms of three processes and two
interactions. The Moon (process one) strikes the Earth (process two). A contact
zone, a persistent modification in kinetic energy and momentum distributions
propagates through the Moon, and another through the earth (interaction one).
The modification in the Earth is transmitted to Frank (process three). Frank is
modified by gaining a great deal of momentum and kinetic energy and the
surface of the Earth is modified by losing some energy and momentum to Frank
(interaction two).
It may appear, given the example we have chosen, that Salmon1 converges
with the transference analysis at this point. Indeed, in "Causal and theoretical
explanation" we have already seen that most, if not all causal processes
transmit energy, and in "Causality: production and propagation" Salmon notes
that most causal interactions - perhaps all- involve momentum and energy
transfers from process to process, and cites Fair's transference analysis as
providing an illuminating account of the role of energy and momentum
transfer in causation.209 Salmon also suggests that all fundamental physical
interactions can be interpreted in terms of the interactive fork.210 Such a
20B To the extent that the uncertainty principle allows us to talk meaningfully of interfaces in
these cases.
209 "Causality: production and propagation", p294 and supporting footnote p301
210 "Causality: production and propagation", pp298-9
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programme seems entirely consonant with the Heathcote conjecture, that causal
interaction is properly associated with the interactions described by an
appropriate quantum field theory.
Yet Salmon still holds that the defining feature of causal interactions and
processes is the introduction and propagation of marks. As we saw in an earlier
quote from Dowe, Salmon (with Fair in mind) argues that processes should not
be associated with transmission of energy, because there is no way of
distinguishing between the transmission of quantities of energy (in a beam of
light, for example) and the regular appearance of energy (in a moving spot of
light being cast on a wall by the same beam of light). In other words, a process
analysis in which processes are defined as transmissions of energy does not
adequate distinguish between causal and pseudo processes.211 Conversely, the
edge of the expanding contact zones need not qualify as a mark simply on the
basis of its energy density. It is also a deformation in the crystalline structure of
the Earth. We could also cash out all the interactions in the case of the bouncing
of Frank in terms of modifications of crystalline structure, not just modifications
in energy/momentum density.
Note that this new account of causal interactions locates interactions in the
same place as a basic Aronson-Fair analysis. A spatiotemporal intersection of
two processes corresponds fairly closely to the point of contact of two
211 The objection is neither relevant nor correct. Under a process analysis, if two circumstances
are connected by a causal process, then one circumstance could causally depend on the
other regardless of whether or not we could tell that the two circumstances were causally
connected. If we consider an adequate Aronson-Fair analysis to be a variety of process
analysis, it would fail to have an adequate causal/pseudo process distinction if it did not
have an ontological criterion for distinguishing between regular appearance and
transmission of energy. In fact, Aronson-Fair does have such a criterion: transmission
involves the propagation of genidentical quantities of energy/momenta and regular
appearance does not. The energy/momentum of the moving spot is constituted by many
different bits of energy/momenta, so it is a pseudo process not a causal process. The
problem for Aronson-Fair is that its particular criterion does not hold in this universe. To
use the distinction we drew at the beginning of this chapter, Aronson-Fair fails the second
challenge for an adequate process analysis rather than the third challenge.
It even seems, prima facie, that we could ontologically distinguish between the
transmission of energy/momentum and mere regular appearance of energy/momentum
by adopting an at-at theory of energy/momentum transmission. Photons propagate along
light beams in the absence of local causal interactions, so the light beam is a causal process.
The photons in the spot appear as a consequence of continual local interactions between the
beam and the wall, so the spot is a pseudo process. Indeed, in the mature form of Salmon2
beams of light qualify as causal processes for precisely this reason.
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interacting middle-sized objects. But it locates interactions in a different place to
an Aronson-Fair analysis which respects the Heathcote conjecture.
Consider our electron-only model of physical interaction. In the case of two
electrons repelling each other, an adequate Aronson-Fair analysis locates the
causal interaction in the exchange of the virtual photon. Effectively, the
interaction is located in an intervening process. In the case of a collision between
macroscopic objects such as the white and the red, the interaction is located in
the cascades of virtual photon exchanges spreading through the contact zones
of the objects. Under Salmon1, there should be two interactions in the single
electron case: one at each point of interface between the virtual photon processes
and the electron processes (these interfaces correspond to the couplings we
discussed in our disproof of genidentity at the quantum scale). Similarly, in the
macroscopic case we can locate interactions at each coupling of a virtual and/or
real quantum-scale object in the cascade. But we could also legitimately locate
the interaction at a single point - the point of impact of the white and the red.
Thus Salmon1 is another scale-invariant analysis of causation: like a basic
Aronson-Fair analysis, but unlike an adequate Aronson-Fair analysis.
Both locations of causal interactions in Salmon1 seem inappropriate in an
analysis of causation which tracks physical interaction. To begin with,
according to the Heathcote conjecture physical interactions can only take place
at the quantum scale. In that case, how can simple causal interactions
(interactions which need not be reduced into the sum of myriad quantum
interactions) take place at macroscopic scales? Similarly, the account of causal
processes in Salmon1 is also scale invariant: we can treat the spreading contact
zone as a single processes, or a complex network of quantum-scale processes
and interactions. But under the at-at theory of causal propagation, a single
process only propagates in the absence of local interactions. Surely the cascade
of quantum-scale interactions amount to local interactions. In that case, we
seem obliged to claim that the macroscopic entity that the quantum-scale
circumstances sum to is not a genuine process,
In addition, locating the causal interactions at couplings between quanta
turns the phrase "causal interaction" in Salmon1 into a term of art. Insofar as we
understand interaction, it is by reference to physical interaction. By locating
causal interactions at couplings we go beyond our best fundamental
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understanding of physical interactions. At best, when we designate these
couplings as "interactions" we are applying a metaphoric extension of our
common sense notion of interactions.
A brief story should serve to demonstrate this point. Suppose we are asked
to participate in a demonstration of interaction. We are shown a white and a
red billiard ball rolling towards one another, striking with a gentle "clack" and
rebounding away. We are asked to draw a quick sketch of what we have seen:
so we draw something like figure 9.
Figure 9 - artist's impression of macroscopic interaction
We are asked to indicate where the interaction took place. We hem and haw a
little over whether the points of contact between the balls and the billiard table
count as interactions, but then indicate that the interaction between the balls
takes place at the intersection of the arrows. This corresponds with the Salmon1
view that interactions take place at intersections or interfaces of processes.
Then we are asked why the interaction took place in the way it did: why the
balls interacted in the way they did, rather than passing straight through each
other. We might say: because the balls are hard·solid objects. Then we are asked
to give a more fundamental account of the macroscopic interaction. Knowing a
reasonable amount about chemistry and other quantum theory, we say that the
material of the red (and of the white) is quite tightly bonded together, and there
are few half-filled orbitals on the surface of the balls which would allow the
balls would stick together. Hence the predominant factor in the physical
interaction is the repulsive electromagnetic interaction between the electrons in
the objects. Virtual photons are exchanged, and so on.
And this is the point at which the analysis in terms of fundamental
interactions stops, with the statement that virtual quanta are exchanged. The
"emission" or "absorption" of virtual quanta at couplings is not a more
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fundamental physical interaction underlying the exchange. The existence of
couplings is a significant factor in fundamental interactions, as we saw in our
discussion of genidentity at the quantum scale. But it is only a crucial part of
physical interaction, not an interaction itself.
The reason why we are tempted to think a coupling is a physical interaction
is that it occupies an analogous position in a quantum-scale interaction to the
position where we commonsensically locate interactions in cases of
macroscopic interaction: spatiotemporal intersections or interfaces of objects (or
processes). But this is a metaphoric extension of common sense rather than an
application of our best understanding of physical interaction. Thus, by locating
causal interactions at spatiotemporal intersections, the phrase"causal
interaction" has come adrift from best understanding and fundamental
application of the term "interaction".
So how might a Salmont-style analyst reply to these charges? We think the
best response must be along the lines that these criticisms are only telling
against a energy/momenta transference process analysis, where causal
dependence genuinely has to reduce to sums of quantum-scale physical
dependence and interactions are properly associated with processes rather than
intersections of processes. But Salmont is an information transfer analysis, to
which the criticisms do not apply.
Information is manifest at every physical scale: marks can range in scale from
increased energy levels of quantum particles to chalk marks on billiard balls, to
billboards, to the configuration of lights marking airport runways, to the
configurations of town lighting observed from Earth orbit. Although the
macroscopic processes and interactions may be composed of many quantum-
scale processes and interactions, frequently the relevant form of mark being
transmitted or transferred is manifest at the macroscopic level, so we can limit
our attention to a single macroscopic process and interaction rather than the
complex network of quantum-scale processes.
Salmon is sympathetic to the view that most processes might strictly
speaking not be processes but networks of processes. Yet he still argues for
some scale invariance in the manner we have suggested:
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When it comes to practical investigation of actual processes pragmatic considerations
determine the level of analysis. For some purposes the motion of a molecule of a gas
between collisions with other objects (other molecules, Brownian particles, or walls of
containers) may be considered a single causal process; for other purposes the motion
of a baseball from a bat to a window (in spite of innumerable collisions with
molecules in the atmosphere) may be regarded as a single causal process. I think we
gain greater philosophical insight into causality by operating at a rather rarefied
theoretical level, recognising, of course, that we must often descend from such
abstract heights when it comes to practical investigations.212
Similarly, it need not matter that interaction is a term of art when applied to
quantum-scale couplings between quanta. So long as there is a plausible
definition of the term which does not explicitly cash it out as a species of
physical dependence, the usage is permissible. Arguably, Salmon1 supplies
such a definition - causal interaction is information exchange between
processes. Prima facie, this sort of phenomena could take place at a
spatiotemporal intersection of any process: no deviant account of physical
interaction is being invoked.
We think that even these best rejoinders fail. Positing the scale invariance of
causation on the basis of the pragmatics of investigation of the world produces
an external problem for Salmon1. The problem is that Salmon1 is intended to
provide an objective basis for a theory of explanation. An explanation is
objectively justified by appeal to an underlying configuration of causal
processes and interactions, which are supposed to be objective, physical
features of the world. If these processes and interactions turn out not to be
objective features of the world but rather are artifacts of our explanatory
requirements, then the justification of explanations are other explanations. The
objective basis of justification promised by Salmon1 just isn't delivered.
So the decoupling of relevance of the quantum-scale network of processes
and interactions from the macroscopic processes and interactions required by a
scale-invariant information transfer process analysis can't be cashed out by a
failure of explanatory relevance. What seems to be needed is a failure of physical
relevance between the complex quantum-scale process-interaction cascades and
212 "Causality and explanation: a reply to two critiques", p464. Note that these observations
are in the context of SalmonZ, rather than Salmonl, but the sentiments could readily be
transferred to the earlier analysis.
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the associated simple macroscopic process-interaction configurations. But this
just isn't the case in our universe.
Consider a whole series of bouncing-of-Frank experiments. The strength of
the lunar impact is kept constant over the series of experiments, as are the
properties of each Frank. We alter each trial bouncing by changing the chemical
structure of the Earth. This will affect the rate at which the mark introduced
into the Earth by the lunar impact propagates to Frank's jumping-off point. So
in some of the trials Frank will have a normal last leap, and in some of the trials
Frank will have a big last leap. The propagation of the macroscopic mark (the
spreading contact zone) through the Earth is found to depend sensitively on the
changes in chemical structure. But these changes largely amount to changes in
the number and packing of electrons within the Earth - in other words, the
quantum-scale process-interaction cascade is physically relevant to the
macroscopic processes and interactions. Hence the interactions within the
cascades must amount to local interactions, and the contact zone really is not a
process in its own right.
So, despite appearances to the contrary, an adequate version of Salmon1 can
not be scale-invariant. Processes and interactions should only be associated
with quantum-scale phenomena. "Macroscopic" processes and interactions are,
properly speaking, only assemblages of genuine processes and interactions.
But this failure of scale invariance poses a number of massive problems for
an information transfer analysis - and particularly for Salmon1, which locates
causal interactions at couplings between quantum entities. A preliminary
problem is that the coupling between a virtual photon and an electron does not
form an X-type intersection.213 A secondary problem is that the X-type
intersection should involve mutual modifications of processes. This implies that
there should be some fact of the matter about each process being one and the
same process "before" and"after" a coupling. If there is no such fact of the
matter, then the marking of an outgoing process could hardly amount to a
modification in one of the incoming processes. But the most problematic
consequence is that information transfers are apparently being made between
entities which cannot carry information.
213 We shall look at Salmon's discussion of this point presently.
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Consider the Salmon1 interaction between a virtual photon and an electron.
At the coupling, information is either being passed from the photon to the
electron, or from the electron to the photon, or is being exchanged between the
photon an the electron. Yet as we saw in the Davies excerpt in.the first section
of this chapter, information can only be encoded by real quanta, not virtual
quanta. So no such information transfer or exchange could take place. It
appears that Salmon1 could only assign causal status to a coupling between real
quanta. So if we are appealing to a standard notion of physical information in
Salmon1, this renders many physical interactions acausal- for example,
virtually all radioactive decay in the known universe, which is mediated by the
exchange of virtual W-, W+ and ZO bosons.
In fact, it is very difficult to avoid the involvement of virtual quanta
couplings even in quantum-scale interactions which apparently involve only
real quanta. Consider the annihilation of a real electron and a real positron
producing real photons. One perfectly good interpretation of this physical
interaction is that the real photons are virtual photons from the cloud
surrounding the electron and the positron which are "liberated" by the
annihilation of the electron and positron.214 Since virtual photons were involved
at some stage of this set of circumstances, a breakdown in information transfer
occurs and no causation takes place. Consider Salmon's favourite example of
Compton scattering. We can regard the emission of the real photon as being the
result of energy from the excited electron "promoting" into real status one of
the virtual photons from the cloud around the electron.215 Once again no
standard information transfer could be taking place since there is a virtual
photon involved. Conceivably, virtually all couplings could be acausal.
Let's recap and summarise. We are looking for a process analysis of
causation in which causal dependence tracks physical dependence. In the light
of the Heathcote conjecture, this version of Salmon1 doesn't seem to fit the bill.
Firstly, is inappropriately scale-invariant. Secondly, physical interactions are
correctly located in processes rather than at couplings.
The defence is to claim that Salmon1 is an information transference analysis.
Physical information is scale invariant, and information exchanges are located
214 The forces ofnature, p128
215 The forces ofnature, p128
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at couplings, so causal interactions should be located at couplings. But this
defence fails. Our best understanding of physical information is that it is not
scale invariant. "Macroscopic" processes and interactions are not actually
processes and interactions in their own right, they are complex networks of
quantum-scale processes and interactions. So the level at which information is
genuinely being transmitted and transferred is at the quantum scale. But if this
is the case, then causal interactions simply can't be located at couplings,
because physical information would then be being exchanged between real
quanta and virtual quanta, and virtual quanta can not encode physical
information.
There are two possible upshots of all this. Firstly, this version of Salmon1 is
simply wrong, because it is in conflict with our understanding of physical
information. Secondly, the notion of information appealed to in order to defend
against the charge that causal interaction is a term of art is itselfa term of art,
since the relevant information certainly could not be physical information. So
unless either the notion of information transference is abandoned in Salmon1 or
some satisfactory definition of the term of art is supplied, Salmon1 will not fulfil
our basic desideratum.
Counterfactual Salmonl
The final major stage of development of Salmon1 occurs in the 1984 book
Scientific explanation and the causal structure of the world. The standard verities are
affirmed. The propagative aspect of causation is understood in terms of the at-
at theory of transmission of marks by causal processes. The productive aspect
of causation is explained in terms of conjunctive forks and interactive forks.
Interactive forks are given an ontological characterisation in terms of X-type
spatiotemporal intersections of processes involving the introduction of a mark
into each of the processes. Causal interactions are interactive forks. Conjunctive
forks provide the temporal asymmetry of causation.
Arguably Salmon also goes some way toward either abandoning the
information transference basis of Salmon1 or providing a substantive definition
of the peculiar sense of information, although the definition is never applied
explicitly to the notion of a mark. Marks are frequently referred to as being
characteristics or modifications of structure of processes. In response to
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criticisms by Dowe of vagueness in these notions, in a later paper Salmon notes
that these characteristics should be explicated in terms of another notion
developed in Scientific explanation and the causal structure of the world:
The key concept is that of an objectively codefined class [ODC] ... which is explicated in
terms of physically possible detectors attached to appropriate kinds of computers that
receive carefully specified types of information. It is possible to ascertain, on the basis
of local observations - detections - whether an entity possesses a given property at
a particular time. Since, in scientific contexts, we often detect one property by
observing another, it must be possible in principle to construct a computer to make
the determination. For example, when we measure temperature by using a
thermocouple, we actually read a potentiometer to detect an electromotive force (emf).
The computer to which the explication refers must be able to translate the
potentiometer reading into a temperature determination on the basis of laws
concerning the electrical outputs of thermocouples, but without receiving information
from other physical detectors. Notice that this explication is physical, not epistemic.
This kind of definition would easily suffice to rule out properties such as ... being a
shadow that is closer to the Harbour Bridge than to the Sydney Opera House [Dowe], as well
as properties such as grue.216
It is not clear that the definition of an ODC mandates scale invariance. (We shall
not debate the point.) At first glance, the definition promises an account of how
virtual quanta might transmit or exchange information. Virtual quanta could
not carry physical information in the standard sense, because information
cannot be encoded within a single wavelength of an entity, and virtual quanta
propagate at most a single wavelength. Yet the definition of ODCs resolves
"information" to possession of a particular property. It seems entirely plausible
that virtual quanta possess properties.
Unfortunately, the definition of ODCs also requires some property of the
virtual quanta to be observable. But virtual quanta are strictly unobservable. So
virtual quanta don't possess ODC. Hence, information cannot be being
exchanged across couplings involving virtual quanta. Salmon1 still can't fulfil
our fundamental desideratum, because the account of causal interactions is still
appealing to an inadequate account of information transfer.
216 "Causality without counterfactuals", p251
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Even if we could provide an adequate account of information transfer, there
are a number of extremely difficult problems for the analysis. The first involves
the requirement that causal interactions are located at X-type intersections of
processes which persist through the interaction. Salmon reiterates his
suggestion that all fundamental physical interactions might be understood in
terms of the interactive fork. But most physical interactions at the quantum
level do not involve X-type intersections of processes. For example, a hydrogen
atom absorbing a photon exemplifies a A -type intersection of processes. There
are two "incoming" processes, one of which is annihilated at the coupling, and
one "outgoing" process, which is a modified form of one of the "incoming"
processes.217 A hydrogen atom emitting a photon exemplifies a y-type
intersection of processes. There is one "incoming" process and two "outgoing"
processes, one of which is created at the coupling, and one of which is a
modified form of the incoming process.218
Compton scattering, Salmon's favourite example of an interactive fork,
actually involves such a A -type intersection (absorption of the incident photon
by the electron).linked by a process (the excited electron) to a y-type
intersection (emission of a photon by the excited electron).219 Salmon
acknowledges the reductive programme is therefore contingent on an
explication of the interactive fork in terms of these "simpler" A -type and y-type
intersections. Salmon is forced to leave this explication as an exercise for the
reader.220
In fact, the requirements for the programme are even more complex.
Consider the mutual annihilation of an electron and a positron. The energy
released by the collision escapes in the form of photons. The energy is not
carried away by a single photon. If this was the case, such an interaction
arguably could be described in terms of the putative A -type interactive fork.
But this would seem to involve the claim that the photon is a modified electron
process, which would be unwarranted special pleading.
217 As we noted earlier, since causal interactions are time-symmetric, such talk of "incoming
and "outgoing" processes is merely a convenient figure of speech. We shall use scare
quotes to indicate this.
218 Scientific explanation and the causal structure of the world, p181
219 As we noted earlier, the situation may be even more complex than this, involving
intermediate stages such as the promotion of a virtual photon.
220 Scientific explanation and the causal structure of the world, pp181-2
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One possibility is that two photons are produced. This corresponds in some
ways to an X-type interactive fork, but it would again be unwarranted special
pleading to argue that the two"outgoing" photons are modified versions of the
two "incoming" electron processes.221 The other possibility is that three photons
are produced, producing a spatiotemporal intersection of five distinct processes:
an "incoming" electron, an "incoming" positron, and three "outgoing"
photons.222 Let's call such interactions involving five (or more) processes *-type
interactions.
Due to the existence of the *-type and the anomalous A-, y- and X-type
intersections, it seems that the "final theory" of the interactive fork needed for
Salmon's programme has to be capable of dealing with interactions involving
arbitrary numbers of "incoming" and "ou~going" intersecting processes and
involving arbitrary numbers of creations, annihilations and modifications of
processes. Indeed, a scale-invariant version of Salmon1·also needs such a theory
for causal interactions at the macroscopic scale. Consider a rock being hurled
through the window. Here we have an intersection of two "incoming"
processes (the rock and the window) and many, many outgoing processes (the
rock and dozens of window shards), most of which were created by the
interaction. This is close to a paradigm case of the *-type interaction.
The major innovation - and one of the most serious failings - introduced
in Scientific explanation and the causal structure of the world is that the Salmon1
accounts of mark transmission and causal interaction are given explicitly
counterfactual formulations.
The modification to the at-at theory is motivated by a counterexample due to
Nancy Cartwright. Consider the case of the rotating beacon. Suppose the
moving spot of light on the wall is marked by a local interaction: being made
red by a red filter being held up next to the wall. Suppose that a few
nanoseconds later a red filter is placed over the lens of the beacon. So the spot is
marked red by a single local interaction (the wall filter), and remains red
221 In fact, at the quantum scale every interaction involving an X-type intersection of processes
will be anomalous. The claim that the IIoutgoing" processes are modified versions of
"incoming" processes amounts to the claim that the outgoing processes are genidentical to
the incoming processes. Yet as we have seen in our earlier discussion of the transference
analysis and Salmon1 there is no such genidentity at the quantum scale in our universe.
222 Theforees ofnature, pp108-10
131
without any further local interactions (because of the filter at the beacon).
Cartwright concludes that under the previously developed account of
transmission of marks (being at the intervening positions at the intervening
times in the absence of additional interactions), the spot is transmitting a mark,
and thus is not a pseudo process at all.
Salmon attempts to rule out such cases by introducing an explicitly
counterfactual condition into the at-at theory of mark transmission, formally
stated as principle MT:
MT: Let P be a process that, in the absence of interactions with other processes, would
remain uniform with respect to a characteristic Q, which it would manifest
consistently over an interval that includes both of the space-time points A and B
(A:;t:B). Then, a mark (consisting of a modification of Q into Q"), which has been
introduced into process P by means of a single local interaction at point A, is
transmitted to point B if [and only if] P manifests the modification Q" at B and at all
stages of the process between A and B without additional interventions.223
This modification to at-at is an extremely dangerous move on Salmon's part.
Consider how MT operates in specific cases. In the case of the red filtered beam
of light, marks are being transmitted by the beam because but for the
interposition of the red filter, the beam would have remained white. We have a
straightforward case of counterfactual dependence. In the case of the
Cartwright example, marks are not being transmitted by the spot of light
because but for the interposition of the red filter at the wall, the spot would still
have turned red due to the filter at the beacon. We have a paradigmatic case of
failure of counterfactual dependence due to late preemption. A standard Lewis-
style counterfactual analysis treats late preemption as a problem case: a failure
of the counterfactual analysis to establish causal dependence in cases where
causal dependence ought to be occurring. MT actually appeals to late
preemption to demarcate between cases of causal dependence and lack of
causal dependence.
223 Scientific explanation and the causal structure of the world, p148. The "[and only if]" clause is a
modification suggested by Elliott Sober. See "Wesley Salmon's process theory of causality
and the conserved quantity theory", pp196-7.
132
In this mature version of Salmon1 causal dependence is supposed to track
physical dependence. Causal mechanisms are objective features of the universe:
they are particular physical structures in the universe. The distinction between
a causal process and a pseudo process should be that the causal processes are
different kinds of physical structures from the pseudo processes. So if
overdetermination problems such as late preemption serve to distinguish
between causal processes and pseudo processes, then it must be the case that
there is some relevant physical distinction between the physical circumstances
in which counterfactual dependence occurs and the physical circumstances in
which overdetermination problems arise. Yet the strange case of the
overdetermining dumbbell demonstrates that overdetermination problems
arise in sets of physical circumstances where there are no relevant physical
differences from sets of physical circumstances in which straightforward
counterfactual dependence occurs. So it can not be the case that Salmon1 with
MT tracks physical dependence.
If Cartwright's examples necessitate a counterfactual amendment to at-at,
then at-at should be abandoned. But Cartwright's example actually does not
necessitate the move to MT. The weak link in Cartwright's example is the
assertion that the spot remains red without further causal interactions. Of
course there are further interactions. The spot is produced by photons from the
beacon scattering off the material of the wall. Each of these scatterings is a
causal interaction under Salmon1. In a case where these interactions cease - for
example, if a particular piece of the wall is perfectly transparent to the light
frequencies from the filtered beacon - not only would the spot not remain red,
there would be no spot. If a portion of the wall is made of a material which
perfectly absorbs visible frequencies of light and preferentially emits infra-red
radiation when stimulated by absorption of visible light, then the spot persists
in that area of the wall- as a "hot spot" - but it is not red.
We can generalise from this that all pseudo processes which, like the spot,
consist of a continuous series of interactions are immune to Cartwright's
criticism (because the required absence of local causal interactions never
occurs). If a Cartwright example could be formulated using a pseudo process
which is not a continuous string of interactions, then an amendment to at-at is
required. In the absence of such an example Salmon may retain the original
formulation of at-at.
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Salmon also provides a counterfactual explication of causal interactions in
Scientific explanation and the causal structure of the world, via the principle CI:
CI: Let PI and P2 be two processes that intersect with one another at the space-time
point 5, which belongs to the histories of both. Let Q be a characteristic that process PI
would exhibit throughout an interval (which includes subintervals on both sides of 5
in the history of PI) if the intersection with P2 did not occur; let R be a characteristic
that process P2 would exhibit throughout an interval (which includes subintervals on
both sides of 5 in the history of P2) if the intersection with PI did not occur. Then, the
intersection of PI and P2 at 5 constitutes a causal interaction if:
(1) PI exhibits the characteristic Q before 5, but it exhibits a modified characteristic
Q" throughout an interval immediately following 5; and
(2) P2 exhibits the characteristic R before 5, but it exhibits a modified characteristic
R" throughout an interval immediately following 5.224
The reference simply to processes rather than causal processes eliminates a
worrying circularity from the earlier statistical and ontological characterisations
of interactions. Causal processes were defined partly in terms of causal
interactions, because the introduction of a mark is by means of a causal
interaction. Yet causal interactions were defined in terms of spatiotemporal
intersections of causal processes.
The reference in CI to any processes rather than just causal processes does
not allow intersections of pseudo processes or intersections of causal processes
and pseudo processes to qualify as interactions. Consider two moving spots of
light projected on a white screen - paradigmatic examples of pseudo
processes. One spot is green; one is red. The green moves from the top left
corner to the bottom right, the red from the top right to the bottom left. They
intersect in the middle, momentarily creating a yellow spot. Since the
modification at the intersection does not persist beyond the intersection, this is
not a causal interaction. Now suppose that the projectors are set up so that
when the red and the green intersect the red changes direction and moves to
the top left, and the green changes direction and moves to the bottom left. This
looks like a causal interaction, but does not count due to the counterfactual
condition. If the projector set-up was identical but for there being no red
224 Scientific explanation and the causal structure of the world, p171
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projector, the green would still change direction. Mutatis mutandis, the red
would still change direction. (Note that unlike the case of MT this is merely a
straightforward case of absence of counterfactual dependence. CI does not
appeal to overdetermination problems.) Salmon describes some more complex
counterexamples of "collisions" of pseudo processes due to Patrick Maher and
Richard Otte, but also argues that the counterfactual condition of CI rules that
the cases are not causal interactions.225
Despite the apparent improvement in terms of elimination of the circularities
of the earlier statistical and ontological characterisations of causal interactions,
CI still only applies to the standard X-type interaction, and cannot account for
interactions at anomalous X-type intersections, A-type or y-type interactions, or
*-type interactions.
A little further tidying up occurs in Salmon1. The propensity interpretation
of transmission of causal influence is supplied in the 1988 paper "Dynamic
rationality: propensity, probability, and credence" and discussed in the 1991
paper "Causal propensities: statistical causality versus aleatory causality". We
can now summarise the salient points of the mature Salmon1:
1. Causal phenomena are explained in terms of two basic phenomena:
propagation and production of (probabilistic) causal influence.
2. The causal mechanism underlying propagation of causal influence is the
causal process. A process is a thing with some consistency of structure
(such as a material object or a moving spot of light). A causal process is a
process capable of transmitting a mark (a modification of structure).
Mark transmission is defined by a counterfactual at-at theory (but
perhaps need not be so defined).
3. The causal mechanisms underlying production of causal influence are
conjunctive forks and interactive forks.
(a) Conjunctive forks are configurations of causal processes which
produce correlations between events obeying a specific set of statistical
conditions. Conjunctive forks determine temporal asymmetry.
225 Scientific explanation and the causal structure of the world, pp171-4
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(b) Interactive forks are X-type spatiotemporal intersections of processes
where a modification of structure (a mark) is introduced into each
process at the point of intersection, the modifications persist beyond the
intersection, and the modification would not have occurred had the
intersection not occurred. Interactive forks are causal interactions.
Interactive forks are temporally symmetric.
4. Since characteristics and modifications of characteristics can occur at any
scale, like the early Aronson transference analysis, Salmon1 is a scale-
independent analysis of causation.
Kitcher and Dowe against Salmont
We have noted that the mature Salmon1 converges with the basic Aronson-Fair
analysis (but not with an adequate Aronson-Fair analysis). Arguably, it
converges even more dramatically with the counterfactual analysis.
Suppose we could demonstrate that all pseudo processes are continual
strings of interactions. Then all pseudo processes would be immune to
Cartwright's example, and Salmon need not provide an explicitly
counterfactual version of the at-at theory. But even if we could do this, the
account of causal interactions (CI) is still explicitly counterfactual. Since marks
are produced by causal interactions, and markability demarcates causal
processes from pseudo processes, the account of processes in Salmon1 is still
thoroughly counterfactual.
In fact, Salmon1 is open to the charge that no fundamental work is being
done in the analysis by the causal mechanisms postulated by the process
ontology: causal dependence in Salmon1 does not track physical dependence in
the form of a network of interconnecting causal processes and interactions, but
rather tracks relations of counterfactual dependence. This charge is laid by
Phillip Kitcher in the 1989 article "Explanatory unification and the causal
structure of the world":
What is critical to the causal claims seems to be the truth of the counterfactuals, not
the existence of the processes and the interactions. If this is correct then it is not just
that Salmon's account of the causal structure of the world needs supplementing
through the introduction of more counterfactuals. The counterfactuals are at the heart
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of the theory, while the claims about the existence of processes and interactions are, in
principle, dispensable. Perhaps these notions may prove useful in protecting a
basically counterfactual theory of causation against certain familiar forms of difficulty
(problems of preemption, overdetermination, epiphenomena, and so forth*). But,
instead of viewing Salmon's account as based on his explications of process and
interaction, it might be more revealing to see him as developing a particular kind of
counterfactual theory of causation, one that has some extra machinery for avoiding
the usual difficulties that beset such proposals. [*Kitcher's note: See Lewis (1973)
["Causation"], both for an elegant statement of a counterfactual theory of causation
and for a survey of difficult cases.]226
Indeed, the counterfactual formulation of the mature Salmon1 is very similar to
a Lewis-style counterfactual analysis. Consider the case of the moving spots of
light on the screen. We determine by CI that no causal interaction has taken
place by comparison of the actual case with either a single possible
experimental set-up identical but for the presence of the red projector or a
single possible experimental set-up identical but for the presence of the green.
This is almost identical to Lewis's formulation in terms of comparison with the
closest single possible world, or at least one of the joint closest possible worlds.
But if causal dependence is tracking counterfactual dependence in Salmonl,
could causal dependence genuinely be said to be an objective physical feature
of the world which could provide an objective physical basis to a theory of
scientific explanation? Salmon is uncomfortably aware that the answer to this
question is no - he has already expressed his reservations about the use of
counterfactuals in Scientific explanation and the causal structure of the world due to
the irreducibly pragmatic nature of counterfactuals:
Consider the famous example about Verdi and Bizet. One person might say, "If Verdi
had been a compatriot of Bizet, then Verdi would have been French," whereas another
might maintain, "If Bizet had been a compatriot of Verdi, then Bizet would have been
Italian." These two statements seem to be incompatible with one another. Their
antecedents are logically equivalent; if however, we accept both conditionals, we wind
up with the conclusion that Verdi would be French, that Bizet would be Italian, and
they would still not be compatriots. Yet both statements can be true. The first person
226 This summary by Kitcher of Kitcher's position is excerpted by Salmon in "Causality
without counterfactuals', p253
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could be making an unstated presupposition that the nationality of Bizet is fixed in
this context, while the second presupposes that the nationality of Verdi is fixed. What
remains fixed and what is subject to change - which are established by pragmatic
features of the context in which the counterfactual is uttered - determine whether a
counterfactual is true or false. It is concluded that counterfactual conditional
statements do not express objective facts of nature ...227
Salmon suggests a way out of this problem: scientists, or rather experimenters
using scientific methods, determine by means of well-designed controlled
experiments "which conditions are to be fixed for purposes of the experiment
and which allowed to vary".228 Such experimental measures are supposed to
give an objective basis to the relevant counterfactual conditions. (We could
view this way out as providing a distinction between Salmon1 and a Lewis-
style counterfactual analysis. The choice of relevant possible world is not being
made on the basis of comparative similarity, but on the basis of the decisions of
experimenters. On the other hand, Salmon may just be providing a criterion for
determining which is the closest possible world.229) Yet, as Dowe points out,
Salmon desperately needs to elaborate on why an otherwise pragmatic decision
about fixing conditions becomes an objective decision when made by a scientist
or experimenter.23o
Salmon finds Kitcher's claim that Salmon1 resolves to a Lewis-style
counterfactual analysis "disconcerting", although he argues that the
concentration on physical connections rather than the truth of counterfactual
conditionals marks a fundamental distinction between Salmon1 and a
counterfactual analysis.231 But this criticism and Kitcher and Dowe's reiteration
of the problems of providing an account of "objective counterfactuals" (or
objective grounds for determining which is the closest possible world) in
combination with Salmon's own misgivings over counterfactuals is the
deciding factor in favour of Salmon's rejection of Salmon1 in favour of the
Salmon2 conserved quantity analysis of causation.232
227 Scientific explanation and the causal structure of the world, p149
228 Scientific explanation and the causal structure of the world, pp149-50
229 Kitcher argues for the latter interpretation in "Explanatory unification and the causal
structure of the world", pp474-5
230 "Wesley Salmon's process theory of causality and the conserved quantity theory", p208
231 "A new look at causality", p18
232 "Anew look at causality", pp18-20. See also "Causality without counterfactuals", p253,
p259 and p260.
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Smith against Salmont
We think the most telling criticism against the mature version of Salmonl is still
the failure to give an adequate account of the sense of information being used.
The definition of an ODC does not clearly mandate the scale-invariance of
Salmonl. Consequently, only quantum scale entities are genuine causal
processes and only quantum-scale couplings are genuine causal interactions. At
this scale, very few couplings involve X-type intersections of processes. Due to
the breakdown of genidentity at this scale, even the X-type intersections do not
qualify as causal interactions. An interaction involves the persistent
modification of processes beyond the point of intersection. The notion of
modification of a process requires the process before the modification to be one
and the same process as the process after the modification. But there is no such
fact of the matter about the genidentity of entities at this scale. Even if these
problems could be solved, the location of causal interactions at couplings
requires that information is being exchanged with virtual quanta. But the ODC
interpretation of information resolves information to observable properties of
processes. Since the properties of virtual quanta are unobservable, virtual
quanta cannot carry such information. In effect, the only physical scale at which
a causal interaction could genuinely be said to occur is a physical scale at which
these causal interactions could not occur.
But suppose scale invariance was warranted by the ODC interpretation. In
that case, the counterfactual qualities of Salmon1 should not just cause concern
over the objective nature of causation, as argued by Kitcher and Dowe. The
counterfactual involvement mandates the rejection of the process/interaction
ontology.
The debate over whether Salmon1 should properly be referred to as a
physicalist analysis with strong counterfactual elements (as per Salmon) or as a
fundamentally counterfactual analysis with a few extra physical bells and
whistles (as per Kitcher) probably resolves to a matter of taste. The crucial issue
is that the process ontology does not help protect Salmon1 from the "usual
difficulties" of overdetermination, preemption and so forth. The process
ontology produces many more such familiar difficulties. Of course, Salmon
does not wish to abandon the analysis of causal dependence in terms of
physical dependence. But suppose he did. Would it not be possible to accept
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Kitcher's secondary observation - that Salmon1 is a counterfactual analysis
with special resources to deal with the problems of overdetermination,
preemption and so forth?
Consider how the CI treats the case of the bonking of Frank. The relevant
processes would be parts of Frank and parts of the Moon. In fact, they would be
the expanding contact zones in Frank and the Moon - no other portions of the
Moon or Frank are experiencing anything like a persistent modification over
the course of the bonking on either side of the initial impact. We would be
compelled to conclude that Frank's crushing did not depend on the entire
Moon, just the contact zone of the Moon.
But if the 3.3 metre radius contact zone of the Moon had not been present
when the Moon struck Frank~ it is not the case that certain characteristics of the
contact zone of Frank - such as rigidity, fleshiness, having rigid skeletal
structure and so forth - would not have been altered. Frank would still have
been crushed by part of the rest of the Moon. But the counterfactual criterion in
CI requires that these characteristics of Frank would have been altered had that
intersection or interface not taken place. Given that the counterfactual criterion
is not satisfied it simply is not the case that the crushing of Frank does not involve
a causal interaction.
We have an exact parallel between Salmon1 and a Lewis-style counterfactual
analysis in which assignment of object status is keyed to physical involvement.
Cases of single-object overdetermination arise. Both analyses are more prone to
Kitcher's "familiar forms of difficulty" than a standard Lewis-style analysis. By
paying close attention to the physical connections involved in physical
interactions, Salmon1 is even less capable of assigning causal dependence in
instances of obvious physical dependence than a standard Lewis-style analysis.
It seems that the only way to turn Salmon1 into a satisfactory counterfactual
analysis is to reject the use of processes and interactions. But such a move
amounts to the utter rejection of Salmon1 in favour of a counterfactual analysis.
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Processes
Salmon2
CQand
Dreams of a final process analysis
Given the failure of the mature Salmon1 to provide an analysis of causation in
which causal dependence, what line of enquiry seems most likely to produce an
analysis of causation which does fulfil our basic desideratum?
The fundamental problem with Salmon1 is the failure to supply an adequate
account of the information that is being transmitted by processes and
transferred or exchanged at interactions. It is tempting to suppose that the
correct avenue of approach is to develop a workable and plausible account of
information and slot this in to Salmon1.
But this would not be satisfactory. Even if we were to rehabilitate the notion
of information the mature Salmon1 is compromised by the counterfactual
formulation of CI and MT. Contra Kitcher, it is not the case that Salmon1 should
be treated as a Lewis-style counterfactual analysis with extra tools (the
process/interaction ontology) which allows it to deal more satisfactorily with
overdetermination problems. The process/interaction ontology leaves Salmon1
subject to more such problems than a standard Lewis-style counterfactual
analysis - the counterfactual version of Salmon1 is an even-Iess-than-usually-
adequate counterfactual analysis of causation. Retaining the counterfactual
formulation mandates the abandonment of the process/interaction ontology.
We have argued that the counterfactual amendment to the at-at theory of
mark-transmission is not necessitated by the Cartwright example. So we could
readily extricate the account of processes from counterfactual entanglement by
retreating to the pre-MT version of the at-at theory. But we cannot similarly
retreat to an earlier account of interactions in Salmon1.
The earlier ontological characterisation of interactive forks is unacceptably
circular. Causal processes are distinguished from pseudo processes by the mark
criterion. Yet marks are introduced by interactions, and, under the ontological
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characterisation, interactive forks (which constitute causal interactions) are
partially defined in terms of X-type intersections of causal processes.
Nor can we retreat to a statistical characterisation of causal interactions.
Salmon's statistical characterisations of both the conjunctive and interactive
forks also involve explicit mention of connecting causal processes, which is
unacceptably circular. Another problem is that interactions are properly to be
associated with the interactive fork, rather than the conjunctive fork. But the
perfect fork can be a limiting case of either the interactive fork or the
conjunctive fork. So causal interactions cannot be given a purely statistical
characterisation.
So we cannot rehabilitate Salmon! merely by developing a new notion of
information. Although a plausible Salmon! account of processes may be
extricated from counterfactual entanglement, there is no satisfactory Salmon!
non-counterfactual account of interactions. Some new ideas about causal
interaction are required in order to produce a satisfactory non-counterfactual
process analysis of causation.
Perhaps an old idea might suffice. We noted at the beginning of the
preceding chapter that - despite other failings - the transference analysis
seemed to provide an account of causal interactions that tracked physical
interactions. We have seen that the mature Salmon! resembles a transference
analysis. Salmon has already accepted that most causal interactions he wishes
to associate with interactive forks - perhaps all such causal interactions - are
associated with energy and momentum transfers.233 Salmon speaks highly of
Fair's transference analysis in this context. Perhaps the key to the conundrum is
to identify the causal interactions with something like energy/momentum
transfers or exchanges, rather than the marking of processes.234
Why "rather than the marking of processes"? Why not simply cash out
"markings" in terms of energy/momentum transfers? Simply because
"marking" implies some form of information transfer, and by cashing out
"marking" thus we would be relying on yet another non-standard
interpretation of information. Worse still, although energy/momenta transfers
or exchanges presumably have something to do with transfer or transmission of
233 "Causality: production and propagation", pp294-5
234 See Salmon's discussion of this point in "Causality without counterfactuals", pp252-3
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information, it is difficult to believe that one resolves to the other. Such an
intuition underlies the quote from Davies at the beginning of the previous
chapter asserting that causality is not violated by faster-than-light exchange of
virtual quanta. Although energy/momenta exchanges may briefly exceed the
speed of light, no information travels faster than the speed of light.
To put the point another way, the rationale for investigating the Salmon1
information transfer analysis of causation was that it appeared to be a plausible
alternative account of how causal dependence might track physical dependence,
which might not be subject to some of the failings of the energy/momenta
transference analysis. If information transfer is not significantly different from
energy/momenta transfer, and our intention is to look for a way of overcoming
the failures of the transference analysis, then we should attempt to deal directly
with those failures rather than proceeding under the cover of darkness
provided by a term-of-art interpretation of "information".
If we are rejecting the notion of information transfer or exchange at causal
interactions, we should reject the notion that causal processes transmit
information. As Salmon points out, the notion of marking is logically prior to
the notion of a mark. If we deny that causal interactions fundamentally involve
markings, we should deny that processes fundamentally involve transmission
of marks.
Yet retaining some explicit notion of a causal process prima facie seems
advisable. We concluded from our examination of the case of the bouncing of
Frank that a basic Aronson-Fair analysis which did not assert the genidentity of
energy/momenta was either inadequately casually connective or excessively
causally connective. To produce an adequately causally connective analysis, we
needed to key causal connectivity to the propagation of the lunar impact
contact zone through the Earth. As we noted during our discussion of Salmon1,
an account of connection by causal process is tailor made for capturing
adequate causal connectivity. Indeed, assuming a solution to the problem of
dissipation could have been found the genidentity of quantities of
energy/momenta would have supplied such an account of causal processes.
Unfortunately, genidentity fails at the appropriate physical scale in this
universe. Similarly, the challenge for the process analyses that supersede
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Salmon1 will be to identify a criterion for causal processes which is an actual
feature of this world.
So the project that shows most promise of fulfilling our basic desideratum is
a new process analysis of causation in which interactions are defined in terms
of energy/momentum transfers or exchanges of the transference analysis (or
some related mechanism). Two·such analyses have been proposed: Dowe's
conserved quantity analysis (which we will refer to as CQ) and Salmon's
version of the conserved quantity analysis (which we have been referring to as
Salmon2)·
Unfortunately, neither analysis can be regarded as satisfactory. Both analyses
repeat the Salmon1 error of locating causal interactions at couplings rather than
in types of processes. The proposed role for conserved quantities in causal
interactions does not seem to match the role that conserved quantities play in
physical interaction. Indeed, physical interactions seem to be more closely
associated with brief violations of certain conservation principles.
But most damningly, under the criteria proposed for processes there just
don't seem to be any processes in this universe. Neither analysis can justify
scale invariance, so properly speaking there are no processes except at the
quantum physical scale. Dowe relies on a genidentity criterion for processes,
but genidentity fails at this physical scale. Salmon2 provides an at-at theory of
processes. But at this physical scale few things appear to have enough
spatiotemporal extension between interactions in order to warrant being
referred to as processes. In the final analysis, either causation under Salmon2
tracks explanatory dependence rather than physical dependence or Salmon2 is
merely a brief restatement of our best accounts of physical dependence.
Candidates for a final process analysis
In his 1992 paper "Wesley Salmon's process theory of causation and the
conserved quantity theory", Phil Dowe tackles head-on the deficiencies of
Salmon1. Contra Kitcher, Dowe does not advocate that Salmon1 should be
construed as a counterfactual analysis of causation (which as we have argued
mandates the abandonment of the process/interaction ontology). Rather, Dowe
argues that Salmon1 should be supplanted by a new, non-counterfactual
process analysis.
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Dowe begins the paper with an exposition of Salmonl, and then proceeds to
elucidate various deficiencies of the analysis. Although he does not present a
historical analysis of the development of Salmon1, as per our presentation in the
previous chapter, Dowe does not restrict his criticism to the counterfactual form
of the analysis. (For example, the statistical characterisations of causal
interactions are examined and found wanting.)
We shall not give an detailed exposition of Dowe's arguments against
Salmonl. But the salient points of Dowe's attack include that the notions of
process and interaction are interdefined in a dangerously circular manner
(paralleling our concerns about the ontological and statistical characterisations
of interactions). The counterfactual formulation of the principles MT and CI is
out of place in an analysis which seeks to tie causation to objective matters of
fact. The origin of processes cannot be analysed in terms of statistical relations
by means of the conjunctive fork, and causal interactions cannot be analysed in
terms of the statistical characterisation of the interactive fork (once again,
paralleling our analysis). Salmonl's account of interactions is also limited to X-
type intersections involving modificatiol1. of two and only two causal processes,
yet many interactions seem to be of the y-type and the A -type. 235
Dowe is also concerned by the vagueness of the critical terms IIcharacteristic"
and "structure", although his concern is not parallel to our concern over the
justifiability of scale invariance. Indeed, CQ, Dowe's own process analysis is
also intended to be scale invariant. Dowe's concern is that without some more
precision in the definition of structure, an alteration in relational properties (a
Cambridge change) might qualify as a cllange in characteristics of a process,
and hence a causal interaction, when we would intuitively wish to deny their
causal status.236
Dowe seeks to avoid these problems by presenting a new process analysis of
causation, which we shall refer to as CQ (for IIconserved quantities"). CQ is, as
Salmon notes, beautiful for its simplicity:
Definition 1. A causal interaction is an intersection of world lines which involves
exchange of a conserved quantity.
235 "Wesley Salmon's process theory of causality and the conserved quantity theory", pp200-
210
236 "Wesley Salmon's process theory of causality and the conserved quantity theory", p201
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Definition 2. A causal process is a world line of an object which [possesses] a
conserved quantity.237
A world line is the collection of points on a spacetime (Minkowski) diagram which
represents the history of an object. A conserved quantity is any quantity universally
conserved according to current scientific according to current scientific theories. Some
conserved quantities are mass-energy, linear momentum, angular momentum, and
charge. An exchange means that at least one incoming and at least one outgoing
process manifest a change in the value of the conserved quantity. "Outgoing" and
"incoming" are delineated on the spacetime diagram by the forward and backward
light cones, but are essentially interchangeable. The exchange is governed by the
conservation law. The intersection can therefore be of the form X, Y,A or of a more
complicated form. An object can be anything found in the ontology of science (such as
particles, waves or fields), or commonsense.238
Several examples show how the definitions apply. The first is the bombardment
of nitrogen with an alpha particle (a helium nucleus), producing an oxygen
isotope and a proton (a hydrogen nucleus), which we can symbolise by the
equation:
This is an example of an anomalous X-type interaction that is difficult to
account for in Salmonl. To describe this p11enomenon in terms of mutual
modifications of two processes beyond a point of intersection, we would be
required to claim, for example, that the 1/outgoing" proton is a modified version
of a nitrogen atom (or a helium nucleus). This seems unwarranted special
pleading. But under CQ, by definition 2 each atom or nucleus is a causal
process because they possess the conserved quantity charge, signified in the
equation by the subscripts, which represent the numbers of protons in each
nucleus. The total incoming charge is equal to the total outgoing charge, and at
least one of the outgoing processes has a different charge from an incoming
process, so the transmutation involves a causal interaction by definition 1.
237 "Wesley Salmon's process theory of causality and the conserved quantity theory", p210.
The bracketed term "[possesses]", used in the later paper "Causality and conserved
quantities: a reply to Salmon" replaces the original term "manifests". Dowe does not wish
to give the impression that observing whether or not a process has a quantity underlies
causation.
238 "Wesley Salmon's process theory of causality and the conserved quantity theory", p2l0
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Y-type intersections are also causal under CQ. Consider the transmutation of
radium into radon, symbolised by the equation:
2~Ra~2~~Rn+~He
Both the "incoming" radium processes and the outgoing radon and alpha
particle processes qualify as causal processes by virtue of possessing charge.
The intersection involves an exchange of charge, so a causal interaction has
taken place.239
Dowe claims that CQ is an improvement over an Aronson-Fair analysis by
virtue of providing a workable account of processes and being more generally
applicable:
Using "conserved quantity" rather than "energy" is more general and more practical.
Many common instances, such as collisions between cars or billiard balls, are more
amenable to an analysis in terms of momentum rather than energy. Similarly,
electrical causes can be more practically identified according to charge than by energy.
Earlier we noted the difficulty of basing cause on energy on the grounds that it is not
possible to identify a quantity of energy as being the same as an earlier quantity. This
is avoided here because there is no notion of transference or transmission in the
definitions.240
Note that CQ differs from Salmon1 not only by giving a new account of causal
interactions, but also abandoning the at-at account of processes. The new
account is a genidentity criterion. We find in Dowe's "Causality and conserved
quantities: a reply to Salmon":
The theory could have been formulated ll1 terms of objects: there are causal objects and
pseudo objects - causal objects are those which possess conserved quantities, pseudo
objects do not. Then a causal process is the world line of a causal object.241
And even more explicitly:
... the CQ theory identifies genuine causal objects according to the possession of
certain properties at a time, and identifies genuine processes over time via the
239 "Wesley Salmon's process theory of causality and the conserved quantity theory", pp211-2
240 "Wesley Salmon's process theory of causality and the conserved quantity theory", p214
241 "Causality and conserved quantities: a reply to Salmon", p324
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additional presumption of a relation of identity over time. Thus: an electron existing at
a point in time is causal because it possesses charge, and its world line represents a
causal process, assuming that the world line represents one and the same object over
that time interval.242
Salmon considers Dowe's elimination of counterfactuals from the process
analysis and the ability to designate a greater variety of spatiotemporal
intersections as causal interactions to be a great boon for the process analysis
project. In the 1994 paper "Causality without counterfactuals" he consequently
renounces Salmon1 in favour of his own version of CQ - Salmon2.
There are several differences between the early version of Salmon2 and CQ.
Initially, Salmon believes that the process analysis should be cashed out in
terms of invariant quantities rather than conserved quantities. (The value of a
conserved quantity within a given physical system does not change over time;
the value of an invariant quantity remains constant with respect to change of
frame of reference.) In response to criticisms by Dowe and Christopher
Hitchcock,243 Salmon abandons this formulation in favour of conserved
quantities in his most recent formulation of Salmon2, presented in the 1998
paper "Causality and explanation: a reply to two critiques".244
But an issue that Salmon stands firm on is the rejection of Dowe's
genidentity criterion for casual processes. Hence, in the latest version of
Salmon2 Dowe's definition 2 is replaced by two other definitions detailing a
variant of the at-at theory of causal propagation. The mature version of
Salmon2 is:
(1) A causal interaction is an intersection of world-lines that involves exchange of a
conserved quantity.
(2) A causal process is the world-line of an object that transmits a non-zero amount
of a conserved quantity at each moment of its history (each spacetime point of
its trajectory).
242 "Causality and conserved quantities: a reply to Salmon", p330
243 pp314-5, Hitchcock, Christopher: "Discussion: Salmon on explanatory relevance",
pp304-20, Philosophy ofscience vol 62 (1995)
244 "Causality and explanation: a reply to two critiques", p472
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(3) A process transmits a conserved quantity between A and B (A:;eB) if and only if
it possesses a fixed amount of this quantity at A and B and at every stage of the
process between A and B without any interactions in the open interval (A,B)
that involve an exchange of that particular conserved quantity.245
A notable distinction between CQ and Salmon2 is thus that under CQ a single
causal process may persist through a causal interaction, so long as an
"incoming" process and an "outgoing" process are genuinely one and the same
process, but under Salmon2, a causal interaction signals the birth and death of
every interacting process. By definition 3, the presence of an interaction dictates
the absence of transmission at a particular spacetime point. But by definition 2,
a process must transmit a conserved quantity at every spacetime point of its
trajectory. So processes only extend from interaction to interaction, not through
interactions.
Failings of the final process analyses
Do either CQ or Salmon2 fulfil our basic desideratum? We think not.
Our first point, contra CQ but less so against Salmon2, is that a conserved
quantity analysis ought not be scale invariant as Dowe suggests. The argument
is along similar lines to our critique of the scale invariance of Salmonl.
How does an everyday, common-sense object come to possess charge?
Charge is not (as far as we understand in our current scientific theories, which
Dowe claims we are supposed to derive the notion from) a primitive or
emergent property of common-sense objects. For example, we find that
common-sense objects possess charge by virtue of being partly composed of
charged particles such as ions. The ions possess a charge by virtue of being
composed of unequal numbers of singly negatively charged particles (electrons)
and singly positively charged particles (protons).246 The electrons appear to
possess charge as a primitive property. The protons possess charge by virtue of
being composed of a multitude of fractionally charged quarks (the sum of these
charges being equal to a charge of +1). The quarks appear to possess charge as a
primitive property.
245 "Causality and explanation: a reply to two critiques", p462 and p468
246 Some other charged particles may contribute to the overall charge of the ion, but the same
considerations applicable to protons and electrons will also apply to these particles.
149
So if possession or transmission of a conserved quantity by an object is the
mark of a causal process,'and.common-sense objects do not possess conserved
quantities in their own right but rather by virtue of being composed of
quantum-scale entities possessing those quantities, it follows that common-
sense objects should not be treated as processes in their own right, but rather as
complex networks of quantum-scale processes.
As we indicated in the previous chapter, Salmon is much more sympathetic
to the view that "common sense" processes are actually networks of distinct but
connected processes,247 although his concern seems to be based on the
requirement in Salmon2 that processes only extend from interaction to
interaction, and common-sense processes are certainly involved in a great many
internal and external interactions. As we noted, Salmon thinks there is a case
for considering common sense objects "as if" they were processes in their our
right: the pragmatic considerations governing explanation in some contexts
make it considerably easier to conduct practical investigations of the world if
we treat common sense processes as if they were single processes. But this
defence won't do. As per Salmonl, Salmon2 is supposed to give an objective
physical basis to a theory of scientific explanation. If the objective structures
appealed to tum out to be artifacts of explanatory practice, then the theory of
explanation is circular. At any rate, ease of explanatory practise ought not
govern the physical scale at which processes exist. Ease of application of the
process application is an epistemological issue separate from the ontological
issue of the scale at which processes genuinely exist.
Secondly, we question whether the move to associate causation with
conserved quantities constitutes any improvement over the association of
causal dependence with quantities of energy/momentum of an Aronson-Fair
analysis which respects the Heathcote conjecture. Indeed, we think the role of
conserved quantities is misconceived in the conserved quantity analyses.
Dowe's argument that CQ is more generally applicable than a transference
analysis because some examples of causation can be more practically identified
by reference to conserved quantities such as charge rather than
energy/momentum constitutes another confusion of the epistemology of
causation with the ontology of causation. The point of moving to a process
247 "Causality and explanation: a reply to two critiques", p464
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analysis from an Aronson-Fair analysis is that the Aronson-Fair analysis fails to
provide a satisfactory ontological account of processes. So the conserved
quantity theory is supposed to be an ontological improvement. Similarly, what
would amount to a satisfactory improvement of generality of application over
the Aronson-Fair analysis is an increase in ontological applicability. To whit:
certain processes which are not causal by virtue of possessing or transmitting
energy/momentum but which ought to be causal processes would be causal by
virtue of possessing or transmitting some other conserved quantity, and certain
intersections of processes which are not causal by virtue of involving an
exchange of energy/momentum but ought to be causal are causal by virtue of
involving an exchange of some other conserved quantity.
In fact, we find that ontological generality speaks in favour of limiting our
attention to energy/momentum. All quantum-scale entities which possess
some other conserved quantity (for example, electric charge) also possess
energy/momentum. But not all quantum-scale entities which possess
energy/momentum possess charge. The proton, the W bosons, the ZO and the
neutrino all possess energy/momentum. The proton and the W bosons are
charged, and the ZO and the neutrino are not charged.
Similarly, all causal interactions under CQ and Salmon2 which involve the
exchange of the other conserved quantities also involve energy/momentum
exchanges, but few (if any) of the other conserved quantities are always
involved in causal interactions.
With respect to electric charge, consider the scattering of an electron from a
neutrino (an instance of the weak interaction), which takes place by virtue of
exchange of a virtual ZO between the electron and the neutrino ("exchange"
being used in the sense of the transference analysis, or the sense used in
quantum physics, that of the electron and the neutrino being connected by the
virtual ZO).248 This involves two causal interactions under Salmon2 or CQ, one
located at the coupling of the electron with the ZO and one at the coupling of the
neutrino with the ZOe A change in value of charge takes place at the coupling of
the ZO and the electron (since the electron has charge -1 and the ZO has no
charge). Yet no such change in value of charge occurs at the coupling of the ZO
and the neutrino (since neither the ZO nor the neutrino have any charge). But
248 Story of the Wand Z, p49
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changes in the value of energy/momentum possessed by each particle occur at
each coupling.
So the move to associate causation with possession or transmission of
conserved quantities in general, or with changes in value of conserved
quantities in general constitutes no advance in ontological generality from an
analysis which just focuses on energy/ momentum. This suggests that
conserved quantities should play some other role in an analysis of causal
dependence (or perhaps in some other part of an account of physical
dependence). We suspect that they are most at home in an account of
propensities.
Some fundamental physical interactions occur in this universe, some do not.
Protons interact with electrons via the electromagnetic interaction, but electrons
do no interact with neutrinos via the electromagnetic interaction. But electrons
do interact with neutrinos via the weak interaction. Is this just a de facto
happenstance? Just an incidental fact about which couplings of particles have
occurred up to now? No, it seems that the physical interactions that quantum-
scale entities can be involved in are governed by the possession of particular
conserved quantities, such as charge. The proton and the electron both possess
electrical charge, so they can be connected by an exchange (in the physicists'
sense) of a virtual photon. By virtue of possessing charge, the particles have a
non-zero propensity to be subject to the electromagnetic interaction. The neutrino
does not possess electrical charge, so it is never connected to a charged particle
by exchange of a photon. By virtue of not possessing electrical charge, neutrinos
have a propensity of zero to be subject to the electromagnetic interaction. But
neutrinos possess other conserved quantities, such as weak hypercharge.
Electrons also possess weak hypercharge. So electrons can be connected to
neutrinos by the exchange of a virtual ZOe By virtue of possessing weak
hypercharge, the particles have a non-zero propensity to be subject to the weak
interaction.
This alternative account of the role of conserved quantities other than
energy/momenta in physical interactions and physical dependence can't be
considered to be completely satisfactory as stated. Consider once again the
example of "virtual pair production". A individual photon can briefly form a
virtual electron-positron pair, which then re-coalesces into a photon. This is an
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instance of the electromagnetic interaction, so the photon must have a
propensity to be subject to the electromagnetic interaction. Yet photons do not
possess electrical charge. 249 Yet our account seems to be on a better track than
CQ or Salmon2. In the final analysis, if conserved quantities such as charge turn
out to have anything to do with causal dependence, it seems much more likely
that they should form part of the analysis of causal propensities, rather than
causal production or propagation.
Thirdly, CQ and Salmon2 follow Salmon1 in loc.ating causal interactions at
couplings of processes. As can be noted from our preceding discussion of the
role of conserved quantities in the process analysis, this creates a significant
tension between our best accounts of physical interaction and the account of
causal interaction. Physical interaction is normally associated with the presence
of a connecting virtual quanta. But causal interaction is associated with the
couplings between quanta. We saw that this identification with couplings in
Salmon1 hinged on an unsatisfactory interpretation of "information". The
identification in CQ and Salmon2 hinges on an unsatisfactory interpretation of
"exchange".
Salmon and Dowe can't mean exchange in many ordinary senses of the
word. Suppose David and Ed go out for a walk in the rain. They grumble about
their respective umbrellas, and decide to swap. So they exchange umbrellas. Ed
then walks along with David's umbrella, and David has Ed's. This type of
exchange can not be being invoked in, for example, beta decay. Here a neutron
emits a virtual W- and transmutes into a proton (one exchange of the conserved
quantity, electric charge). The virtual W- then decays into an electron and an
antineutrino (the second exchange of charge). Salmon and Dowe can't be
249 The other conserved quantities such as charge will also playa role in determining the
number of "incoming" or "outgoing" processes at couplings. Because charge is conserved a
real photon (with zero charge) has a non-zero propensity to convert into a virtual electron-
positron pair (since the respective charges of the pair, -1 and +1, sum to zero) but a zero
propensity to convert into a single electron or a single positron. Energy/momentum can
also play some similar role in the analysis of causal propensities. In the case of the
annihilation of a real electron-positron pair, the non-zero propensity that either two or three
photons are formed and the zero propensity that one photon is formed is a consequence of
the conservation of energy/momentum (but this set of propensities do not hold in the case
of virtual electron/positron annihilation).
A propensity for a particular interaction to occur or not occur can also be generated by
possession of a complex set of conserved quantities. A good example is the non-occurrence
of weak neutral current decays of "strange" particles such as the KG. (See Story of the Wand
2, pp48-51 for a good discussion)
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literally saying that the electron now has the W-'s charge. Otherwise they
would be falling into the same trap as Aronson and supposing quantitative
properties can be genidentical. Indeed, Dowe doesn't want to say this, and
argues:
The CQ theory is also noncommittal on the question of genidentity of physical
quantities. The CQ theory simply requires that there is an exchange of some
conserved quantity, where exchange is to be understood in terms of a change in the
value of a quantity. The only sense of "identity" involved here is numerical
equality.250
The sense of "exchange" appealed to is simply that a kind of cosmic
bookkeeping standard is obeyed at the spatiotemporal intersections. The
amount of the relevant conserved quantity possessed or transmitted by the
"incoming" processes must be numerically equal to that of the "outgoing"
processes, but a least one value of a conserved quantity possessed or
transmitted by a process on each side must change.251
If that is the case, then we ought to find that the overall energy/momentum
value - the quantity most generally ontologically associated with causal
interactions - ought to be numerically equal on each side of a coupling. But
this is not what our advanced understanding of physical interaction tells us. As
we discussed earlier in the context of the transference analysis, production of
virtual quanta is associated with violations of the conservation of
energy/momentum. So the values aren't going to equal out across the
couplings. Something is desperately wrong with the identification of causal
interactions with "exchanges" in the CQ and Salmon2 sense at couplings at the
quantum physical scale.
It could be argued that these problems don't arise at quantum-scale
couplings that only involve real processes. But as we saw in our earlier
discussion of Compton scattering and matter-antimatter annihilation, it can be
surprisingly difficult to find an example of such a coupling which can not be
interpreted as involving virtual quanta in some way, which would
250 "What's right and what's wrong with transference theories", pp372-3
251 The "change" is important: it distinguishes causal interactions from mere spatiotemporal
intersections of processes (for example, a neutrino meeting a photon). In these latter cases
the relevant quantities are conserved on each side of the intersection, but no changes in
values of quantities occur.
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automatically involve a brief violation of the conservation of
energy/ momentum.
Since the signal, most general feature associated with physical interactions is
the violation of the conservation of energy/ momentum associated with the
existence of virtual quanta, we think it is advisable that causal interactions
should be associated with the physicists' notion of exchange at the quantum
scale - being connected by an intervening virtual quanta. By identifying
interactions with the entire virtual quanta, not just the couplings, we are
claiming that causal interactions are not a basic causal mechanism distinct from
causal processes, but rather are a species of causal process.
This might seem to vitiate both CQ and Salmon2, but the analyses can be
modified to deal with this reinterpretation of causal interactions very easily.
The common ground of the analyses, definition I, is converted into a definition
of couplings:
(1) A coupling is an intersection of world lines which involves a violation of the
conservation of energy/momentum.
CQ's definition 2 could remain in its present form, although our earlier
arguments suggest that "conserved quantity" should probably be replaced by
"energy/momentum". The apparent contradiction of suggesting in definition 2
that energy/momentum is conserved but also suggesting in definition 1 that
this conservation is violated can be avoided by following Dieks and Dowe in
noting that energy/momentum is globally conserved. Before and after a
physical interaction (before the creation and after the annihilation of virtual
quanta), the value of this quantity remains the same.252 During an interaction
(while the virtual quanta are in existence) the conservation of
energy/momentum is locally violated.
Salmon2's definition 2 could remain in its present form. Definition 3 could be
modified as follows:
(3) A process transmits a conserved quantity between A and B (A:I=B) if and only if
it possesses a fixed amount of this quantity at A and at B and at every stage of
252 "Physics and the direction of causation, p88; "What's right and what's wrong with
transference theories", pp370-1
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the process between A and B without any couplings in the open interval (A,B)
that involve a violation of the conservation of energy/momentum.
The same caveat that applies to CQ's used of "conserved quantity" in definition
2 would apply to definitions 2 and 3 of Salmon2.253
We don't think anything has been lost by our reinterpretation of causal
interactions as a species of causal processes - in fact, something has been
gained. If the quantum physical scale is the only physical scale at which
processes could be claimed to really exist, then the process analysis now reflects
the blurring of the boundaries between substances and interactions described
by our best current theories of fundamental physics.
If causal interactions are a species of causal process, then the challenges for
the conserved quantity analyses resolve to the challenge of providing an
adequate account of causal processes. Unfortunately, our fourth objection to the
conserved quantity analyses is that they do not provide such an account.
Are there any grounds for preferring the account of processes of CQ over
Salmon2 or vice versa? Dowe thinks CQ has the advantage, and provides a series
of justifications in "Causality and conserved quantities: a reply to Salmon".254
We think Dowe's most damaging objection to the Salmon2 account relates to
the requirement of the at-at theory that processes are spatiotemporally
continuous. Dowe does not wish to rule out a priori the possibility of
discontinuous processes.255
At the quantum physical scale, Dowe's objection seems to be well-founded.
Consider the absorption and emission of light by an atom. An electron in the
"ground state" (lowest energy) orbital around the atom absorbs a photon, and
discontinuously jumps to a higher-energy orbital. The electron then emits a
photon and discontinuously jumps to a lower-energy orbital. Given that there is
253 This alteration means that a corollary Salmon proposes to his definitions of causation no
longer holds. The corollary - "When two or more processes possessing a given conserved
quantity intersect (whether they interact or not), the amount of that quantity in the region
of intersection must equal must equal the sum of the separate quantities possessed by the
processes thus intersecting" (Causality and explanation: a reply to two critiques", p473) -
is simply false if the relevant intersection is a coupling, since energy/momentum is not
locally conserved (conserved on each side of a coupling).
254 "Causality and conserved quantities: a reply to Salmon", pp325-33
255 "Causality and conserved quantities: a reply to Salmon", p332
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a spatiotemporal gap between the electron's being in the different orbitals in
each case, Salmon2 can not treat the motion of the electron as involving the
transmission of causal influence. So the absorption of the first photon would
not be a cause of the emission of the second photon, even though the electron
could not have emitted without being moved to a higher level orbital (since an
electron will only emit a photon if it jumps to a lower-energy orbital, and the
ground state is the lowest-energy orbital). CQ can treat the absorption as a
cause of the emission so long as the electron which emits the photon is
genidentical with the electron which absorbs the photon.
But, of course, while this is a problem for the Salmon2 account of processes, it
is a catastrophe for the CQ account. As we discussed in our investigation of the
transference analysis, it is nonsense to speak of quantitative properties of
quantum-scale objects being genidentical. But it is also the case that genidentity
fails for quantum-scale objects. If relations of genidentity did apply at the
quantum scale, the universe would be observably different to the way we
observe it to be. So the electron that emits the photon can not be one and the same
electron as the electron that absorbs the photon.
This result generalises. As we have argued, the only scale at which processes
really exist under a conserved quantity analysis is the quantum scale. The CQ
criterion for being a causal process is based on a genidentity relation between
objects. We can observe that genidentity fails at the quantum scale in this
universe. So there are no real causal processes in this universe. Since causal
interactions are a species of causal processes, there are no causal interactions in
this universe. SO CQ fails to fulfil our basic desideratum, because under CQ
there is no such thing as causal dependence in this universe.
Salmon2 is not quite so badly off. No genidentity relation is required by the
at-at theory to account for transmission of causal influence by quantum-scale
entities. For example, the claim that an electron transmits energy/momentum
from one object to another does not presuppose the claim that one-and-the-
same electron takes energy from one object and delivers energy to another
object. Rather roughly speaking, all that is required is that at every point of a
spatiotemporal trajectory between the two objects there is electron with such-
and-such energy/momentum. This is in reasonable accordance with the
practise in physics of defining a IIcurrent" of elementary particles: a rate of
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change of density of some particles (or property of particles) across a set of
spatiotemporal points.
Yet there are still problems with the Salmon2 conception of processes.
Throughout the development of Salmonl and Salmon2, we have been lead to
understand processes in terms of macroscopic, significantly spatiotemporally
extended objects, such as billiard balls or Frank. We understand interactions in
terms of macroscopic phenomena such as collisions. When we examine the
analyses closely, we conclude that these things aren't really "processes" or
"interactions" - it is merely convenient for explanatory purposes to treat them
as if they were processes and interactions. Actual processes and interactions
would exist down at the quantum scale. We look down at the quantum scale
and determine that interactions are best not treated as being specially different
causal mechanisms from processes. So our justification for treating collisions as
if they were actual interactions has disappeared. Collisions and other
macroscopic "interactions" are nothing like actual interactions. So can we
justifiably claim that macroscopic "processes" are anything like actual
processes? That would seem to depend on whether there are any significantly
spatiotemporally extended processes at the quantum scale.
Salmon claims there are such processes:
Lest anyone believe that I have completely lost contact with physical reality in
discussing extended causal processes without causal interactions, it should be noted
that the mean free path of photons in intergalactic space is estimated in terms of very
large numbers of light years. Such photons are causal processes, and the mean free
path is the average distance between causal interactions with other processes.256
But this won't do. Consider first an electron moving aimlessly through
intergalactic space. This does not form a single extended process. As we noted
earlier, electrons constantly emit and reabsorb virtual photons ("self
interaction"). Under Salmon2, every coupling with a virtual photon will
produce a new electron process. So we can only treat the electron as if it was a
single significantly spatiotemporally extended process.
The same can be said of the photon moving through intergalactic space. Real
photons continually convert into virtual electron-positron pairs which
256 "Causality and explanation: a reply to two critiques", p464
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reconvert into single real photons. Every such conversion involves a coupling.
so every such conversion involves the creation of a new process under Salmon2.
So we can only treat Salmon's intergalactic photo!ls as if they are single
significantly spatiotemporally extended processes.
So are any "actual" processes significantly spatiotemporally extended?
Perhaps neutrinos might fit the bill. But this is by virtue of neutrinos being the
least physically active of the known quantum entities, and the least likely to be
involved in relations of physical dependence. There is something decidedly odd
about treating significantly spatiotemporally extended macroscopic entities "as
if" they are actual processes when the only"actual" processes they are anything
like are our paradigm examples of entities which do not stand in relations of
physical dependence.
So there is a significant tension in Salmon2 between what the nature of
processes is supposed to be and the nature of the actual causal mechanisms. Not
just "common sense" processes are explanatory artifacts; all processes are
explanatory artifacts. Given that Salmon2 is based on the notion of a causal
process, it appears that causal dependence in Salmon2 resolves to explanatory
dependence. So Salmon2 does not fulfil our basic desideratum - it does not
give an account of the cement of the universe, it gives an account of the cement
of our explanatory structures. To put it another way, causal dependence does
not track physical dependence, it tracks explanatory dependence.257
Could we escape this result by ditching the problematic notion of
"p~ocesses"?Perhaps it is best to refer instead to something like a "current".
Our picture of the causal structure of the world then becomes a complex
network of coupled currents of quantum-scale real and virtual entities, where
couplings occur because particular properties of some currents give those
currents a non-zero propensity to couple with other currents. But this is no
longer an analysis of causal dependence. It is a very brief, non-mathematical
statement of our best theories of physical dependence.
We have fought our way to an analogue of Quine's criticism of the
transference analysis: ifwe must talk of causation, best to talk of it in terms of
257 In which case, SalmonZ does not fulfil Salmon's basic desideratum either. The process
analysis is supposed to provide an objective, physical basis for scientific explanation. If
processes are explanatory structures, Salmon's project is just circular.
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energy transfers; but in the final analysis it is better to just talk of energy
transfers. It seems that ifwe must talk of causal dependence, best to talk of it in
terms of the processes of the conserved quantity analyses. But in the final
analysis it is best to just talk of physical dependence.258
So we conclude that the conserved quantity analyses fail to fulfil our basic
desideratum, that causal dependence should track physical dependence in this
universe. Under our best understanding of CQ, we can observe that there are
no actual causal processes in this universe, so there is no causal dependence in
this universe. Under our best understanding of Salmon2 either causal
dependence does not track physical dependence but instead tracks explanatory
dependence or Salmon2 is not an analysis of causal dependence, but merely a
brief, non-mathematical restatement of our best theoretical understanding of
physical dependence.
258 And if Salmon2 is just a brief summary of our best theories of physical dependence,
Salmon2 still doesn't fulfil Salmon's basic desideratum. The point of a theory of scientific
explanation is to justify our best theories of physical dependence. If the basis of the theory
of explanation is a brief statement of our best theories of physical dependence, then
Salmon's project is still just circular.
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Conclusion
We were looking for an analysis of causation in which causal dependence
tracks physical·dependence. None of the analyses we investigated fulfilled this
basic desideratum.
We began by investigating a basic version of the current "orthodox" analysis
of causation, the Lewis-style counterfactual analysis. The strange case of the
overdetermining dumbbell shows that Lewis-style analyses do not track
physical dependence. Rather, the analyses are sensitive to common-sense
individuation of objects within events. The case of the bonking of Frank shows
that if we try to solve this problem by keying object individuation to physical
dependence, the "sophisticated" analysis produced is even less successful at
fulfilling our basic desideratum than the "naive" analysis.
We turned our attention to the modern transference analysis of causation
developed by Aronson, Fair and Heathcote, and constructed a best possible
version of the analysis (an Aronson-Fair analysis which respects the Heathcote
conjecture). The case of the bouncing of Frank demonstrates that even this
version of the transference analysis fails to fulfil our basic desideratum, as the
analysis does not give an adequate account of causal connectivity. Attempting
to fix this flaw by asserting the genidentity of quantities of energy/momentum
also fails because relations of genidentity do not apply to quantitative
properties of objects, and genidentity fails when applied to·quantum-scale
objects (the scale at which energy/momentum exchanges actually take place in
this universe).
In order to try and solve the problem of causal connectivity, we turned our
attention to the process analyses of causation developed by Salmon and Dowe.
We began with a semi-historical exposition of the development of Salmon1.
Salmon1 fails due to its reliance on an unsatisfactory notion of information
transfer and transmission, and the lack of a satisfactory account of causal
interactions. Indeed, the mature form of Salmon1 either resolves to a
"sophisticated" Lewis-style counterfactual analysis or is at least subject to the
same problems with fulfilling our basic desideratum as the "sophisticated"
Lewis-style analysis.
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We finally looked briefly at the two "conserved quantity" process analyses,
CQ and Salmon2. Applying a number of our earlier results to these analyses
shows that these analyses also fail to fulfil our basic desideratum. Scale
invariance fails for these analyses. So the only"actual" processes under these
analyses exist at the quantum scale. SO CQ fails because processes are defined
by a genidentity relations across objects and genidentity fails at the quantum
scale. The best reading of Salmon2 fails because either causal dependence under
Salmon2 tracks explanatory dependence rather than physical dependence or
Salmon2 is not an analysis of causal dependence but merely a brief non-
mathematical restatement of our best theoretical understanding of physical
dependence.
So none of the analyses we have investigated fulfil our basic desideratum.
Should we therefore embrace the Russell-Quine thesis, and call for the
extirpation of causal talk from philosophical discourse?
Hardly. Our results only speak against analyses of causation in which causal
dependence is supposed to track physical dependence. An analysis which
explicitly does not seek to fulfil our desideratum, such' as the manipulability
analysis, is completely immune to our objections. Nor have we shown that every
possible counterfactual, transference or process analysis fails to fulfil our
desideratum. Lewis-style analyses are not the only counterfactual analyses of
causation in town. Perhaps a satisfactory solution to the quantum measurement
problem may be developed, in which case an Aronson-Fair analysis which
respects the Heathcote conjecture might just be able to avoid the causal
connectivity problem. A satisfactory account of processes might rehabilitate the
process analysis. Or some completely different approach to an analysis of
causation might do the trick.
But our results are still of some concern. The requirement that causal
dependence tracks physical dependence seems so innocent, yet we have
demonstrated that it is very hard for an analysis to fulfil this requirement. The
casual contemporary practise of invoking causal dependence in philosophical
theories as ifcausal dependence tracked physical dependence has to be called
into question.
The following programme in the spirit of the Russell-Quine thesis suggests
itself to us, and so we suggest it to philosophers in general. When a
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philosophical theory invokes causal dependence and assumes that causal
dependence tracks physical dependence, ask yourselves two questions. Is an
account of physical dependence all that is required for the theory to work? If so,
replace all mention of causal dependence with the best appropriate accounts of
physical dependence. Does the theory rely on features of a particular analysis of
causation in order to work? If so, establish that causal dependence tracks
physical dependence under that analysis. If neither project can be successfully
carried out, commit the theory to the flames for it can contain nothing but
sophistry and illusion.
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